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Abstract
In this paper, we review three years of development and improvements on COPACOBANA,
the probably most popular, reconﬁgurable cluster system dedicated to the task of cryptanal-
ysis. Latest changes on the architecture involve modiﬁcations for larger and more powerful
FPGA devices with dedicated 32 MB of external RAM and point-to-point communication
links for improved data throughput. We outline how advanced cryptanalytic applications,
such as Time-Memory Tradeoﬀ (TMTO) attacks or attacks on asymmetric cryptosystems,
can beneﬁt from these new architectural improvements.
1 Introduction
The security of symmetric and asymmetric ciphers is usually determined by the size of their
security parameters, in particular the key-length. Hence, when designing a cryptosystem, these
parameters need to be chosen according to the assumed computational capabilities of an at-
tacker. Depending on the chosen security margin, many cryptosystems are potentially vulner-
able to attacks when the attacker’s computational power increases unexpectedly. In real life,
the limiting factor of an attacker is often the ﬁnancial resources. Thus, it is quite crucial from
a cryptographic point of view to not only investigate the complexity of an attack, but also
to study possibilities to lower the cost-performance ratio of attack hardware. For instance, a
cost-performance improvement of an attack machine by a factor of 1000 eﬀectively reduces the
key lengths of a symmetric cipher by roughly 10 bit (since 1000 ≈ 210). Many cryptanalytical
schemes spend their computations in independent operations, which allows for a high degree
of parallelism. Such parallel functionality can be realized by individual hardware blocks that
operate simultaneously, improving the running time of the overall computation by a perfect
linear factor. At this point, it should be remarked that the high non-recurring engineering costs
for ASICs have put most projects for building special-purpose hardware for cryptanalysis out
of reach for commercial or research institutions. However, with the recent advent of low-cost
programmable ICs which host vast amounts of logic resources, special-purpose cryptanalytical
machines have now become a possibility outside government agencies.
In this work we review the evolution of a special-purpose hardware system which provides a
cost-performance that can be signiﬁcantly better than that of recent PCs (e.g., for the exhaustive
key search on DES). The hardware architecture of this Cost-Optimized Parallel Code Breaker
(COPACOBANA) was initially introduced on the SHARCS and CHES workshops in 2006 [24,
25]. In this contribution we will describe further research on cryptanalytical applications overG uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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the last three years and ongoing improvements on the hardware to cope with new requirements
of these advanced applications.
The original prototype of the COPACOBANA cluster consists of up to 120 FPGA nodes
which are connected by a shared bus providing an aggregate bandwidth of 1.6 Gbps on the
backplane of the machine. COPACOBANA is not equipped with dedicated memory modules,
but oﬀers a limited number of RAM blocks inside each FPGA. Furthermore, COPACOBANA
is connected to a host PC with a single interface to control all operations and provide a little
amount of I/O data.
In the following sections, we present cryptanalytic case studies for a large variety of attacks
which all make use of the COPACOBANA cluster system. Examples for these case studies
include exhaustive key search attacks on the Data Encryption Standard (DES) blockcipher and
related systems (e.g., Norton Diskreet), the electronic passport as well as the GSM mobile phone
encryption based on the A5/1 streamcipher. More advanced attacks with COPACOBANA com-
prise implementations for integer factorization (with the Elliptic Curve Method), computations
on elliptic curve discrete logarithms and Time-Memory Tradeoﬀs (TMTO). We brieﬂy review
attack implementations and compile a list of improvements on hardware level that can lead to
improved performance. Finally, we present a modiﬁed cluster architecture which addresses most
of the determined issues and promises excellent performance results for the next generation of
cryptanalytic applications.
The paper is structured as follows: we begin with a brief review of the original COPA-
COBANA architecture and a list of case studies on cryptanalytic attacks in Section 3. Next, we
present the modiﬁed cluster architecture with improvements based on our ﬁndings in the previ-
ous section. We conclude with an outlook on future cryptanalysis based on COPACOBANA.
2 Architecture of COPACOBANA
Our ﬁrst prototype of an Cost-Optimized Parallel Code Breaker (COPACOBANA) was pro-
duced for less than B C 10,000 (material and manufacturing costs only). It was primarily designed
for applications and simple cryptanalytic attacks with high compuational complexity but mini-
mal requirements on communications and local memory. In addition to that, it assumes that the
computationally expensive operations are inherently parallelizable, i.e., single parallel instances
do not need to communicate with each other. The design for limited communication bandwidth
was driven by the fact that the computation phase heavily outweighs the data input and output
phases. In fact, COPACOBANA was designed for applications in which processes are comput-
ing most of the time, without any input or output. Communication was assumed to be almost
exclusively used for initialization and reporting of results. A central control instance for the
communication can easily be accomplished by a conventional (low-cost) PC, connected to the
FPGAs on the cluster by a simple interface. Furthermore, simple brute-force attacks typically
demand for very little memory so that we considered the available memory on low-cost FPGAs
(such as the Xilinx Spartan-3 devices) to be suﬃcient.
Recapitulating, COPACOBANA consists of many independent low-cost FPGAs, connected
to a host-PC via a standard interface, e.g., USB or Ethernet. The beneﬁt of such a standard
interface is the easy scalability and to attach more than one COPACOBANA device to a single
host-PC. Note that the initialization, control of FPGAs, and the accumulation of results is done
by the host. All time-critical computations such as the cryptanalytical core tasks are performedThree Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
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Figure 1: Architecture of COPACOBANA
on the FPGAs. The ﬁrst prototype of COPACOBANA was equipped with up to 120 FPGAs,
distributed along 20 slots - in FPGA modules which can be plugged into a single backplane. Note
that the choice for 120 FPGAs was driven by the form factor of the FPGA module which was
designed according to cheap and standardized DIMM interface speciﬁcations. One (single-sided)
DIMM-sized FPGA module can host 6 FPGA devices in a 17 × 17 mm package, such as the
Xilinx Spartan3-1000 FPGA (XC3S1000, speed grade -4, FT256 packaging). This device comes
with 1 million system gates, 17280 equivalent logic cells, 1920 Conﬁgurable Logic Blocks (CLBs)
equivalent to 7680 slices, 120 Kbit Distributed RAM (DRAM), 432 Kbit Block RAM (BRAM),
and 4 digital clock managers (DCMs) [40]. The backplane of COPACOBANA connects all
FPGA devices with a shared 64-bit data and 16-bit address bus. The entire cluster system is
depicted in Figure 1.
COPACOBANA was designed for single master bus arbitration for simpliﬁed control. How-
ever, in case the communication scheduling of an application is not predictable, the bus master is
required to poll all FPGAs for new events and returned data. This signiﬁcantly slows down the
communication performance and increases latencies when reading data back from the FPGAs.
Data transfer from and to the FPGAs is accomplished by a dedicated control unit. Originally,
we decided to pick a small development board with an FPGA (CESYS USB2FPGA [6]) in favor
of a ﬂexible design. The board provides an easy-pluggable 96-pin connector which we use for
the connection to the backplane. In later versions of COPACOBANA, we replaced the USB
controller using an TCP/IP-based unit so that COPACOBANA can be controlled remotely and
can be placed externally, for example in a server room.
3 Cryptanalytic Applications for COPACOBANA
In this section, we brieﬂy describe cryptanalytic applications which we have already implemented
on our initial release of the COPACOBANA cluster system. We compiled the most importantG uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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facts and key points of each application into individual case studies which eventually should
help to identify shortcomings and potential enhancements of our cluster architecture.
3.1 Exhaustive Key Search Scenarios
In the following sections, we present a short survey about our work on exhaustive key search
and guessing attacks on a variety of real-world systems. Since all these applications consist
mostly out of very basic tasks that can be eﬃciently parallelized on completely independent
computational cores, they can be perfectly mapped onto a highly parallel cluster system such
as COPACOBANA.
3.1.1 Case-Study I: Breaking DES with Exhaustive Search
Our ﬁrst cryptanalytic target application was the exhaustive key search on the DES block cipher.
We implemented a known-plaintext attack and used an improved version of the DES engine of
the Universit´ e Catholique de Louvain’s Crypto Group [36] as a core component. Inside a single
FPGA, we could place four of such DES engines which allows for sharing plaintext-ciphertext
input pairs and the key space. Our ﬁrst implementation and successful attack was presented
in [25]. Since this original publication, we were able to improve the system performance by use
of additional pipelined comparators and simpliﬁed control logic. Now, we are able to operate
each of the FPGAs at an increased clock rate of 136 MHz with a overall gain in performance
by 36%, compared to [25]. Consequently, 242 keys can be checked in 240 × 7.35ns by a single
FPGA, which is approximately 135 minutes. Since COPACOBANA hosts 120 of these low-cost
FPGAs, the entire system can check 4 × 120 = 480 keys every 7.35ns, i.e., 65.28 billion keys
per second. To ﬁnd the correct key, COPACOBANA has to search through an average of 255
diﬀerent keys. Thus, it can ﬁnd the right key in approximately T = 6.4 days on average. By
increasing the number n of COPACOBANAs used for this task, we can further decrease this
average runtime of the attack by a linear factor 1/n.
3.1.2 Case-Study II: Cracking Norton Diskreet
In the 1990s, Norton Diskreet, a part of the well-known Norton Utilities package, was a very
popular encryption tool. Diskreet can be used to encrypt single ﬁles as well as to create and
manage encrypted virtual disks. The tool provides two encryption algorithms one can choose
from, a (cryptographically weak) proprietary algorithm and the DES in cipher block chaining
(CBC) mode. To encrypt a ﬁle or virtual disk, Diskreet asks for a password with a minimal
length of 6 and a maximal length of 40 bytes. From this password the 56-bit DES-key is
generated. The password-to-key mapping works as follows: First, leading whitespace characters
are removed before the password is converted to uppercase characters which are divided into
chunks of 8 bytes. Then, all 8-byte blocks are subsequently XORed with each other and the
resulting sum is used as DES-key. Obviously, this method of key generation is unfavorable since
the password-to-key mapping is not chaotic at all. As explained more thoroughly in [13], we
can modify the key generator to our implementation (cf. Section 3.1.1) so that it generates only
a limited set of keys according the password distribution based on diﬀerent assumptions. The
performance of the attack with a single COPACOBANA is shown in Table 1.Three Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
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Key space Remark DES decryptions Runtime
(on average)
{A,...,Z,@,[,\,],, } Known pwd length 231 32.8  s
{A,...,Z,@,[,\,],, } Unknown pwd length 235 0.53 s
7-bit ASCII 8 Characters 247 35.9 m
8-bit ASCII 8 Characters 255 6.39 d
Table 1: Breaking Norton Diskreet with COPACOBANA
3.1.3 Case-Study III: Hacking the ePassport
The electronic passport (ePass), as speciﬁed by the international civil aviation organization
(ICAO), is deployed in many countries all over the world. The security and privacy threats have
been widely discussed (e.g., [20], [22], [17], [19]). A chip embedded in the machine readable travel
document (MRTD) contains private data as text, such as name, date of birth and sex, as well
as biometrics [29]. A digital facial photograph and in some countries additionally ﬁngerprints
or an iris scan of the passport holder can be accessed via a contactless interface based on the
ISO 14443 [18] standard. The wireless communication constitutes new opportunities for attack-
ers, such as relay attacks [21] or eavesdropping from a range of several meters, as investigated
in [14], [35] and [9]. To prevent unauthorized access to the information transferred via the radio
frequency (RF) interface some countries, among them Germany and the Netherlands, employ
the so-called basic access control (BAC). The BAC is meant to secure the interchanged data,
i.e., establish a conﬁdential channel, by employing symmetric cryptography. The secret keys
needed for carrying out the BAC are stored in the embedded integrated circuit (IC) and can
also be derived from a machine readable zone (MRZ) that is printed on the paper document.
We here shortly sketch a possible attack on the BAC using COPACOBANA which is adapted
from [4] and more thoroughly described in [27, 13]. We assume that a device for eavesdropping
of the RF ﬁeld can be mounted nearby an e-passport inspection system, such that all bits
transmitted via the air channel can be captured and stored in a database. The fundamental
secret required to access the private data rely on an authentication key kMAC and an encryption
key kENC that are derived from the MRZ information on the paper document according to
ki = msb16 (SHA-1(msb16 (SHA-1(MRZ)) C)),
where the msb16(x) function selects the most signiﬁcant 16 byte of x. After the ﬁrst execution
of SHA-1[32], the result is concatenated with a constant C which is either C = 0x00000001 for
kENC or C = 0x00000002 for kMAC. The keys are then used with a Triple DES (TDES) block-
cipher [30]. Having access to system messages by eavesdropping the near-ﬁeld communications,
we can attack the combination of SHA-1 and TDES in a brute-force attack scenario (although
the theoretical keyspace available to TDES is out of reach for conventional exhaustive key search
attacks). This is possible since the entropy of the MRZ can be found to be as low as ≈ 233
for realistic scenarios based on the BAC realizations of the Netherlands and Germany [35, 27].
Hence, instead of performing an exhaustive search on every possible TDES key, we implemented
again a smart generator which only produces a limited set of outputs that are reasonable MRZ
values.
The time critical component in our attack implementation is the SHA-1 hash function,
determining the maximum clock frequency of fclk = 40MHz and requiring 80 clock cycles forG uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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one key candidate. Processing of one key thus requires 80 × 25ns= 2 s. As there are 120
FPGAs running in parallel, each consisting of four encryption engines, 4 × 120 = 480 keys are
tested every 2 s, resulting in a throughput of 227.84 ≈ 240 million keys per second. On average,
testing of 233 keys reveals the correct candidate in 232
227.84 ≈ 18seconds which can be regarded as
real-time, compared to the duration of one inspection at the border control.
3.1.4 Case-Study IV: Breaking the A5/1 Streamcipher
A5/1 is a synchronous stream cipher that is used for protecting GSM communication. In the
GSM protocol, the communication channel is organized in 114-bit frames that are encrypted by
XORing them with 114-bit blocks of the keystream produced by the cipher as follows: A5/1 is
based on three LFSRs, that are irregularly clocked. The three registers are 23, 22 and 19 bits
long, representing the internal 64-bit state of the cipher. During initialization, a 64-bit key k
is clocked in, followed by a 22-bit initialization vector that is derived from the publicly known
frame number. After that a warm-up phase is performed where the cipher is clocked 100 times
and the output is discarded. For a detailed description of A5/1 please refer to [3].
Most of previously proposed attacks against A5/1 lack from practicability and/or have never
been fully implemented. In contrast to these attacks, we present in [11] a real-world attack
revealing the internal state of A5/1 in about 6 hours on average (and about 12 hours in the worst-
case) using COPACOBANA. The implementation is an optimization of a guess-and-determine
attack as proposed in [23], including an improvement in runtime of about 13% compared to
their original approach. Each FPGA contains 23 guessing engines running in parallel at a
clock frequencey of 104 MHz each. To mount the attack, only 64 consecutive bits of a known
keystream are required and we do not need any precomputed data. Note, however, that an
average of 6 hours runtime still cannot be considered a real-time attack when using a single
COPACOBANA. In this case, we need to record the full communication ﬁrst and attack its
encryption oﬄine afterwards. Alternatively, by adding further machines the attack time will be
linearly reduced, e.g., 100 machines only require 3.6 minutes for a sucessfull attack on average.
3.2 Advanced Cryptanalytic Applications
In the last section, we brieﬂy surveyed simple attacks based on exhaustive key searches or guess-
ing. All these attacks have in common that their performance is basically limited by the number
of computations. In other words, the available logic of the FPGA devices on COPACOBANA
directly determines the performance of the attack. By incrementing the number of COPA-
COBANA units we yield a speed-up in performance by a perfect linear factor. This, however,
does not hold for the following, more advanced attacks.
3.2.1 Case-Study V: Time-Memory (Data) Tradeoﬀs
Time-Memory Tradeoﬀ (TMTO) and Time-Memory-Data Tradeoﬀ (TMDTO) methods were
designed as a compromise between the two well-known extreme approaches: either to perform
an exhaustive search on the entire key space of the cipher or precomputing exhaustive tables
representing all possible combinations of keys and ciphertexts for a given plaintext. The TMTO
and TMDTO strategies oﬀer a way to reasonably reduce the actual search complexity (by doing
some kind of precomputation) while keeping the amount of precomputed data reasonably low,
whereas “reasonably” has to be deﬁned more precisely. Roughly speaking, it depends on the
concrete attack scenario (e.g., real-time attack), the internal step function and the available
resources for the precomputation and online (search) phase.Three Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
7 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
Method DU PT (COPA) OT TA SR
[GB] [days] [ops]
Hellman 1897 24 240.2 240.2 0.80
Rivest 1690 95 221 239.7 0.80
Oechslin 1820 23 221.8 240.3 0.80
Table 2: TMTO methods according to: expected runtimes and memory requirements using
COPACOBANA for precomputations.
Existing TMTO methods by Hellman, Rivest and Oechslin [16, 7, 31] share the natural prop-
erty that in order to achieve a signiﬁcant success rate much precomputation eﬀort is required
on chained computations. A representation of start point and end point of each chain is stored
in (a set of) large tables, e.g., on hard disk drives. The actual attack takes place in a second
search phase (online phase) in which another chain computation is performed on the actual data
and compared to the stored endpoints in the tables. In case a matching endpoint is found in
the table, the sequence of keys can be reconstructed using the corresponding start point. There
are few contributions attacking DES with the TMTO approach. In [38] an FPGA design for an
attack on a 40-bit DES variant using Rivest’s TMTO method [7] was proposed. In [28] a hard-
ware architecture for UNIX password cracking based on Oechslin’s method [31] was presented.
However, to the best of our knowledge, a set of complete TMTO precomputation tables for full
56-bit DES was never created up to now.
The idea of cryptanalytic TMDTO is due to Babbage, Biryukov and Shamir [1, 2]. TMDTOs
are variants of TMTOs exploiting a scenario where multiple data points y1,...,yD of the function
g are given and one has just to be successful in ﬁnding a preimage of one of them. Such
a scenario typically arises in the cryptanalysis of stream ciphers where we like to invert the
function mapping the internal state (consisting of log2(N) bits) to the ﬁrst log2(N) output bits
of the cipher produced from this state. We employed this method to mount an advanced attack
on the A5/1 streamcipher which provides a runtime of far less than 6 hours (cf. Section 3.1.4),
at the cost of a reduced success probability.
In [13] we present possible conﬁgurations and parameters to use COPACOBANA for TM-
TO/TMDTO precomputations both to attack the DES blockcipher and the A5/1 streamcipher.
Our estimates took the assumed communication bandwidth between host-PC and backplane of
24 MBit/s into account. To break DES with TMTOs on COPACOBANA, Table 2 presents
our worst case expectations concerning success rate (SR), disk usage (DU), the duration of
the precomputation phase (PT) as well as the number of table accesses (TA) and calculations
(C) during the online phase (OT). Note that for this extrapolation, we have used again the
implementation of our exhaustive key search on DES (cf. Section 3.1.1).
For the implementation of the TMDTO attack on A5/1, we selected the set of parameters
presented in the second row of Table 3, since it produces a reasonable precomputation time
and a reasonable size of the tables as well as a relatively small number of table accesses. The
success rate of 63% may seem to be small, but it increases signiﬁcantly if more data samples are
available: For instance, if 4 frames of known keystream are available, then D = 4 51 = 204 and
thus the success rate is increased to 96%.
Although both attacks are realistic (precomputations of less than one and about 3 months
for DES and A5/1 respectively), we encountered several issues while running the attacks. OneG uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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m S d Iℓ PT DU OT TA SR
[days] [TB] [secs] [%]
241 215 5 [23,26] 337.5 7.49 27.8 221 0.86
240 214 5 [24,27] 95.4 4.85 10.9 220 0.63
239 215 5 [23,26] 84.4 3.48 27.8 221 0.60
237 215 6 [24,28] 47.7 0.79 73.5 221 0.42
Table 3: A5/1 TMDTO: Expected runtimes and memory requirements. The choice and expla-
nation for parameters are described thoroughly in [13]
problem is the access time to hard disk storage in the online phase which is not reﬂected in
the tables above and takes a considerable amount of time for itself (about 4-10 ms per access).
Moreover, the generation of precomputation tables is slower than expected with respect to
the communication link between host-PC and COPACOBANA backplane. It turned out that
the communication speed of 24 MBit/s must be considered as theoretical throughput limit
since additional data overhead and latencies need to be taken into account as well. In other
words, to support TMTO/TMDTO for required parameters, the communication facilities of
COPACOBANA need to be improved by at least one order of magnitude.
3.2.2 Case-Study VI: Integer Factorization
The factorization of a large composite integer n is a well-known mathematical problem which
has attracted special attention since the invention of public key cryptography. RSA is known as
the most popular asymmetric cryptosystem and was originally developed by Ronald Rivest, Adi
Shamir and Leonard Adleman in 1977 [34]. Since the security of RSA relies on the attacker’s
inability to factor large numbers, the development of a fast factorization method could allow for
cryptanalysis of RSA messages and signatures. Recently, the best known method for factoring
large RSA integers is the General Number-Field Sieve (GNFS). An important step in the GNFS
algorithm is the factorization of mid-sized numbers for smoothness testing. For this purpose,
the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM) has been proposed by Lenstra [26] which has been proved to
be suitable for parallel hardware architectures in [37, 10, 8], particularly on FPGAs.
The ECM algorithm performs a very high number of operations on a very small set of input
data, and is not demanding in terms of high communication bandwidth. Furthermore, the
implementation of the ﬁrst stage of ECM requires only little memory since it is based on point
multiplication on an elliptic curve. The operands required for supporting GNFS are well beyond
the width of current computer buses, arithmetic units, and registers, so that special purpose
hardware can provide a much better solution.
In [8] it has been shown that the utilization of DSP slices in Virtex-4 FPGAs for imple-
menting a Montgomery multiplication can signiﬁcantly improve the ECM performance. In that
work, the authors used a fully parallel multiplier implementation which provides the best known
performance ﬁgures for ECM phase 1 so far, however they did provide details how to realize
ECM phase 2.
To accelerate integer arithmetic using a similar strategy, we designed a new slot-in module
for use with a second release of COPACOBANA hosting 8 Xilinx Virtex-4 XC4VSX35 FPGAs,
each providing 192 DSP slices. Due to the larger physical package of the FPGAs (FF668 package
with dimension of 27x27 mm) we enlarged the modules. This included also modiﬁcations of theThree Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
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Aspect Our work Results [10]
Modular Adder/Subtracter 14 clk 31 clk1
Montgomery Multiplication 118 clk 167 clk1
Point Doubling 434 clk n/a
Point Addition 500 clk n/a
Combined Point Doubling and Addition 689 clk 947 clk1
Clock Frequency of an ECM Core 200 MHz 135 MHz
Table 4: Clock cycles and frequency for point multiplication of 151-bit numbers required in
phase 1 of ECM on Virtex-4 devices (single core)
corresponding connectors on the backplane. For more eﬃcient heat dissipation at high clock
frequencies up to 400MHz, an actively ventilated heat sink is attached to each FPGA. With a
more powerful power supply providing 1.5 kW at 12 V, we could run a total of 128 Virtex 4
SX35 FPGAs distributed over 16 plug-in modules.
In contrast to [8], we used a multi-core ECM design per FPGA. A single ECM engine
comprises of an arithmetic unit computing modular multiplication and additions, a point mul-
tiplication unit for phase 1 and ROM tables for phase 2. Only point operations on the elliptic
curve are performed on FPGAs, this means that the setup of the Montgomery curve needs to be
done on the host-PC and then transferred to the FPGAs. We provide ﬁrst estimates for ECM
phase 1 shown in Table 4 and compare our results to the implementation presented in [10].
Although the implementation based on DSP slices promise better results on Virtex-4 FPGAs
compared to [10], we like to point out that the switch to Virtex-4 SX35 devices has a strong
negative eﬀect on our cost-performance ratio. With respect to a Spartan-3 device, a single
Virtex-4 SX35 is much more expensive (roughly a factor of 10-20) and does not outperform
the cheaper Spartan-3 devices by an corresponding factor. Hence, we still consider Spartan-3
devices more appropriate for cryptanalytical tasks due to their better cost-performance ratio.
In particular, latest Spartan-3A DSP and Spartan-6 devices also come with a number of DSP
slices, so that expensive Virtex devices (which formerly were the only devices with DSP slices)
are not a necessity anymore.
Another issue of ECM is memory. Although ECM stage 1 has only very moderate memory
constraints it can be considerately improved by additional computations in a second stage.
However, stage 2 involves a signiﬁcant amount of precomputations as well as storage for prime
numbers. Since memory on FPGA devices is rather limited (192 × 18 KBit BRAM elements per
device), a fast accessible, external memory could help to improve the beneﬁcial eﬀect of stage 2
by storing even larger tables.
3.2.3 Case-Study VII: Solving Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms
Another popular problem used for building public-key cryptosystems is known as the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) where the exponent ℓ should be determined for a given aℓ mod n.
A popular derivative is the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) for Elliptic
Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) [15].
1The presented cycle count for 151-bit integers was scaled down accordingly to the results given in [10] for
198-bit parameters. Here, Gaj et al. reported their implementation to take 1212 cycles for one combined 198 bit
point doubling and addition (ECM stage 1).G uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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An attack on ECC relies on the same algorithmic primitives as the crypto system itself,
namely point addition and point doubling. Up to now, the best known algorithm for this
purpose is the Pollard’s Rho (PR) algorithm for parallel implementation described in [39]. This
variant of the original PR method [33] allows for a linear gain in performance with the number
of available processors. This can be eﬃciently implemented in hardware as presented in [12].
The PR algorithm essentially determines distinguished points on the elliptic curve. These
points are reported to a central host computer which awaits a collision of two points. A distin-
guished point is deﬁned to be a point with a speciﬁc characteristic, e.g., its x-coordinate has a
ﬁxed number of leading zero bits. To reach such a distinguished point, PR follows a so called
pseudo-random walk on the elliptic curve by subsequently adding points from a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set
of random points. Hence, with careful parametrization of the distinguished point criterion, the
duration of a computation until a distinguished point is found can be adapted to the bandwidth
constraints of the system. Furthermore, the PR does not need a large memory for computation
so that the COPACOBANA system seems to be a suitable platform for running the algorithm.
As with the ECM unit, a single PR unit is comprised of an arithmetic unit, a few kilobytes
of RAM and control logic. The arithmetic unit supports modular inversion as an additional
function required for uniquely determining distinguished points.
For a parallelized PR on COPACOBANA according to the method presented in [39], all
instances of the algorithm can run completely independent from each other. For solving the
discrete logarithm problem over curves deﬁned over prime ﬁelds Fp, we have to compute ap-
proximately
√
q points, where q is the largest prime power of the order of the curve. Note that
the transfer of data between host computer and point processing units on the FPGA can be
performed independently from the computations.
Implementing the PR on Spartan-3 FPGAs for solving the ECDLP over curves with a length
of 160 bits and using an aﬃne point representation, we achieve a maximum clock frequency of
approximately 40 MHz and an area usage of 6067 slices (79%) for two parallel instances. The
corresponding point addition requires 846 cycles so that slightly less than 50,000 point operations
can be performed per second by one unit. Consequently, a single COPACOBANA can compute
about 11.3 million point operations per second. Table 5 compares our results for COPACOBANA
with challenges and corresponding estimates from Certicom based on the computing time of an
(outdated) Intel Pentium 100. To compare our results with COPACOBANA against more recent
systems, we refer to the solved ECC P-109 challenge that took 10,000 computers (mostly PCs)
running 24 hours a day for a total time of 549 days. To solve this challenge in the same time,
according to Table 5 about 17 COPACOBANAs (and subsequently an investment of B C 170,000)
would be required. In return, assuming a single PC of the original cluster to cost only about
B C 200, this already sums up to the amount of B C 2 million, excluding any additional operational
costs for power and cooling.
Note that our Pollard-Rho implementation also can beneﬁt from advanced FPGAs with DSP
slices (cf. Section 3.2.2. The large n-bit adders can be more eﬃciently implemented using
cascades of the 48-bit adder contained in each DSP slice.
4 Enhancing the COPACOBANA Architecture
Recapitulating the issues of our COPACOBANA architecture according to the application shown
in Section 3, we should consider a redesign to meet the following requirements:
• Larger FPGA Devices: more logical elements on an FPGA enable more complex applica-
tions or more computational cores per device.Three Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
11 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
k Certicom Est. [5] Single XC3S1000 Single COPACOBANA
79 146 d 15.3 d 3.06 h
89 12.0 y 1.62 y 4.93 d
97 197 y 30.7 y 93.4 d
109 2.47   104 y 2.91   103 y 24.3 y
131 6.30   107 y 7.40   106 y 6.17   104 y
163 6.30   1012 y 9.15   1011 y 7.62   109 y
191 1.32   1017 y 1.89   1016 y 1.57   1014 y
239 3.84   1024 y 8.62   1023 y 7.18   1021 y
Table 5: Expected runtime on diﬀerent platforms and for diﬀerent Certicom ECC challenges
• Local Memory per FPGA: a few megabytes of fast SRAM should be placed adjacent to
each FPGA device to provide additional storage while solving more complex problems.
• Dedicated Communication Links: Only a single access to an FPGA at a time was possi-
ble in the recent communication models. Individual links for each FPGA simplify data
communication and also enable high performance from simultaneous data exchange.
• Improved Controller between Host-PC and COPACOBANA: the main bottleneck with
respect to data communication is the controller interface between backplane and host-
PC. The embedded controllers for USB and Gigabit Ethernet, which we used for previous
controller interfaces, did not provide suﬃcient performance due to high overhead (e.g.,
TCP/IP and USB frame packaging). A solution could be to integrate the host-PC inside
the COPACOBANA case and directly link the PC’s mainboard with the backplane, e.g.,
using a high-speed PCIe link.
• Improved Signaling: the single-ended I/O lines for the data and address bus system were
subject of signiﬁcant noise and side-eﬀects like signal crosstalk. Improved signal quality
can be achieved by switching to diﬀerential I/O at the cost of another signal line per I/O
port. This is also beneﬁcial when attempting to increase the data transmission frequency.
To address the aspects mentioned above, we entirely redesigned the backplane and FPGA
module of our cluster system. The new FPGA module consists of 8 FPGAs with a package size
up to 27 × 27mm, a CPLD for system control (e.g., temperature and voltage monitoring) and
DC/DC converters (dependant on the FPGA type used). Most suitable FPGA devices for the
new systems are the low-cost Xilinx Spartan-3 5000 with up to 74,880 logic cells (104 hardware
multipliers, 104 BRAMs, FG676 packaging), the Xilinx Spartan-3A DSP 3400 with 53,712 logic
cells (126 DSP48A, 126 BRAMs, FG676 packaging) and the upcoming class of Spartan-6 FPGAs.
For the ﬁrst prototype of the enhanced COPACOBANA, we chose 128 Spartan-3 5000 devices.
Moreover, we placed 32 MB of SRAM adjacent to each FPGA that can be accessed by the FGPA
within a single clock cycle at 100 MHz.
The new COPACOBANA design integrates the host-PC (uATX format) in the same case so
that short (and fast) interfaces can be used. Target applications like for example Time-Memory
Tradeoﬀs (cf. Section 3.2.1) require a high data rate between COPACOBANA and an external
hard disk drive. One option could be to place a hard disk drive physically inside COPACOBANA,
e.g., attached via a SATA interface to the integrated host-PC. The second option would let the
integrated host-PC access other IT-infrastructure like a Storage-Area Network by additional
interfaces or its two Gigabit Ethernet ports.G uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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Figure 2: Enhanced COPACOBANA Architecture based on Xilinx Spartan-3 5000 FPGAs
The integrated PC connects to the FPGA-cluster by one or two PCIe modules. Therefore,
the former communication bottleneck due to the single controller is completely eliminated. The
new enhanced architecture COPACOBANA consists of an 18 slot backplane equipped with 16
FPGA-cards and two controller cards which connect the FPGA backplane to the integrated PC.
Additional components of the new system are the 1.5kW main power supply unit (with 125A
at 12V), six high-performance fans and a 19-inch rack of three hight units for the housing.
There are fast serial point-to-point connections between every two neighbors building a chain
of FPGAs. In the conﬁguration as described below, we employed eight Xilinx Spartan-3 5000
which are arranged as a systolic one-dimensional array, i.e., in each clock cycle data is transferred
from one FPGA to the next in pipeline fashion according to a global, synchronous clock. Note
that transferring data using a systolic array introduces signiﬁcant latencies on the data path.
However, since the target applications do not have real-time requirements, this should not be an
issue for our cryptanalytic applications where operations usally can be interleaved to hide any
latencies. Between the controller-cards and the integrated PC the maximum data rate is limited
to 250 MByte/s due to the limitations of the PCIe connection. For high throughput, the I/O
capabilities of the FPGA has to be considered carefully. The highest throughput can be achieved
by connecting communicating chips by short point-to-point lines. To allow eﬃcient broadcasts
to all FPGAs simultaneously, there is a direct connection between adjacent FPGA-cards. The
point-to-point interconnections consist of 8 pairs of wires in each direction. Each pair is driven
by low voltage diﬀerential signaling (LVDS) with a speed of 250MHz, thus achieving a data-rate
of 2Gbit/s. Figure 2 shows the overall architecture of our enhanced COPACOBANA.
As in the original system, the backplane connects to all FPGA cards on which individually
the clock signals, data and power are (re-)generated and distributed. However, the bus isThree Years of Evolution: Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA
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managed now cooperatively by all FPGA modules instead of a single bus master, i.e., a central
controller. Each FPGA module can transfer incoming data to the next slot or it can remove the
data out of the stream. In this case, an empty data frame cycles through the bus pipeline from
slot to slot. Note that another card is allowed to insert new data now into this empty slot. The
two counter-rotating systolic datapaths allow to minimize the worst case latency to half of the
total number of slots multiplied by the clock cycle time. The enhanced bus system assigns one
ascending and one descending slot to each single card. This leads to a ring of point to point
connections in which the bus system can be seen as a circular, parallel shift register.
Due to the modular architecture further developments can be incorporated seamlessly. For
example, alternative FPGA modules equipped with a Spartan-3A DSP 3400 or Spartan-6 FPGAs
can easily plugged into the backplane. In particular, it is possible to run even a heterogenous
conﬁguration, with a mixed set of FPGAs for diﬀerent tasks.
5 Expected Improvements in Cryptanalytical Applications
At the time of writing, the cluster incorporating the presented enhancements as described in
Section 4 is still in production and is expected to become available in October 2009. Hence,
we now provide ﬁrst estimates and projections concerning the expected performance of the new
cluster system. We will revise our ﬁgures as soon as the system (and adapted cryptanalyti-
cal implementations) become available. With the design modiﬁcations on the COPACOBANA
architecture, we can ﬁrstly make use of more logic resources due to the larger Spartan-3 5000
FPGAs. With respect to the original Spartan-3 1000 FPGAs, the amount of logic has increased
by a factor of 4.5 per FPGA device. For our exhaustive key search applications as shown in
Section 3.1, we thus assume a linear speedup (at least) by a factor of 4. More precisely, the orig-
inal DES breaking application implemented four engines per Spartan-3 1000 so that we expect
16 engines to run at the same clock frequency per Spartan-3 5000. This will reduce the average
runtime to break DES to a single day and 19 hours with only one enhanced COPACOBANA.
Similar linear performance speed-ups can be gained for the ePass cracker and A5/1 breaker
(about 4.5 seconds and 1.5 hours, respectively). However, note that due to the higher cost of
the enhanced COPACOBANA (which grows by a factor of 4.5 as well), the cost-performance is
not better than with the original machine (even worse, when taking Moore’s Law into account).
In general, brute-force techniques do not beneﬁt from the new architectural improvements, i.e.,
instead of one new COPACOBANA also ﬁve original machines based on Spartan-3 1000 can be
used. In this case, the only advantage of the new design is due to the reduced power consumption.
The real advantages of the enhanced machine manifest for advanced cryptanalytical appli-
cation with higher demands on the infrastructures such as communication throughput and local
memories adjacent to the FPGAs. The eﬃcient generation of TMTO tables will now become
available so that we expect to ﬁnish the tables for A5/1 in less than a month. Furthermore,
we are working towards an implementation of our ECM core (cf. Section 3.2.2) for Spartan-3A
DSP 3400 FPGAs which also integrate 126 DSP slices, however at much lower costs compared
to Virtex-4 devices. Finally, we plan to adapt the same implementation strategy based on DSP
slices also for the Pollard-Rho ALU. This can also result in a gain in performance by an order of
magnitude. Last but not least, the new COPACOBANA also could provide a suitable platform
for even more complex applications, e.g., additional tasks required by the number ﬁeld sieve,
index calculus methods or lattice basis reduction algorithms.G uneysu, Pfeier, Paar, Schimmler
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6 Conclusion
In this work, we presented a series of cryptanalytical applications for a cost-eﬃcient hardware
architecture (COPACOBANA). According to our ﬁndings based on a varietly of cryptanalytical
implementations, we identiﬁed shortcomings in the design of our cluster. Then, we came up
with an enhanced version which also provides larger and more powerful FPGAs, up to 4 GB
of local memory and fast point-to-point serial communication links between all devices and the
controller. These modiﬁcations bring COPACOBANA into a promising position to tackle even
more complex tasks in cryptanalsis as well as from general-purpose computing. With all these
enhancements, in particular for communication and local memory, the new COPACOBANA
cluster becomes even useful beyond pure code-breaking, catching up with respect to other su-
percomputing platforms, still at low costs.
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Abstract. A system of Boolean equations is called sparse if each equa-
tion depends on a small number of variables. Finding eﬃciently solu-
tions to the system is an underlying hard problem in the cryptanalysis
of modern ciphers. In this paper we study new properties of the Agree-
ing Algorithm, which was earlier designed to solve such equations. Then
we show that mathematical description of the Algorithm is translated
straight into the language of electric wires and switches. Applications
to the DES and the Triple DES are discussed. The new approach, at
least theoretically, allows a faster key-rejecting in brute-force than with
Copacobana.
Key words: Sparse Boolean equations, equations graph, electrical cir-
cuits, switches
1 Introduction
Let X = {x1,x2,...,xn} be a set of Boolean variables. By Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m we
denote subsets of X of size li ≤ l. The system of equations
f1(X1) = 0,...,fm(Xm) = 0 (1)
is considered, where fi are Boolean functions (polynomials in algebraic normal
form) and they only depend on variables Xi. Such equations are called l-sparse.
We look for the set of all 0,1-solutions to (1). Obviously, the equation fi(Xi) = 0
is determined by the pair Ei = (Xi,Vi), where Vi is the set of 0,1-vectors in
variables Xi, also called Xi-vectors, where fi is zero. In other words, Vi is the
set of all solutions to fi = 0. The function fi is uniquely deﬁned by Vi. Given
fi, the set Vi is computed with 2li trials.
In [15] Agreeing and Gluing procedures were described. Then they were com-
bined with variables guessing to solve (1). See also earlier work [22]. Table 1 sum-
marizes expected complexity estimates for simple combinations of the Agreeing
and Gluing in case of m = n and a variety of l. Each instance of (1) may be
encoded by a CNF formula with clause length l in the same variables. So l-SAT
solving algorithms provide with worst case complexity estimates. The table data
? The author was partially supported by the grant NIL-I-004 from Iceland, Licht-
enstein and Norway through the EEA Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian
Financial Mechanism.Semaev
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Table 1. Algorithms’ running time.
l 3 4 5 6
the worst case,[12] 1.324
n 1.474
n 1.569
n 1.637
n
Gluing1, expectation,[18] 1.262
n 1.355
n 1.425
n 1.479
n
Gluing2, expectation,[18] 1.238
n 1.326
n 1.393
n 1.446
n
Agreeing-Gluing1, expectation,[19] 1.113
n 1.205
n 1.276
n 1.334
n
.
suggests that Agreeing-Gluing based methods should be very fast in practice.
This is the reason why a hardware implementation of the Agreeing Algorithm
is here proposed. In spite of relatively high worst case bound on l-SAT prob-
lem complexity, there exist a number of eﬃcient l-SAT solvers. They became
useful tool in cryptanalysis [4,5]. However, an eﬃcient hardware version of the
approach is still unknown.
Conjectured asymptotic bounds on the complexity of the popular Gr¨ obner
Basis Algorithm and its variants as XL, see [8,3], are found in [1,20]. They are
far worse than the estimates by the brute force approach except for quadratic
and very over-deﬁned equation system. It was found in [16] that a linear algebra
variant(called MRHS) of the Agreeing-Gluing signiﬁcantly overcomes(on AES
type Boolean equations in around 50 variables) F4 method, a Gr¨ obner Basis
Algorithm implemented in Magma.
We ﬁrst study here a new property of the Agreeing Algorithm. This al-
gorithm implements pairwise simpliﬁcation to the initial equations after some
suitable guess. We will show that the result only depends on a smaller subset of
equation pairs. This signiﬁcantly reduces memory requirements for the Agreeing
Algorithm. E.g. for the DES instead of 3545 pairs, the algorithm should only
run through 1404 of them with the same output. In case of the Triple DES the
ﬁgure is 3929 instead of 16831, see Table 2.
Then we suggest implementing the Agreeing Algorithm in hardware. The
main features of the related device, called Circuit Lattice(CL), are:
– No memory locations are necessary as no one bit is kept by the device in
common sense. Solutions to particular equations are circuits with two type
of switches and the whole system is a network of connections between them
represented as a circuit lattice. See Fig. 5 for instance.
– Voltage is induced by variables guess. Its expansion is then directed by
switches implemented as electronic relays or transistors on a semiconductor
chip. The potential diﬀerence detected in some particular circuits indicates
the system is inconsistent after the guess.
– The number of input contacts is essentially 2s, where s is the number of
variables guessed during the solution of the system. That is at most 2n
anyway. Some power contacts and one output contact that sends out a signal
when the system is found inconsistent should be added.
– The speed of the device is determined by the time of switching, where lots
of switches turn simultaneously. Switches are not necessarily synchronized,
so that the device does not work as a conventional computer.Sparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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It is very unlikely to solve the system by Agreeing alone. So some guesses on
the variable values should be made. The system is then checked for consistence
with the Agreeing Algorithm. As most of the guesses should be incorrect, it is
important to have an eﬃcient way to check the system’s inconsistence. The sug-
gested Circuit Lattice is designed to achieve this goal. Implementing equations
from a cipher, it may be used for a brute force attack. When trying the current
key, one introduces the guess into the device, and checks whether the system is
inconsistent.
Common approaches to the key search [6,21,2,7,17,13,14] are based on
the parallelization of the job to many special purpose chips, which eﬃciently
implement the encryption. The best reported speed for one DES encryption with
Copacobana is about 0.1 GHz per chip, [13]. Approximately the same speed per
each of its SPU is achieved by Cell Processor, see [14]. Therefore about 0.034
GHz for the Triple DES anyway. This is the key rejecting rate.
In contrast, our idea is to not implement any encryption. If constructed,
the Circuit Lattice might achieve a higher key rejecting rate, see the discussion
in Section 7. Moreover, depending on the equation system from the cipher, the
number of key bits necessary to guess before solving or observing an inconsistence
may vary. For instance, in [15] it was reported that 37-38 key variables out of
56 are guessed and the rest of the system from 6 rounds of the DES is solved by
the Agreeing Algorithm alone. So it is sometimes not necessary to guess all key
bits. There may exist a lot of equation systems describing one particular cipher
produced, for instance, with the Gluing procedure. Our approach therefore has
more ﬂexibility.
It was also reported in [16] that admitting up to 2s right hand sides(produced
with Gluing during system solution) in MRHS equations for the AES-128, one
should only guess 128 − s of the key bits before the system is solved. A fast
way, based on some physical principle, for checking the system’s inconsistence
after the guess might result in breaking a real world cipher. Two principles may
be in use here: electric potential expansion and the expansion of light. We will
presently follow the ﬁrst principle.
This proposal is diﬀerent from an independent work by Geiselmann, Matheis
and Steinwandt, which describes a hardware implementation of main MRHS
routines, see [11].
The author is grateful to H˚ avard Raddum for useful discussions, Thorsten
Schilling for indicating a ﬂaw in the ﬁrst version of Lemma 2 and one of the
anonymous referees from WCC’09 for suggestions on improving the presentation.
2 Agreeing Procedure
For equations E1 = (X1,V1) and E2 = (X2,V2), let X1,2 = X1 ∩ X2. Then let
V1,2 be the set of X1,2-subvectors of V1, that is the set of projections of V1 to
variables X1,2. Similarly, the set V2,1 of X1,2-subvectors of V2 is deﬁned. We say
the equations E1 and E2 agree if V1,2 = V2,1. Otherwise, we apply the procedure
called Agreeing. All vectors whose X1,2-subvectors are not in V2,1 ∩ V1,2 areSemaev
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deleted from V1 and V2. Obviously, we delete Vi-vectors which can’t make part
of any common solution to the equations. Then we put Ei ← (Xi,V 0
i ), where
V 0
i ⊆ Vi consist of the survived vectors.
2.1 Agreeing Algorithm
The goal of the Agreing Algorithm is to identify wrong solutions to equations Ei
and remove them from Vi by pairwise application of the Agreeing Procedure. The
output doesn’t depend on the order of pairwise agreeings, see [16]. Application
of the procedure to Ei and Ej where Xi ∩Xj = ∅ can be avoided. We will show
that some pairs Ei,Ej can be avoided too even if Xi∩Xj 6= ∅. This signiﬁcantly
optimizes memory requirement of the Agreeing Algorithm and the hardware
implementation described in Section 3.
The equations E1,...,Em are vertices in an equation graph G. Vertices Ei
and Ej are connected by the edge (Ei,Ej) labeled with Xi,j = Xi ∩ Xj 6= ∅.
There may occur diﬀerent edges with the same labels. The Agreeing Procedure,
being applied to Ei and Ej, implements a kind of information exchange between
them through the edge (Ei,Ej). That is for Y ⊆ Xi,j the information Y 6= a for
some binary string a is transmitted from Ei to Ej or backwards. For simplicity,
the same symbol Y also denotes an ordered string of variables Y . We will now
show that some of the edges in the graph G are obsolescent in this respect.
A subgraph Gm of G is called minimal if it is on the same vertices and
1. For any (Ei,Ej) in G, there exists a sequence of vertices
Ei,Ek,El,...,Er,Ej, (2)
where (Ei,Ek),(Ek,El),...,(Er,Ej) are in Gm and Xi,j is a subset in each
label Xi,k,Xk,l,...,Xr,j.
2. Gm has minimal number of edges.
The edges of a minimal subgraph are called maximal and denoted A for some
ﬁxed Gm. Minimal subgraph is not uniquely deﬁned.
Lemma 1. The Agreeing Algorithm output doesn’t depend on whether the Agree-
ing procedure runs through all edges of G or through only maximal edges.
Proof. Let Y ⊆ Xi,j for the equations Ei and Ej. Assume we learn, from the
equation Ei, that Y 6= a for some string a. The Agreeing procedure expands
Y 6= a from Ei to Ej. Therefore, there exists a path (2), where
Y ⊆ Xi,j ⊆ Xi,Xk,Xl,...,Xr,Xj.
So Y 6= a is expanded from Ei to Ej through the path (2) by agreeing pairwise
Ei,Ek, then Ek,El,... and Er,Ej. This proves the Lemma.
We now formulate the algorithm to compute a minimal subgraph of G:Sparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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1. For Y ⊆ X ﬁnd all edges (Es,Er) in G such that Y ⊆ Xs,r. We only need
do that for Y which is a label in G. Denote a subgraph of G on the vertices
Es,Er,... with all such edges (Es,Er) by GY . Remark that GY is a complete
graph.
2. Find the set VY of edges (Es,Er) in GY , where Xs,r = Y . Find a largest
subset WY ⊆ VY such that GY is still connected after removing the edges
WY . Remark that WY is not uniquely deﬁned.
3. Remove the edges WY from G for all Y and get Gm.
Lemma 2. Let Gm be the algorithm’s output graph. Then Gm is minimal.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that for any edge (Ei,Ej) in G there is a path (2) on Gm.
Let Y = Xi,j. If (Ei,Ej) is not in WY , then it is nothing to prove as (Ei,Ej) in
Gm. Assume (Ei,Ej) ∈ WY . Then there is a path on GY from Ei to Ej through
the edges (Er,Es) / ∈ WY and Y ⊆ Xr,s. This is because GY remains connected
after removing WY . If all such (Er,Es) / ∈ WXr,s, then the required path is found,
as all these edges are in Gm.
Otherwise, assume some (Er,Es) ∈ WZ, where Z = Xr,s. Therefore Y ( Z
and the edge (Er,Es) was removed from G. Then there is a path on GZ from
Er to Es through edges (Ek,El) / ∈ WZ. This is because GZ is still connected
after removing the edges WZ. Moreover, Y ( Z ⊆ Xk,l for (Ek,El). If all such
(Ek,El) / ∈ WXk,l, then the required path is found, as all these edges are in Gm.
Otherwise, we continue so on and stop at some point as the sequence of the
graphs GY ) GZ ) ... is strictly decreasing.
The resulting graph Gm is with minimal number of edges. Otherwise, let be
possible to remove one more edge (Er,Es) from Gm and still have some path
(2) for any (Ei,Ej). Then there exists Z = Xr,s and a bigger WZ such that
removing WZ from GZ keeps this graph connected. That is impossible by the
deﬁnition of WZ. The Lemma is proved.
Example. Let there be ﬁve Boolean equations in four variables, where X1 =
{x1,x2},X2 = {x2,x3},X3 = {x3,x4},X4 = {x1,x3} and X5 = {x2,x4}. The
graph G has 5 vertices and 7 edges: (E1,E2) labeled with X1,2 = {x2}, (E2,E3)
labeled with X2,3 = {x3}, and so on. Two edges (E1,E2) and (E2,E4) are to be
removed as they are obsolescent for the Agreeing Algorithm.
2.2 Agreeing2 Algorithm
This is an asymtotically faster variant of the Agreeing Algorithm, see [16].
(Precomputation.) For each maximal edge (Ei,Ej) ﬁnd the set Xi,j and the
number r = |Xi,j|. For each r-bit address b unordered tuple of lists
{Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)} (3)
is precomputed. The lists Vi,j(b) and Vj,i(b) consist of vectors from Vi and
respectively Vj whose projection to variables Xi,j is b. The set of tuples isSemaev
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sorted using some linear order. The algorithm marks vectors in tuples (3),
then deletes all marked vectors from Vi. We say list Vi,j(b) empty if it does
not contain any entries or all they are marked.
(Agreeing.) The Algorithm starts with the ﬁrst tuple {Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)}, where
just one list is empty and follows the rules:
1. Let the current tuple be {Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)}, where Vi,j(b) is empty, while
Vj,i(b) is not. Then all the vectors a in Vj,i(b) are made marked one after
the other.
2. For a in Vj,i(b) the projection d of a to variables Xj,k is computed, where
(Ej,Ek) is a maximal edge. Then a in Vj,k(d) is made marked. The tuple
{Vj,k(d);Vk,j(d)} is now current.
3. If just one of Vj,k(d) or Vk,j(d) is found empty, then apply step 1. If
not, then take another maximal edge (Ej,Ek) or mark another a in
Vj,i(b). If Vj,i(b) is already empty, then backtrack to the tuple last to
{Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)}.
4. For each starting tuple the algorithm walks through a search tree with
backtracking. If new deletions do not occur in the current tree, then the
next tuple, where just one list is empty, is taken.
5. The algorithm stops when in all tuples {Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)} the lists both
are empty or both non-empty. Then all vectors that have been earlier
marked in the tuples are now deleted from Vi.
We remark that each tuple {a1,...,ar;b1,...,bs} implements two implications.
First, marking all {a1,...,ar} implies marking all {b1,...,bs}, which can be
denoted ¯ a1,...,¯ ar ⇒ ¯ b1,...,¯ bs, and vise versa ¯ b1,...,¯ bs ⇒ ¯ a1,...,¯ ar. Agreeing2
Algorithm simply expands marking through these implications.
Lemma 3. Equations (1) are pairwise agreed if and only if in all {Vi,j(b);Vj,i(b)}
deﬁned for maximal edges (Ei,Ej) the lists both are empty or both non-empty.
Lemma 4. Let for at least one edge (Ei,Ej) the lists Vi,j(b) be empty for all b.
Then the system is inconsistent.
2.3 Example
Let three Boolean equations E1,E2,E3 be given in algebraic normal form:
1 + x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x2x3 = 0,
1 + x1 + x4 = 0,
1 + x3 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x2x3x4 = 0.
Represent them as lists of solutions:
x1 x2 x3
a1 0 0 1
a2 0 1 1
a3 1 1 0
,
x1 x4
b1 0 1
b2 1 0
,
x2 x3 x4
c1 0 1 0
c2 1 0 1
c3 1 1 0
. (4)Sparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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The list of tuples: P = {a1,a2;b1}, Q = {a3;b2}, R = {b1;c2}, T = {b2;c1,c3}, U =
{a1;c1}, V = {a2;c3}, W = {a3;c2}. As there are no tuples with just one list
empty, a guess is necessary to start marking. We mark with a bar.
Assume x4 = 0. So b1 should be marked. We now have two tuples, where just
one of the lists is empty: {¯ b1;a1,a2} and {¯ b1;c2}. According to the algorithm,
take the ﬁrst of two. Then a1 get marked in {¯ b1;a1,a2} and {a1;c1}. Therefore,
c1 get marked in {¯ a1;c1} and then in {c1,c3;b2}. Now backtrack and mark a2
in {¯ b1;¯ a1,a2} and {a2;c3}, and so on. The sequence of marking is represented
in Fig.1. Instances in all tuples have been marked. The guess was wrong. We
Fig.1. The marking expansion.
alternatively could add a new tuple {b1;∅} to the tuple list and start marking.
Similarly, all tuple lists become empty in case x4 = 1. The system has no solution.
3 Agreeing with a Circuit Lattice
Switches. Circuit lattice is a combination of switches and wires. There are two
types of switches as in Fig. 2. Type 1 switch(1-switch) controls vertical cir-
cuits connected in parallel and powered by the same battery by any of hori-
zontal circuits also connected in parallel and powered by another battery . So
that voltage detected in at least one horizontal circuit makes the switch close.
That may induce voltage in all vertical circuits simultaneously. Similarly, type 2
switch(2-switch) controls horizontal circuits connected in parallel by any of ver-
tical circuits; voltage detected in a vertical circuit makes the switch close. That
may induce voltage in all horizontal circuits. Only switches with one vertical
and one horizontal input circuits are used in this Section in order to construct
Circuit Lattice. Later, in Section 4 we will see that using switches with multi-
ple horizontal and vertical input circuits enables constructing Reduced Circuit
Lattices with much low number of switches.
Circuit lattice construction. Assume the list of tuples (3) is precomputed. The
device is a lattice of horizontal and vertical circuits with intersections at switches
of two types as in Fig. 5. The horizontal circuits are in one-to-one correspondence
with solutions a ∈ Vi to equations Ei in (1). SoSemaev
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Fig.2. The type 1 and 2 switches.
1. each a ∈ Vi deﬁnes the horizontal circuit labeled a as in Fig. 3. 1-switches
on the horizontal circuit a are connected either in series or in parallel. We
choose here series connection. 2-switches should be connected in parallel.
2. each tuple {a1,...,ar;b1,...,bs} deﬁnes two vertical circuits, see Fig. 4.
They implement two related implications. The left crosses horizontal circuits
a1,...,ar at switches of type 1 and b1,...,bs at switches of type 2. Therefore
it implements implication ¯ a1,...,¯ ar ⇒ ¯ b1,...,¯ bs. That means potential in
all horizontal circuits a1,...,ar implies potential in all horizontal circuits
b1,...,bs simultaneously. Similarly, the right circuit in Fig. 4 implements
another implication ¯ b1,...,¯ bs ⇒ ¯ a1,...,¯ ar. Also see Fig. 5, which represents
circuit lattice for equations (4).
The number of 1-switches equals the number of 2-switches on each horizontal
circuit. This is the number of tuples (3), where a occurs. As the horizontal circuits
are labeled by vectors a ∈ Vi, there are
P
i |Vi| horizontal circuits. Assume
Fig.3. The horizontal circuit for a particular solution a.
voltage(potential) is detected in a horizontal circuit. That is due to one of 2-
switches on that circuit was closed. Then all 1-switches on this circuit get closed
too. This may imply voltage in vertical circuits, e.g. in circuits P1 and T1 in Fig. 3.
That happens if all other 1-switches on these vertical circuits(e.g. on P1 and T1)
are closed. Then their 2-switches get closed. That aﬀects new horizontal circuits
and voltage expands so on. We remark that all horizontal circuits consume powerSparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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from the same battery. All vertical circuits may be powered from another battery.
Fig.4. The vertical circuits deﬁned by {a1,...,ar;b1,...,bs}.
Solving. Solving starts with inducing potential into the circuit lattice. The po-
tential may appear due to the tuples with just one of the lists empty. That is
similar to Agreeing2 method explained before, as we start the algorithm with
such tuples. So potential appears in one of two vertical circuit constructed from
{∅;b1,...,bs} as soon as the battery is switched on. This induces voltage in the
horizontal circuits b1,...,bs. Voltage may be then induced in some new vertical
and horizontal circuits, and so on. One easily sees that potential is detected in
a horizontal circuit labeled a if and only if a is marked by Agreeing2 algorithm.
That is a can’t be a part of any common solution to equations (1). Therefore,
the following statement is obvious.
Lemma 5. Assume that after inducing potential in the circuit lattice, it is de-
tected in each horizontal circuit aj ∈ Vi for at least one Vi. Then the system is
inconsistent.
If there are no tuples with just one empty list, then the device won’t start.
So variable guesses are to be introduced to start voltage expansion. Assume
we are to guess the value x ∈ Xi for some equation Ei. Let a1,...,at be all
vectors in Vi, where x = 0, and at+1,...,ar all vectors in Vi, where x = 1. Each
horizontal circuit a ∈ Vi is provided with one additional 2-switch. It is connected
in parallel with other 2-switches. Two vertical circuits are constructed: S1 and
S2 by connecting new 2-switches above on horizontal circuits at+1,...,ar andSemaev
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a1,...,at respectively. It is not necessary to use 1-switches here as they won’t
play any role. To guess x = 0 one switches on the vertical circuit S1, while S2 is
oﬀ. To guess x = 1 one switches on another vertical circuit S2 with S1 is oﬀ. See
Fig. 5 for an example. Remark that S1 and S2 are there constructed for guessing
the value x4 in E2.
Example. Circuit lattice in case of (4) is represented in Fig. 5. Two vertical
Fig.5. The circuit lattice for equations (4).
circuits related to tuples P,Q... are denoted P1,P2,Q1,Q2 .... There are two
additional circuits S1 and S2 used for introducing guesses on x4. Each of these
two circuits incorporates one additional 2-switch. So the device composes of 34
switches on the whole. In order to check x4 = 0, one turns the circuit S1 on,
while S2 is oﬀ. This results in 2-switch on the circuit S1 get close and voltage
appears in the horizontal circuit b1. Two 1-switches on b1 get closed and therefore
voltage appears in two vertical circuits R2 and P2. All 2-switches on them become
closed and voltage expands to the horizontal circuits a1,a2,c2 and so on. Finally,
after a number of simultaneous switch turns, voltage is detected in all horizontal
circuits. The guess was wrong. Similarly, the circuit S2 is switched on, S1 is oﬀ,
in order to check x4 = 1. All horizontal circuits get voltage. The guess was wrong
too. The system is therefore inconsistent.Sparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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The number of switches. The main characteristic of the device is the number of
switches. This is twice the number of vectors in all tuples (3) for maximal edges
and computed by the formula
2
X
A
X
b
(|Vi,j(b)| + |Vj,i(b)|) = 2
X
A
(|Vi| + |Vj|). (5)
The external sum is over all maximal edges (Ei,Ej) ∈ A in G. For guessing s
variables x1 ∈ Xi1,...,xs ∈ Xis there should be also |Vi1|+...+|Vis| additional
switches.
The number of wires. We also count the number of wires necessary to connect
switches in the circuit lattice. The number of wires in all vertical circuits is
obviously the number of the lattice switches (5) plus the number of vertical
circuits themselves. The latter value equals twice the number of tuples. In a
horizontal circuit the type 2 switches are connected in parallel. So the number
of wires is the number of type 1 switches plus twice the number of type 2 switches
plus two. Therefore, the number of wires in all horizontal circuits is 3
P
A(|Vi|+
|Vj|) + 2
P
i |Vi|. So the total number of wires should be
5
X
A
(|Vi| + |Vj|) + 2
X
i
|Vi| + 2
X
tuples
1. (6)
For guessing s variables x1 ∈ Xi1,...,xs ∈ Xis there should be also |Vi1|+...+
|Vis| + 2s additional wires.
4 Reduced Circuit Lattices
In this Section we brieﬂy discuss how to reduce the parameters of the device(the
number of switches and wires) through using switches that control several cir-
cuits connected in parallel, and controlled themselves by any of several parallel
circuits, see Fig.2.
First, we modify each horizontal circuit so that it now comprises only one
1-switch and one 2-switch. The same 1-switch now controls all vertical circuits
that passed via 1-switches on a horizontal circuit in above Circuit Lattice(CL).
Then the same 2-switch controls that horizontal circuit by any of vertical circuits
passing via 2-switches in CL. So the horizontal circuit in Fig.3 now transforms
into that in Fig.6. We keep all vertical circuits intact. The number of switches
becomes 2
P
i |Vi|, while the number of wires is essentially 2
P
A(|Vi|+|Vj|). We
call the described device Reduced Circuit Lattice 1(RCL1). It operates similarly
to how CL operates.
We will further reduce the device parameters by observing that one 2-switch
can control several horizontal circuits. We keep one type 1 switch on each hori-
zontal circuit as above. Particular a ∈ Vi are in one-to-one correspondence withSemaev
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Fig.6. The reduced horizontal circuit for a particular solution a.
1-switches. So that we say there is voltage in the horizontal circuit a if the re-
lated 1-switch is closed. However the connections in the vertical circuits related
to a tuple are now as in Fig. 7, compare with that in Fig. 4. The number of
switches now becomes
P
i |Vi|+2
P
tuples 1, while the number of wires is essen-
tially 2
P
A(|Vi| + |Vj|). We call the described device Reduced Circuit Lattice
2(RCL2).
Fig.7. The reduced vertical circuits deﬁned by {a1,...,ar;b1,...,bs}.
5 Guessing the variable values
Equations from a cipher. The number of key variables is commonly very small
if compared with all system variables. Guessing all key variables results in theSparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
29 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
whole system collapses by any of the Agreeing Algorithms. This is a variant of
the brute force attack. If Agreeing works faster than this cipher encryption, then
an advantage over common brute force attack is observed. It might be well that
a proper subset of key variables should be guessed before the system is solved
with Agreeing, see this paper Introduction, where the issue is brieﬂy discussed.
Random equations. Generally, s-variable guesses result in 2s trials(Agreeing
runs). However, in randomly generated sparse equations there is a more eﬃ-
cient approach based on Gluing [15]. Assume that an s-bit guess is enough for
solving (1) or ﬁnding it inconsistent with Agreeing. Look at the gluing of some
t equations:
(X(t),Ut) = (Xi1,V1) ◦ (Xi2,V2) ◦ ... ◦ (Xit,Vt),
where s = |X(t)| and X(t) = Xi1 ∪Xi2 ∪...∪Xit. In other words, Ut is the set
of all common solutions to the equations Ei1,...,Eit. The number of vectors in
Ut is 2s−t on the average, see Lemma 4 in [18]. The vectors Ut are produced one
after the other as in [18] with the cost per vector proportional to t. So it is not
necessary to keep the whole set Ut. This is true for t smaller than some critical
value α0n
l , where α0 = 21/l ln(
1−1/2
1−(1/2)1/l), see [18]. So the total complexity of
solving is roughly proportional to 2s−t of Agreeing runs.
6 DES and Triple DES equations
The DES and the Triple DES equation systems are constructed in Appendix,
where input/output 64-bit blocks are considered variables too. So each equation
comprises 20 variables and admits 216 solutions. Table 2 provides with the equa-
tion system parameters as the number of equations, the number of variables,
the number of edges of the adjacent graph with nonempty labels, the number
of maximal edges and the number of tuples (3). Any of Circuit Lattices may be
Table 2. DES and Triple DES equations.
Nmbr of eqns vrbls edges mx.edges tuples
DES 128 632 3545 1409 16636
TDES 384 1712 16831 3929 71320
.
used to compute the key for any given plain-texts and related cipher-texts. These
are introduced into a Circuit Lattice similarly to the guessed key-bits. However
plain-text, cipher-text bits are not changing during the whole computation. So
any CL should have 2 × 56 + 2 × 128 = 368 input contacts for the DES and
2 × 112 + 2 × 128 = 480 input contacts for the Triple DES.
Tables 3 and 4 show main characteristics of Circuit Lattices for DES and
Triple DES: the number of necessary switches, wires and input contacts, which
are computed by formulas (5) and (6) and in Section 4.Semaev
SHARCS '09 Workshop Record 30
Table 3. DES Circuit Lattice implementations.
Nmbr of switches wires input contacts
CL 3.9 × 10
8 9.5 × 10
8 368
RCL1 1.7 × 10
7 3.9 × 10
8 368
RCL2 8.5 × 10
6 3.9 × 10
8 368
.
Table 4. TDES Circuit Lattice implementations.
Nmbr of switches wires input contacts
CL 1.1 × 10
9 2.7 × 10
9 480
RCL1 5.1 × 10
7 1.1 × 10
9 480
RCL2 2.6 × 10
7 1.1 × 10
9 480
.
Two plain-text, cipher-text 64-bit blocks uniquely deﬁne 112-bit key in the
Triple DES. So for the key search there should be two above described devices
working in parallel. The speed of computation is determined by the time that a
switch takes to turn. However, how many switch turns are necessary before the
system is found inconsistent looks generally diﬃcult to estimate. This is an open
problem. Voltage expands in a highly parallel manner through several circuits
which aﬀect each other and many switches turn simultaneously. Fortunately,
this is easy for round ciphers like DES or Triple DES. Assume guessing all key
variables at once. Then all Type 1 switches in tuples related to pairs of equations
in subsequent rounds turn simultaneously when voltage expands from one round
to another. That makes related Type 2 switches turn too. This is so even if
the Agreeing only runs through maximal edges of the adjacent graph. Therefore
the time measured in switch turns that the solver takes to agree pairwise all
equations is twice the number of rounds. In particular, to reject one wrong key
in the Triple DES takes at most 2 × 48 switch turns.
7 Conclusion, open problems and discussion
The paper describes a hardware implementation of the Agreeing Algorithm
aimed to ﬁnd solutions to a system of sparse Boolean equations, e.g. coming
from ciphers. Some variables guess is introduced into the device which signals
out if the system is inconsistent after that guess. The device architecture im-
plemented with a lattice of circuits is transparent. However, this is an open
problem whether the circuit lattice for a real world cipher like DES or Triple
DES is implementable within the current technology in computer industry.
There are several related problems:
1. The number of switches is the most important parameter of the solver. Table
3 and 4 data shows that the equation systems for the DES and the Triple
DES require the number of switches which is within the number of transistors
now available on one semiconductor crystal. For instance, Intel announcedSparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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Dual-Core Itanium2 processor with more than 1.7 billion transistors, see [9].
Obviously, a transistor is able to work as a switch.
2. Special purpose hardware to supply one after the other guesses on ﬁxed vari-
ables is to be devised. Its speed should be comparable with that of the solver.
The device is similarly constructed in wires and switches and controlled by
the output signal from the solver. We do not discuss this in detail as its
construction is rather obvious. It is easy to understand that its speed should
be only 2 switch turns on the average.
3. The transistor speed(the speed of a turn) is constantly increasing. E.g., his-
torical 17% year performance improvement is also predicted in [23] for the
next decade. Then a new speed record for the world fastest transistor which
is more than 1THz(1000GHz), see [10], was reported. However, to be on the
safe side we assume available transistors with speed about 100GHz. Assume
it is feasible to integrate one billion or so such transistors on one semicon-
ductor chip as a Triple DES Circuit Lattice. Remark that Reduced Circuit
Lattices require much low number of transistors, see Table 4 . Then average
time for producing a guess on 112 key variables and ﬁnding the system’s
inconsistence is approximately 2 × 48 + 2 = 98 switch turns. So the key
rejecting rate is approximately 1GHz in this case. It is compared favorably
with what is currently achieved, about 0.034GHz.
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8 Appendix
In this Appendix we describe how to make the equation system from the DES
algorithm. The similar equations are constructed for the Triple DES. The in-
put and output applications of the permutation IP are ignored as well as the
ﬁnal swap between 32-bit sub-blocks. The 64-bit internal state of the cipher
after the i-th round is denoted by (Ri−1,Ri). In particular, (R−1,R0) denotes
the 64-bit plain-text block and (R15,R16) is the related cipher-text block. All
these 128 bits are generally considered known constants. But we write them
variables. So that when the Agreeing algorithm is being run, these 128 variables
are substituted by constants as if for guessing. Therefore, 576 state variables are
bits of R−1,R0,R1,...,R15,R16. They are numbered −63,−62,...,512. 56 key
variables are numbered by 512 + j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ 64 and j 6= 8,16,...,64.
At every round i = 1,2,...,16, sub-blocks Ri are related as
Ri ⊕ Ri−2 = PS(Ri−1 ⊕ Ki), (7)
where Ri−1 is the 48-bit expansion of the 32-bit Ri−1 and Ki is the round key. P
denotes the ﬁxed permutation on 32 symbols and S is the transform implementedSparse Boolean equations and circuit lattices
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by 8 S-boxes. The equation (7) is equivalent to 8 equations related to each of
the S-boxes Sj:
(P−1(Ri))j ⊕ (P−1(Ri−2))j = Sj((Ri−1)j ⊕ Ki,j), (8)
where Ri,j is a 4-bit sub-block of Ri, and Ki,j is a 6-bit sub-block of Ki and
(T)j denotes a 6(or4)-bit sub-block of T. The equation (8) is denoted by Ei,j =
Ej+8(i−1). The full system of the DES equations consists of 128 equations Et,
t = 1,2,...,128. One equation incorporates 20 variables. For instance, E8,4 =
E60 depends on 20 variables:
(P−1(R6))4 = (x161,x170,x180,x186),
(R7)4 = (x204,x205,x206,x207,x208,x209),
(P−1(R8))4 = (x225,x234,x244,x250),
K8,4 = (x514,x529,x538,x539,x556,x561).
These variables compose the set X60. For any values of the following 16 variables:
x204,x205,x206,x207,x208,x209,x225,x234,
x244,x250,x514,x529,x538,x539,x556,x561,
the values of x161,x170,x180,x186 are uniquely deﬁned by (8). So 216 vectors of
length 20 compose the list V60. That is all equations have 216 solutions. Let
m → EK(m) denote the encryption function on plain-text blocks with the DES
algorithm. Then the Triple DES implements the mapping:
m → EK1(EK2(EK1(m))).
Therefore Triple DES equations are determined similarly to those for the DES.35 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
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Abstract. This paper describes a high-performance PlayStation 3 (PS3)
implementation of the Pollard rho discrete logarithm algorithm on ellip-
tic curves over prime ﬁelds. A record has been set using this implemen-
tation by solving an elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)
with domain parameters from a currently standardized elliptic curve over
a 112-bit prime ﬁeld. Solving this 112-bit ECDLP instance required 62.6
PS3 years. Arithmetic algorithms have been designed for the PS3 to
exploit the SIMD architecture and the rich instruction set of its com-
putational units. Though our implementation is targeted at a speciﬁc
112-bit modulus, most of our implementation strategies apply to other
large moduli as well.
Keywords: Elliptic curve discrete logarithm, Pollard rho, Cell broad-
band engine, SIMD arithmetic
1 Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [20,23] is becoming increasingly popular since
it allows smaller key-sizes [22] to obtain the same level of security as other widely
used public-key cryptographic approaches such as RSA [30]. Government and
industry have standardized the use of ECC in, for instance, the Digital Signature
Standards (DSS) [38] and the Standards for Eﬃcient Cryptography (SEC) [6].
Here, elliptic curves deﬁned over prime ﬁelds ranging from 192 to 512 bits, and
from 112 to 512 bits are standardized, respectively.
Processor development seems to be moving away from a single-core towards
a multi-core design in order to scale performance through parallelism. The Cell
broadband engine (Cell), with its unique heterogeneous architecture, is an inter-
esting example. Its single instruction multiple data (SIMD) organization along
with its rich instruction set makes it attractive for accelerating cryptographic
operations [8,2,7,3] and cryptanalysis [34,35].
In this article, the security of ECC – using elliptic curves over prime ﬁelds
– is evaluated using the relatively low-priced and broadly available multi-core
Cell architecture, which is the heart of the video game console PlayStation 3
(PS3). For this purpose, high-performance SIMD arithmetic algorithms have
been designed to exploit the features of the instruction set of the Cell. TheseBos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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SIMD algorithms form the basis of our implementation of the Pollard rho [28]
algorithm, the fastest known algorithm to solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Log-
arithm Problem (ECDLP). Our implementation has been used to set a record by
solving an ECDLP with parameters taken from a 112-bit standardized elliptic
curve. Solving this problem required 62.6 PS3 years and ran on a PS3 cluster of
more than 200 PS3s in the period January - July, 2009. When run continuously,
using the latest version of our code, the calculation would have taken 3.5 months.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
of the Cell broadband engine. Section 3 recalls the Pollard rho discrete loga-
rithm algorithm together with some optimizations. Section 4 presents eﬃcient
arithmetic algorithms aimed at the 112-bit elliptic curve designed to exploit
the features of the Cell architecture. Section 5 gives implementation details and
performance results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Cell Broadband Engine Architecture
The Cell architecture [16], developed by Sony, Toshiba and IBM, has as a main
processing unit, a dual-threaded 64-bit Power Processing Element (PPE) which
can oﬄoad work to the eight Synergistic Processing Elements (SPEs) [11,36].
The SPEs are the workhorses of the Cell and the main interest in this article.
The SPE consists of a Synergistic Processor Unit (SPU) and a Memory Flow
Controller (MFC). Each SPU has a register ﬁle of 128 entries called vectors,
or quad-words, of 128-bit length and to its own 256-kilobyte Local Store (LS)
with room for instructions and data. The main memory can be accessed through
explicit Direct Memory Access (DMA) requests to the MFC. The SPUs have
a 128-bit SIMD organization allowing sixteen 8-bit, eight 16-bit or four 32-bit
integer computations in parallel. The SPUs are asymmetric processors, having
two pipelines, denoted as even and odd pipelines. This means that two instruc-
tions can be dispatched every clock cycle. Most of the arithmetic instructions
are executed on the even pipeline and most of the memory instructions are exe-
cuted on the odd pipeline. It is a challenge to fully utilize both pipelines always
at the same time. The SPEs have no hardware branch-prediction. Instead, the
programmer (or the compiler) can provide hints to the instruction fetch unit
where a branch instruction will most likely jump to.
An additional advantage of the SPEs is the rich instruction set. For instance,
among the available instructions all distinct binary operations f : {0,1}2 →
{0,1} are present. The SPEs are equipped with a 4-SIMD multiplier which can
compute four 16-bit integer multiplications simultaneously per clock cycle. In
addition, a multiply-and-add instruction which performs a 16 × 16-bit unsigned
multiplication, and an addition of a 32-bit unsigned operand to the 32-bit prod-
uct is provided and has the same time cost as a single 16×16-bit multiplication.
This instruction requires the 16-bit operands to be placed in the higher positions
of the 32-bit word elements of the vectors. Note that carries are not generated
for these instructions.Pollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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One of the ﬁrst applications of the Cell was to serve as the main processor
for the Sony’s PS3 video game console. The Cell contains eight SPEs, and in
the PS3 one of them is disabled. One of the remaining SPEs is reserved by
Sony’s hypervisor (a software layer which is used to virtualize devices and other
resources in order to provide a virtual machine environment to operating systems
such as Linux OS). All in all, six SPEs can be accessed when the Linux operating
system is installed on a PS3.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Elliptic Curves over Fp
Let Fp be a ﬁnite ﬁeld of characteristic p 6= 2,3 and a,b ∈ Fp satisfy the inequality
4a3 +27b2 6= 0. Informally an elliptic curve E(Fp) is deﬁned as the set of points
(x,y) ∈ Fp × Fp which satisfy the aﬃne Weierstrass equation [33]:
y2 = x3 + ax + b. (1)
These points, together with a point at inﬁnity, denoted as O, form an abelian
group where the group operation is point addition and the zero point is the point
at inﬁnity. Let P,Q ∈ E(Fp) \ {O}, where P = (x1,y1) and Q = (x2,y2). Then
−P = (x1,−y1). If P 6= −Q then P + Q = (x3,y3) where
x3 = µ2 − x1 − x2, y3 = µ(x1 − x3) − y1 with µ =

   
   
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
if P 6= Q
3x2
1 + a
2y1
if P = Q.
(2)
3.2 The Pollard Rho Algorithm
Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp, P ∈ E(Fp) a point of order n and Q = lP ∈ hPi.
Here p is prime and l,n ∈ Z, in practice p and n are known. The most eﬃcient
algorithm in the literature to ﬁnd l mod n for generic curves is Pollard’s rho
algorithm [28]. The underlying idea of this method is to search for two distinct
pairs (ci,di),(cj,dj) ∈ Z/nZ × Z/nZ such that
ciP + diQ = cjP + djQ.
Then, the discrete logarithm of Q to the base P, i.e. l = logP Q, can be obtained
by computing
l ≡ (ci − cj)(dj − di)−1 mod n.
This calculation might fail if the inverse of (dj − di) does not exist. In practice,
n is prime since one ﬁrst reduces the calculation of the discrete logarithm to the
computation of the discrete logarithm in the prime order subgroups of hPi [27].
The occurrence of two such distinct pairs is called a collision. Given an iter-
ation function f : hPi → hPi, the Pollard rho method calculates a sequence ofBos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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Xλ+1
Xλ+µ+1
Xλ+2
Xλ+µ+2
Xλ+3 Xλ+µ+3
Xλ+µ−2 Xλ+µ−1
X0
X1
X2
Xλ−1
Xλ Xλ+µ
(a)
Xi
Xi+1
Yj
Xi+2 Yj+1
(b)
Fig.1. Representation of the ρ and λ shape of the single-instance Pollard rho 1(a) and
the multi-instance Pollard rho method 1(b) respectively. The points Xi,Yj represent
distinguished points from two diﬀerent walks.
points Xi+1 = f(Xi), i ≥ 0. The sequence of points represents a walk through
the set of points hPi. Given Xi = ciP + diQ and ci,di ∈ [0,n−1], f updates ci+1
and di+1 and computes Xi+1 as Xi+1 = ci+1P +di+1Q. The sequence is started
from a random and known point X0 ∈ hPi by selecting random values for c0 and
d0. This sequence of points eventually collides (as operations are performed over
a ﬁnite cyclic group). Let us denote λ and µ ≥ 1 as the smallest numbers such
that Xλ = Xλ+µ holds. The value λ is called the tail and µ the cycle length,
graphically the walk through the set of points forms a ρ shape: see Fig. 1(a).
Assuming the iteration function is a random mapping of size n = |hPi|, i.e. f
is equally probable among all functions F : hPi → hPi, Harris showed that the
expected values of λ and µ are λ = µ =
pπn
8 when n → ∞ [15]. The advantage
of the Pollard rho method is that it uses a negligible amount of memory, by
using Floyd’s cycle ﬁnding method [19], compared to the baby-step-giant-step
[32] method which has the same asymptotic run-time complexity.Pollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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3.3 Parallelization
In [39], van Oorschot and Wiener present a time-memory trade-oﬀ method based
on the work by Quisquater and Delescaille [29]. In order to run many instances
of the Pollard rho method on diﬀerent processors, in order to speed up the
calculation of the discrete logarithm, each instance starts with a unique value.
The idea is to distinguish points in the walk using a speciﬁc property and share
the distinguished points among all the processors by communicating them to a
central database. Distinguished points (DTP) can be, for example, those with an
x-coordinate that is divisible by 2m, for some m > 0, after being normalized to
[0,p−1]. The search for a collision among the DTPs is performed in this central
database. This technique leads to a linear speed-up on the number of processors.
Graphically, colliding walks form a λ shape: see Fig. 1(b).
3.4 Adding Walks
The iteration function proposed by Pollard in [28] divides hPi into three diﬀerent
partitions: one partition is used to double the current point while in the other
two partitions a constant is added. Teske introduces in [37], based on the work by
Schnorr and Lenstra [31], a class of walks for the iterating function of Pollard’s
rho method which achieves a similar performance, in terms of the number of
iterations needed, compared to a random mapping. The main idea consists in
dividing hPi into r diﬀerent partitions using a partition function h : hPi →
[0,r − 1].
To each partition a point is associated; for partition j the values mj and nj
are randomly chosen in the initialization phase and Rj = mjP+njQ is associated
with this partition. If the parallelized version of the Pollard rho method is used,
the same mj,nj,h should be used in all instances.
The iteration function is deﬁned as
Xi+1 = f(Xi) = Xi + Rh(Xi). (3)
It is shown in [37] that values of r ≥ 16 partitions provide performance com-
parable to the expected values from random mappings, overcoming a loss of
approximately 20 percent of computation time that occurs when Pollard’s orig-
inal iteration function is used.
3.5 Montgomery’s Simultaneous Inversion
Elliptic curves can be parameterized in diﬀerent ways, resulting in diﬀerent oper-
ation counts (cf. [1]). Since many independent walks can be processed conjointly,
Montgomery’s inversion technique [25], which enables to trade M inversions for
3(M − 1) multiplications and one inversion, can be used. This places the aﬃne
Weierstrass coordinate system as the most suitable candidate. For a point addi-
tion, the cost of computing the x-coordinate is four multiplications, one squaring
and 1
M
th inversion, when M group additions are processed in parallel. By reusing
intermediate results of this computation, the y-coordinate can be computed with
an additional cost of one ﬁeld multiplication, see Equation (2).Bos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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[X0,X1,X2,X3] =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
X[0] =
128-bit wide vector
z }| {
16-bit
| {z }
high
16-bit
| {z }
low
. . .
. . .
X[i] =
. . .
. . .
X[n − 1] = | {z }
the most significant position of X1 is located in
either the lower or higher 16-bit of the 32-bit word
Fig.2. Four numbers arranged, in either all lower or higher parts.
3.6 The Negation Map
The computation of the negative of a point P = (x,y), i.e. −P = (x,−y), is
computationally cheap. This observation is used by Wiener and Zucherato [40]
to reduce the search space by a factor of two. Given an equivalence relation ∼
on hPi the idea is to iterate over the set of equivalence classes hPi/ ∼. This can
be accomplished by computing ±P and selecting the point with the smaller y-
coordinate after being normalized to [0,p − 1]. When the negation map is used,
almost all equivalence classes have two elements, giving a theoretical speed-up
factor of
√
2. This technique can be applied to all elliptic curves. In general, if
most equivalence classes contain m points, the search space is reduced by a factor
m. Hence, the total required number of iterations is reduced by a factor
√
m.
Other examples of equivalence relations, aimed at anomalous binary curves, and
more detailed information can be found in [40,13,10].
4 112-bit Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters over Fp
As of 2009, the smallest standardized elliptic curve is over a 112-bit prime ﬁeld.
This elliptic curve is standardized in the Standard for Eﬃcient Cryptography
(SEC), SEC2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters [6] as curve
secp112r1 and in the Wireless Transport Layer Security Speciﬁcation [12] as
curve number 6.
4.1 Integer Representation in the Cell
For a high-performance implementation of arithmetic algorithms on the Cell,
vectorization techniques (cf. [9]) are applied and data are represented using a
4-SIMD organization. If the radix of the number system is r = 2w, with 0 <
w ≤ 32, then a b-bit number is represented using n =
 b
w

digits. In the 4-SIMD
representation, four b-bit numbers X0, X1, X2, and X3 are stored in n vectors.Pollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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Each vector X[j], 0 ≤ j < n, holds four w-bit digits of the four numbers that
correspond to the same digit position. The notation [X0,X1,X2,X3] means that
the four numbers X0, X1, X2, and X3 are grouped using 4-SIMD and operations
are applied in parallel digit-wise (for the same digit positions) for all the four
numbers. For modular multiplication, w = 16 is selected, cf. Section 4.2, and
each of the n vectors is composed of four 32-bit word elements, where the 16-bit
digits of four numbers are stored either in the higher or lower positions of these
32-bit word elements. Hence, each of the four b-bit numbers is represented as
Xi =
Pn−1
j=0 rj
j
X[j]
r2·i+h
k
mod r

for i ∈ {0,1,2,3} and h ∈ {0,1}, where h is 1
if data are placed in the higher bit positions and 0 otherwise. Fig. 2 depicts the
data structure. For modular inversion, w = 32 and each of the four b-bit numbers
is represented as Xi =
Pn−1
j=0 rj
j
X[j]
ri
k
mod r

for i ∈ {0,1,2,3} and adjusting
the value n accordingly.
4.2 Arithmetic
The standardized elliptic curve secp112r1 is over Fp. Here p is prime and has
the special form: p = 2
128−3
11·6949. In order to speed up modular multiplication and
subtraction in the Pollard rho algorithm we use a redundant representation
taking a larger modulus e p = 2128 − 3 = 11 · 6949 · p.
Modular Multiplication One computationally intensive operation in the point
addition on the elliptic curve is modular multiplication. Furthermore, as Mont-
gomery’s simultaneous inversion technique is used to trade one modular inversion
by approximately three modular multiplications, the performance of the Pollard
rho algorithm highly depends on the performance of the modular multiplication.
In order to increase computation speed, operations are performed in a residue
class of a larger modulus e p. This redundant representation signiﬁcantly accel-
erates modular reduction and successive operations can be performed in this
representation.
Let us deﬁne a reduction function R.
Deﬁnition 1. Let R = 2128 and e p = R − 3. Given an integer 0 ≤ x < R2
represented in radix R; x = xh ·R+xl, deﬁne a map R : Z/R2Z → Z/R2Z such
that
y = R(x) = (x mod R) + 3 ·
j x
R
k
Note that, if y = R(x) then x ≡ y mod e p and y ≤ x.
Furthermore, with high likelihood R can be used to quickly reduce values
modulo e p. Because 0 ≤ R(x) < 4R, for any x with 0 ≤ x < R2, it follows that
0 ≤ R(R(x)) < R + 9. It is easily seen that R + 9 can be replaced by R + 6.
Assuming that all values have more or less the same probability to occur, the
result will actually most likely be < e p. Although counterexamples are simple to
construct and we have no formal proof, we can conﬁdently state the following.Bos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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Proposition 1. For independent random 128-bit non-negative integers x and y
there is overwhelming probability that 0 ≤ R(R(x · y)) < e p.
Computation of integer multiplication is performed using the data repre-
sentation described in Section 4.1. In order to take advantage of the multiply-
and-add instruction, we use the following property. If 0 ≤ a,b,c,d < r, then
a·b+c+d < r2. Speciﬁcally, this property enables the addition of a 16-bit word
to the result of a 16 × 16-bit product, used for the multi-precision multiplica-
tion and accumulation, and an extra addition of 16-bit word, which is used for
carry propagation. The multi-precision products are calculated using the school-
book method since the modulus is relatively small and the multiply-and-add
instruction can be exploited. Our tests show that this approach is faster, for this
particular size on this platform, compared to other methods such as Karatsuba
multiplication [18].
Modular Subtraction The modular subtraction algorithm, which can be im-
plemented as a subtraction with a conditional addition, is a basic operation. See
for implementation details Section 5.1.
Modular Inversion We consider modular inversion of one positive integer
x in the residue class of an odd modulus p. Taking into account the memory
constrained environment of the PS3s, and the 4-SIMD organization of the SPEs,
the most suitable algorithm seems to be the Montgomery algorithm for the
classical modular inverse [17]. This algorithm computes modular inversion in
two phases:
1. The computation of the almost Montgomery inverse x−1·2k mod p for some
known k.
2. A normalization phase where the factor 2k mod p is removed.
In order to exploit the 4-SIMD organization, variables A1, B1, A2 and B2 are
grouped and denoted as [A1,B1,A2,B2]. Then, the resulting 4-SIMD Extended
Binary GCD algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, A1 >> t1 means that variable A1 is shifted by t1 bits
towards the least signiﬁcant bit position. Similarly, B1 << t2 means that variable
B1 is shifted to the most signiﬁcant bit position by t2 positions. Assignments
such as [A1,B1,A2,B2] := [A1 >> t1,B1 << t2,A2 >> t2,B2 << t1] mean
that the four operations (shift operations in this case) are performed in parallel
in SIMD. Note that, in the algorithm, operations A1 >> t1 and A2 >> t2 shift
out only zero bits.Pollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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Algorithm 1 4-SIMD Extended Binary GCD
Input:
p : r
n−1 < p < r
n and gcd(p,2) = 1
x : 0 < x < r
n and gcd(x,p) = 1
Output: z ≡
1
x mod p
1: [A1,B1,A2,B2] := [p,0,x,1] and [k1,k2] := [0,0]
2: while true do
3: /* Start of shift reduction. */
4: Find t1 such that 2
t1|A1
5: Find t2 such that 2
t2|A2
6: [k1,k2] := [k1 + t1,k2 + t2]
7: [A1,B1,A2,B2] := [A1 >> t1,B1 << t2,A2 >> t2,B2 << t1]
8:
9: /* Start of subtraction reduction. */
10: if (A1 > A2) then
11: [A1,B1,A2,B2] := [A1 − A2,B1 − B2,A2,B2]
12: else if (A2 > A1) then
13: [A1,B1,A2,B2] := [A1,B1,A2 − A1,B2 − B1]
14: else
15: return z := B2 · (2
−(k1+k2)) mod p
16: end if
17: end while
Let g = gcd(x,p) and y be a solution of xy ≡ g (mod p). Algorithm 1 has
invariants (for j = 1,2)
Aj(2k1+k2y) ≡ Bjg (mod p),
gcd(A1,A2) = g,
A1B2 − A2B1 = p, (4)
2k1A1 ≤ p, 2k2A2 ≤ x,
B1 ≤ 0 < B2, kj ≥ 0, Aj > 0.
At line 15, a modular multiplication removes powers of 2 from the output. We
can bound the exponent k1 + k2 by
2k1+k2 ≤ (2k1A1)(2k2A2) ≤ px.
We have A1 = A2 = gcd(A1,A2) = g. If A2 > 1 then we report an error to the
caller. Otherwise g = 1. The output z = B2 · (2−k1−k2) satisﬁes
z = zg ≡ B2 · (2−k1−k2)g ≡ (A22k1+k2y)2−k1−k2 ≡ A2y = y (mod p).
If we pick t1 and t2 as large as possible during a shift reduction, then the new A1
and A2 will both be odd. The next subtraction and shift reductions will reduce
A1 + A2 by at least a factor of 2.
The values of A1 and A2 are bounded by p and x, respectively. The invariant
p = A1B2 − A2B1 ≥ B2 − B1 bounds B1 and B2.Bos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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Operation Estimated #cycles Quantity Estimated #cycles
per operation per iteration per iteration
Modular multiplication 53 6 318
Modular subtraction 5 6 30
Montgomery reduction 24 1 24
Modular inversion 4941
1
400 12
Miscellaneous 69 1 69
Total 453
Table 1. Estimated number of clock cycles for diﬀerent operations of our Pollard rho
implementation in one SPU.
4.3 The Distinguished Point and Partition Determination
Each application of an r-adding iteration function requires the determination of
the partition to follow for calculating the next point; see Section 3.4. Further-
more, the current unreduced point needs to be inspected for distinguishedness.
Since we are performing arithmetic modulo e p, the coordinates of the elliptic
curve point need to be reduced modulo p, i.e. this point cannot be used to
uniquely determine either the partition number or the the distinguished point
property. Given a point e P = (e x, e y), the idea is to compute a partial Montgomery
reduction [24] instead of normalizing e x modulo p which requires a full modu-
lar reduction at each iteration. This faster reduction computes e x · 2−16 mod p,
where the result of this operation is in [0,p − 1]. The uniqueness of both the
distinguished point property and the partition number is ensured.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the performance analysis of our Pollard rho imple-
mentation using the techniques described in Section 4 and show how this imple-
mentation has set a record by solving a 112-bit ECDLP. The previous record in
the computation of an ECDLP is for an elliptic curve over a 109-bit prime ﬁeld
with parameters taken from Certicom’s ECC challenge [4]. That problem was
solved in the year 2002 using “104 computers (mostly PCs) running 24 hours a
day for 549 days” [5].
5.1 Implementation details
Our software implementation is optimized for the SPE-architecture of the Cell
and uses all the techniques described in Section 3 with the exception of the nega-
tion map. This is because, the computational overhead for this technique, due
to the conditional branches required to check for fruitless cycles [13], results (in
our implementation on this architecture) in an overall performance degradation.
As an iteration function a 16-adding walk is used. In order to take advantage
of the Montgomery simultaneous inversion technique, 400 walks are processedPollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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in parallel. The number of concurrent walks is adjusted to the local storage re-
strictions of the PS3s. At the cost of 16 counters of 32 bits each per process,
updating the values ci+1, di+1 can be postponed until a distinguished point is
found.
Note that, in our implementation, several things can go wrong: we may have
dropped oﬀ the curve because we should have used curve doubling (in the unlikely
case that Xi = Rh(Xi), or in the unlikely case of incorrect reduction modulo e p,
cf. Prop. 1), or a wrong point may by accident again have landed on the curve,
and have nonsensical ci, di values. Just as the correct iterations, these wrong
points will after a while end up as distinguished points. Thus, whenever a point
is distinguished, we check that it indeed lies on the curve and that the equation
Xi = ciP + diQ holds for the alleged ci and di. Only correct distinguished
points are collected. If we hit upon a process that has gone oﬀ-track, all 400
concurrent processes on that SPU are terminated and restarted, each with a
fresh startpoint. This type of error-acceptance leads to enormous timesavings and
code-size reduction at negligible cost: we have not found even a single incorrect
distinguished point during in the process of solving this ECDLP instance.
A summary of estimated clock cycles needed for each operation is detailed in
Table 1. The 69 miscellaneous clock cycles stated in this table include the cost for
fetching the constant for the 16-adding walk, checking if a point is distinguished
and if so perform sanity checks and the overhead of conditional branches in the
main and the simultaneous inversion loop.
Modular Multiplication Our implementation of the modular multiplication
method, which is an 128-bit modular multiplication since we work with integers
reduced modulo e p, as described in Section 4.2, is aimed at ﬁlling both the odd
and even pipelines, to reduce the overall latency. The 4-SIMD multiplication is
done by using the multiply-and-add instruction. Extraction of higher and lower
16-bit parts of a 32-bit word elements is done by using two shuﬄe operations
which are performed in the odd pipeline.
Fast modular reduction, cf. Prop. 1, is implemented using eight multiply-and-
add instructions, seven additions, eight extractions of the lower parts and seven
extractions of the higher parts for the ﬁrst reduction phase. For the second reduc-
tion, only one multiply-and-add instruction is used since the maximum number
that can be added in the second reduction is 4. Most likely no further carries are
generated and modular reduction is complete. This condition is checked using
an conditional “if” branch with a branch-hint. In the unlikely case that carries
are generated, a penalty is paid and the remaining part of the reduction code is
executed.
The number of clock cycles needed for a modular multiplication is 53, as
shown in Table 1. This number is an average over a long benchmark run using
input data from the Pollard rho algorithm.
Modular Subtraction Modular subtraction is performed using operands rep-
resented in 4-SIMD with radix 232. A multi-word subtraction (four extendedBos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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subtractions and four generate borrow instructions), comparison (one compari-
son of the borrow), mask (four AND instructions) and addition (four extended
additions and three extended carry generation instructions) are performed in
order to avoid expensive branches. Conversions back and forth from represen-
tations using radix 216 and 232, in 4-SIMD, are performed using eight shuﬄe
operation for each conversion.
All in all, 16 instructions in the odd pipeline and 20 instructions in the even
pipeline are needed for four modular subtractions. The number of clock cycles
required for a single modular subtraction in practice is roughly ﬁve (see Table 1).
Modular Inversion The proposed modular inversion algorithm performs one
single modular inversion using the SIMD instructions of the SPE, with either
two or four active computations at a time. The 128-bit values of A1, B1, A2,
and B2 are stored using the data representation described in Section 4.1 with
w = 32. The initializations A1 = p, B1 = 0, B2 = 1 do not depend on x.
The initialization of A2 = x requires eight load and four shuﬄe instructions to
convert the input.
A shift reduction always starts with at least one of A1 and A2 being odd, by
Equation (4). We do not know which of these might be even, but can examine
both, in a SIMD fashion. The trailing zero bit count of a positive integer A is
the population count of A ∧ (A − 1). The PS3’s population count instruction
acts only on 8-bit data, so our t1 and t2 may not be maximal. The PS3 lets each
vector element have its own shift or rotate count, although a single instruction
cannot rotate some elements while others shift.
Within the subtraction reduction, the four 128-bit diﬀerences A1 −A2, B1 −
B2, A2 − A1, and B2 − B1 are evaluated in parallel. We exit the loop if neither
A1 − A2 nor A2 − A1 needs a borrow. Otherwise we update [A1,B1,A2,B2]
appropriately. Subtracting 1 from each element of the borrow vector gives masks
of −1 or 0 depending on the sign of A1−A2 or A2−A1. A shuﬄe of these masks
builds a selector which determines which parts of [A1,B1,A2,B2] are updated.
The ﬁnal multiplication with 2−k is done by ﬁrst looking up this value in
a table and next computing the modular multiplication as outlined in Prop. 1.
Hence, the modular inversion implementation takes as input an 128-bit integer
x and outputs an 128-bit integer z ≡ 1
x mod p with 0 ≤ x,z < e p.
5.2 Performance Comparison
In the paper by G¨ uneysu et al. [14] a ﬁeld-programmable gate array (FPGA)-
based multi-processing hardware architecture for the Pollard rho method tar-
geted at elliptic curves over prime ﬁelds is described. Performance details are
stated for a hardware implementation using XC3S1000 FPGAs targeted at ﬁeld
sizes of varying bit lengths.
Our PS3 implementation is targeted at an elliptic curve over a 112-bit prime
ﬁeld. We use 128-bit multiplication with fast reduction modulo the 128-bit spe-
cial modulus e p. The inversion of 128-bit values is performed modulo the 112-bitPollard Rho on the PlayStation 3
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prime. Experimental results show that modular multiplication using fast reduc-
tion (see Prop. 1) is roughly 20 percent faster compared to an implementation
of Montgomery multiplication on the SPE architecture. Because 128-bit reduc-
tion is used, we compare our performance results to the FPGA-results of elliptic
curves over 96- and 128-bit generic prime ﬁelds [14]. These results are given for
the cost-eﬃcient parallel architecture called COPACABANA [21]. This archi-
tecture can host up to 120 FPGAs at a total cost of approximately US$ 10,000
including material and production costs. Using this setup, a performance of
3.97 · 107 and 2.08 · 107 iterations per second can be achieved for the 96- and
128-bit versions respectively.
The current price for a PS3, as stated on large web-stores, is around US$ 300.
Hence, for the price of one COPACABANA, 33 PS3s can be purchased. The re-
sulting cluster of PS3s is able to compute 1.4 · 109 iterations per second. The
performance results reported in [14] are dated from 2007. We scale the perfor-
mance results according to Moore’s law [26], i.e. the performance is doubled. The
implementations by G¨ uneysu et al. use the negation map optimization, leading
to a
√
2 speed-up. The use of this technique results in some overhead related
to the detection and handling of fruitless cycles; the reason why we decided not
to use this technique in our SPE-implementation. Unfortunately, no details are
given related to this overhead. After scaling the COPACABANA performance
numbers by a factor two, due to Moore’s law, and assuming that the negation
map optimization technique is used, leading to a speed-up of a factor
√
2, the
PS3 cluster outperforms the COPACABANA machine by a factor 12.4 and 23.8
compared to the 96- and 128-bit versions respectively.
5.3 Solving a 112-bit ECDLP
We solved the ECDLP using the parameters of the standardized curve over a
112-bit prime ﬁeld using the methods and implementation as explained in this
article. The expected number of iterations is
pπ·n
2 ≈ 8.4 · 1016, where n is
the prime order of the base point P as speciﬁed in the standard, assuming the
negation map optimization is not used. The real number of required iterations
to solve this ECDLP was only two percent higher. The calculation has been
performed on a PS3 cluster of more than 200 PS3s and started on January 13,
2009 and ﬁnished on July 8, 2009. It ran on and oﬀ, occasionally interrupted by
other cryptanalytic projects. When run continuously using the latest version of
our code, the same calculation would have taken 3.5 months.
By selecting a DTP property with occurrence of approximately once every
224 points, we needed to store ≈ 5.0 · 109 DTPs. Storage of a DTP X = (x,y)
together with the values c and d such that X = cP + dQ, requires 4 · 112 bits
when storing in an uncompressed format. Hence, the total required storage sums
up to 4 · 112 · 5.0 · 109 bits ≈ 260 gigabyte. To facilitate collision ﬁnding using
standard unix commands the DTPs were stored in plaintext format increasing
the required storage to 615 gigabyte.Bos, Kaihara, Montgomery
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We solved the discrete logarithm with respect to P for the point Q. The point
P of order n are given in the standard and the x-coordinate of Q was chosen as
b(π − 3)1034c. The points P,Q and the solution to Q = lP are given here:
P = (188281465057972534892223778713752, 3419875491033170827167861896082688)
Q = (1415926535897932384626433832795028, 3846759606494706724286139623885544)
n = 4451685225093714776491891542548933
Q = 312521636014772477161767351856699 ·P
6 Conclusions
We have presented a high-performance PlayStation 3 (PS3) implementation of
the Pollard rho discrete logarithm algorithm on elliptic curves over prime ﬁelds.
Arithmetic algorithms have been designed for the SIMD-like architectures such
as the PS3. Using this implementation a record has been set by solving a 112-bit
ECDLP where the parameters are taken from a standardized curve. The time
required to solve this ECDLP instance is 62.6 PS3 years. This shows that given
the easy accessibility and the relatively low price of these game consoles, solving
ECDLPs for this bit-size is practical.
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Abstract. To encourage research on the hardness of the elliptic-curve
discrete-logarithm problem (ECDLP) Certicom has published a series of
challenge curves and DLPs.
This paper analyzes the costs of breaking the Certicom challenges over
the binary ﬁelds F2131 and F2163 on a variety of platforms. We describe
details of the choice of step function and distinguished points for the
Koblitz and non-Koblitz curves. In contrast to the implementations for
the previous Certicom challenges we do not restrict ourselves to software
and conventional PCs, but branch out to cover the majority of available
platforms such as various ASICs, FPGAs, CPUs and the Cell Broadband
Engine. For the ﬁeld arithmetic we investigate polynomial and normal
basis arithmetic for these speciﬁc ﬁelds; in particular for the challenges
on Koblitz curves normal bases become more attractive on ASICs and
⋆ This work has been supported in part by the National Science Foundation under
grant ITR-0716498 and in part by the European Commission through the ICT Pro-
gramme under Contract ICT–2007–216676 ECRYPT II.Everybody
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FPGAs.
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1 Introduction
In 1997, Certicom published several challenges [Cer97a] to solve the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) on elliptic curves. The challenges cover curves over
prime ﬁelds and binary ﬁelds at several diﬀerent sizes. For the binary curves,
each ﬁeld size has two challenges: a Koblitz curve and a random curve deﬁned
over the full ﬁeld.
For small bit sizes the challenges were broken quickly—the 79-bit challenges
fell already in 1997, those with 89 bits in 1998 and those with 97 bits in 1998 and
1999; Certicom described these parameter sizes as training exercises. In April
2000, the ﬁrst Level I challenge (the Koblitz curve ECC2K-108) was solved by
Harley’s team in a distributed eﬀort [Har] on a multitude of PCs on the Internet.
After that, it took some time until the remaining challenges with 109 bit ﬁelds
were tackled. The ECCp-109 (elliptic curve over a prime ﬁeld of 109 bits) was
solved on November 2002 and the ECC2-109 (random elliptic curve over a binary
ﬁeld with 109 bits) was solved in April 2004; both eﬀorts were organized by
Chris Monico. The gap of more than one year between the results is mostly due
to the Koblitz curves oﬀering less security per bit than curves deﬁned over the
extension ﬁeld or over prime ﬁelds. The Frobenius endomorphism can be used
to speed up the protocols using elliptic curves—the main reason Koblitz curves
are attractive in practice—but it also gives an advantage to the attacker. In
particular, over F2n the attack is sped up by a factor of approximately
√
n.
Since 2004 not much was heard about attempts to break the larger challenges.
Certicom’s documentation states “The 109-bit Level I challenges are feasible
using a very large network of computers. The 131-bit Level I challenges are
expected to be infeasible against realistic software and hardware attacks, unless
of course, a new algorithm for the ECDLP is discovered. The Level II challenges
are infeasible given today’s computer technology and knowledge.”
In this paper we analyze the cost of breaking the binary Certicom challenges:
ECC2K-130, ECC2-131, ECC2K-163 and ECC2-163. We collect timings for ﬁeld
arithmetic in polynomial and normal basis representation for several diﬀerent
platforms which the authors of this paper have at their disposal and outline the
ways of computing discrete logarithms on these curves. For Koblitz curves, the
Frobenius endomorphism can be used to speed up the attack by working with
classes of points. The step function in Pollard’s rho method has to be adjusted
to deal with classes. Per step a few more squarings are needed but the overall
savings in the number of steps is quite dramatic.
The SHARCS community has already had some analysis of the costs of break-
ing binary ECC on FPGAs at SHARCS’06 [BMdDQ06]. Our analysis is an
update of those results for current FPGAs and covers the concrete challenges.
Particular emphasis is placed on the FPGA used in the Copacobana FPGA clus-
ter. This way, part of the attack can be run on this cluster. Our research goesThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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further than [BMdDQ06] by dealing with other curves, considering many other
platforms and analyzing the best methods for how these platforms can work
together on computing discrete logarithms.
Our main conclusion is that the “infeasible” ECC2K-130 challenge is in fact
feasible. For example, our implementations can break ECC2K-130 in an expected
time of a year using only 4200 Cell processors, or using only 220 ASICs. For
comparison, [BMdDQ06] and [MdDBQ07] estimated a cost of nearly $20000000
to break ECC2K-130 in a year.
As validation of the designs and the performance estimates we reimplemented
and reran the ECC2K-95 challenge, using 30 2.4GHz cores on a Core 2 cluster for
a few days to re-break the ECC2K-95 challenge. Each core performed 4.7 million
iterations per second and produced distinguished points at the predicted speed.
For comparison, Harley’s original ECC2K-95 solution took 25 days on 200 Alpha
workstations, the fastest being 0.6GHz cores performing 0.177 million iterations
per second. The improvement is due not only to increased processor speeds but
also to improved implementation techniques described in this paper.
The project partners are working on collecting enough hardware to actu-
ally carry out the ECC2K-130 attack. Available resources include KU Leuven’s
VIC cluster (https://vscentrum.be/vsc-help-center/reference-manuals/
vic-user-manual and vic3-user-manual); several smaller clusters such as TU
Eindhoven’s CCCC cluster (http://www.win.tue.nl/cccc/); several high-end
GPUs (not yet covered in this paper); some FPGA clusters; and possibly some
ASICs. This is the ﬁrst time that one of the Certicom challenges is tackled with
a broad mix of platforms. This set-up requires extra considerations for the choice
of the step function and the distinguished points so that all platforms can coop-
erate in ﬁnding collisions despite diﬀerent preferences in point representation.
2 The Certicom challenges
Each challenge is to compute the ECC private key from a given ECC public key,
i.e. to solve the discrete-logarithm problem in the group of points of an elliptic
curve over a ﬁeld F2n. The complete list of curves is published online at [Cer97b].
In the present paper, we tackle the curves ECC2K-130, ECC2-131, ECC2K-163,
and ECC2-163, the parameters of which are given below.
The parameters are to be interpreted as follows: The curve is deﬁned over
the ﬁnite ﬁeld represented by F2[z]/F(z), where F(z) is the monic irreducible
polynomial of degree n given below for each challenge. Field elements are given as
hexadecimal numbers which are interpreted as bit strings giving the coeﬃcients
of polynomials over F2 of degree less than n. The curves are of the form y2+xy =
x3 + ax2 + b, with a,b ∈ F2n. For the Koblitz curve challenges the curves are
deﬁned over F2, i.e. a,b ∈ F2. The points P and Q are given by their coordinates
P = (P x,P y) and Q = (Q x,Q y). The group order is h   ℓ, where ℓ is a prime
and h is the cofactor.
– ECC2K-130 (F = z131 + z13 + z2 + z + 1)Everybody
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a = 0, b = 1
P_x = 05 1C99BFA6 F18DE467 C80C23B9 8C7994AA
P_y = 04 2EA2D112 ECEC71FC F7E000D7 EFC978BD
h = 04, l = 2 00000000 00000000 4D4FDD57 03A3F269
Q_x = 06 C997F3E7 F2C66A4A 5D2FDA13 756A37B1
Q_y = 04 A38D1182 9D32D347 BD0C0F58 4D546E9A
– ECC2-131 (F = z131 + z13 + z2 + z + 1)
a = 07 EBCB7EEC C296A1C4 A1A14F2C 9E44352E
b = 00 610B0A57 C73649AD 0093BDD6 22A61D81
P_x = 00 439CBC8D C73AA981 030D5BC5 7B331663
P_y = 01 4904C07D 4F25A16C 2DE036D6 0B762BD4
h = 02, l = 04 00000000 00000002 6ABB991F E311FE83
Q_x = 06 02339C5D B0E9C694 AC890852 8C51C440
Q_y = 04 F7B99169 FA1A0F27 37813742 B1588CB8
– ECC2K-163 (F = z163 + z8 + z2 + z + 1)
a = 1, b = 1
P_x = 02 091945E4 2080CD9C BCF14A71 07D8BC55 CDD65EA9
P_y = 06 33156938 33774294 A39CF6F8 C175D02B 8E6A5587
h = 02, l = 04 00000000 00000000 00020108 A2E0CC0D 99F8A5EF
Q_x = 00 7530EE86 4EDCF4A3 1C85AA17 C197FFF5 CAFECAE1
Q_y = 07 5DB1E80D 7C4A92C7 BBB79EAE 3EC545F8 A31CFA6B
– ECC2-163 (F = z163 + z8 + z2 + z + 1)
a = 02 5C4BEAC8 074B8C2D 9DF63AF9 1263EB82 29B3C967
b = 00 C9517D06 D5240D3C FF38C74B 20B6CD4D 6F9DD4D9
P_x = 02 3A2E9990 4996E867 9B50FF1E 49ADD8BD 2388F387
P_y = 05 FCBFE409 8477C9D1 87EA1CF6 15C7E915 29E73BA2
h = 02, l = 04 00000000 00000000 0001E60F C8821CC7 4DAEAFC1
Q_x = 04 38D8B382 1C8E9264 637F2FC7 4F8007B2 1210F0F2
Q_y = 07 3FCEA8D5 E247CE36 7368F006 EBD5B32F DF4286D2
The curves denoted ECC2K-X are binary Koblitz curves. This means that
their equation is deﬁned over F2 which, in turn, implies that the Frobenius
endomorphism σ operates on the set of points over F2n. Because σ commutes
with scalar multiplication, it operates on prime-order subgroups as a group au-
tomorphism. Consequently, there exists an integer s which is unique modulo ℓ
so that σ(P) = [s]P for all points P in the subgroup of order ℓ. The value of s
is computed as T − s = gcd(Tn − 1,T2 + (−1)aT + 2) in Fℓ[T].The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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3 Parallelized Pollard’s rho algorithm
In this section, we explain the parallelized version of Pollard’s rho method. First,
we describe the single-instance version of the method and then show how to
parallelize it with the distinguished-point method as done by van Oorschot and
Wiener in [vOW99]. Note that these descriptions give the “school-book versions”
for background; details on our actual implementation are given in Section 6.
3.1 Single-instance Pollard rho
Pollard’s rho method is an algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm in generic
cyclic groups. It was originally designed for ﬁnding discrete logarithms in F∗
p
[Pol78] and is based on Floyd’s cycle-ﬁnding algorithm and the birthday paradox.
In the following, let G be a cyclic group, using additive notation, of order ℓ with
a generator P. Given Q ∈ G, our goal is to ﬁnd an integer k such that [k]P = Q.
The idea of Pollard’s rho method is to construct a sequence of group elements
with the help of an iteration function f : G → G. This function generates a
sequence
Pi+1 = f(Pi),
for i ≥ 0 and some initial point P0. We compute elements of this sequence until a
collision of two elements occurs. A collision is an equality Pq = Pm with q  = m.
Let us assume we know how to write the elements Pi of the sequence as Pi =
[ai]P ⊕[bi]Q, then we can compute the discrete logarithm k = logP(Q) =
aq−am
bm−bq
if a collision Pq = Pm with bm  = bq has occurred. We show later how to obtain
such sequences.
Assuming the iteration function is a random mapping of size ℓ, i.e. f is
equally probable among all functions G → G, Harris in [Har60] showed that the
expected number of steps before a collision occurs is approximately
p
πℓ/2. The
sequence (Pi)i≥0 is called a random walk in G.
A pictorial description of the rho method can be given by drawing the Greek
letter ρ representing the random walk and starting at the tail at P0. “Walking”
along the line means going from Pi to Pi+1. If a collision occurs at Pt, then
Pt = Pt+s for some integer s, and the elements Pt,Pt+1,...,Pt+s−1 form a loop.
See Figure 1, and see Figure 2 for an example of how this picture occurs inside
the complete graph of a function.
In the original paper by Pollard it is proposed to ﬁnd a collision with Floyd’s
cycle-ﬁnding algorithm. The idea of this algorithm is to walk along the sequence
at two diﬀerent speeds and wait for a collision. This is usually realized by using
the two sequences Pi and P2i. Doing a step means to increase i by 1. If Pi = P2i
for some i, then we have found a collision.
To beneﬁt from this method it is necessary to construct walks on G that
behave like random mappings and for which for each element a representation
as Pi = [ai]P ⊕ [bi]Q is known. An example of a such a class of walks is the r-
adding walk as studied by Teske [Tes01]. The group G is divided in r partitions
using a partition function ψ : G → [0,r −1]. An element Rj = [cj]P ⊕[dj]Q, forEverybody
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Fig. 1. Abstract diagram of the rho method.
random cj and dj, is associated to each partition and the iteration function is
deﬁned as
Pi+1 = f(Pi) = Pi ⊕ Rψ(Pi),
and the values of ai and bi are updated as ai+1 = ai +cj, bi+1 = bi +dj. When
a collision Pq = Pm for q  = m is found, then we obtain
[aq]P ⊕ [bq]Q = [am]P ⊕ [bm]Q,
which implies (aq − am)P = (bm − bq)Q and hence k = logP(Q) =
aq−am
bm−bq . This
solves the discrete-logarithm problem. With negligible probability the diﬀerence
bm − bq = 0; in this case the computation has to be restarted with a diﬀerent
starting point P0. Teske showed that choosing r = 20 and random values for
the cj and dj approximates a random walk suﬃciently well for the purpose of
analyzing the function. For implementations, a power of 2 such as r = 8 or
r = 16 or r = 32 is more practical.
3.2 Parallelized version and distinguished points
When running N instances of Pollard’s rho method concurrently, a speed-up
of
√
N is obtained. To get a linear speedup, i.e. by a factor N, and thus to
parallelize Pollard’s rho method eﬃciently, van Oorschot and Wiener [vOW99]
proposed the distinguished-points method. It works as follows: One deﬁnes a
subset D of G such that D consists of all elements that satisfy a particular
condition. For example, we can choose D to contain all group elements whose s
least signiﬁcant bits are zero, for some positive integer s. This allows to easily
check if a group element is in D or not.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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Fig. 2. Example of the rho method. There are 1024 circles representing elements of
a set of size 1024. Each circle has an arrow to a randomly chosen element of the set;
the positions of circles in the plane are chosen (by the neato program) so that these
arrows are short. A walk begins at a random point indicated by a large red circle. The
walk stops when it begins to cycle; the cycle is shown in black. This walk involves 29
elements of the set.Everybody
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Fig. 3. Example of the parallelized rho method. Arrows represent the same randomly
generated function used in Figure 2. Each circle is, with probability 1/16, designated
a distinguished point and drawn as a large hollow circle. Four walks begin at random
points indicated by large red, green, blue, and orange circles. Each walk stops when it
reaches a distinguished point; those distinguished points are shown in black. The blue
and orange walks collide and ﬁnd the same distinguished point.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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Each instance starts at a new linear combination [a0]P ⊕[b0]Q and performs
the random walk until a distinguished point is found. The distinguished point,
together with the coeﬃcients ai,bi that lead to it, is then stored on a central
server. The server checks for collisions within the set of distinguished points and
can solve the DLP once one collision is found. As before, the diﬀerence bm − bq
can be zero. In this case the distinguished point Pq is discarded and the search
continues; note that the other stored distinguished points can lead to collisions
since all processes are started independently at random.
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the distinguished-points method.
4 Automorphisms of small order
Elliptic-curve groups allow very fast negation. On binary curves such as the
Certicom challenge curves, the negative of P = (x,y) is −P = (x,y + x). One
can speed up the rho method by a factor of
√
2 (cf. [WZ98]) by choosing an
iteration function deﬁned on sets {P,−P}. For example, one can take any iter-
ation function g, and deﬁne f(x,y) as g(min{(x,y),(x,y + x)}), ensuring that
f(−P) = f(P). Here min means lexicographic minimum. Special care has to be
taken to avoid fruitless short cycles; see method 1 below for details.
The ECC2-131 challenge has group size n ≈ 2130; up to negation there are
n/2 ≈ 2129 sets {P,−P}. In this case the expected number of steps is approxi-
mately
p
πn/4 ≈ 264.8. The ECC2-163 challenge has group size n ≈ 2162; in this
case
p
πn/4 ≈ 280.8.
The ECC2K-130 challenge has group size n ≈ 2129. The DLP is easier than
for the ECC2-131 challenge because this curve is a Koblitz curve allowing a very
fast Frobenius endomorphism. Speciﬁcally, if (x,y) is on the ECC2K-130 curve
then σ(x,y) = (x2,y2),σ4(x,y) = (x4,y4) and so on through (x2
130
,y2
130
) are
on the ECC2K-130 curve; note that (x2
131
,y2
131
) = (x,y). One can speed up the
rho method by an additional factor of
√
131 by choosing an iteration function
deﬁned on sets

±σi(x,y)|0 ≤ i < n
	
; there are only about n/262 ≈ 2121 of
these sets. In this case the expected number of rho iterations is approximately p
πn/524 ≈ 260.8. Similarly, the expected number of iterations for the ECC2K-
163 challenge is approximately 277.2.
The remainder of this section focuses on Koblitz curves, i.e. curves deﬁned
over F2 that are considered over extension ﬁelds F2n and considers how to deﬁne
walks on classes under the Frobenius endomorphism.
Speedups for solving the DLP on elliptic curves with automorphisms were
studied by several groups independently. The following text summarizes the
contributions by Wiener and Zuccherato [WZ98], Gallant, Lambert, and Van-
stone [GLV00], and Harley [Har]. In the following we describe two methods to
deﬁne a (pseudo-)random walk on the classes of points, where the class of a point
P also contains −P,±σ(P),±σ2(P),...,±σn−1(P).Everybody
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4.1 Method 1
This method was discovered by Wiener and Zuccherato [WZ98] and Gallant,
Lambert, and Vanstone [GLV00]. To apply the parallel Pollard rho method, the
iteration function (or step function) in the ﬁrst method uses a r-adding walk (see
[Tes01]), i.e. we have r pre-deﬁned random points R0,...,Rr−1 on the curve. To
perform a step of the walk, we add one of the Rj’s to the current point Pi to
obtain Pi+1. To determine which point to add to Pi, we partition the group of
points on the curve into r sets and deﬁne the map
ψ : E(F2n)  → {0,...,r − 1}, (1)
which assigns to each point on the curve one of the r partitions. With this map,
we could deﬁne the walk and the iteration function f as follows:
Pi+1 = f(Pi) = Pi ⊕ Rψ(Pi). (2)
However, more care is required to avoid fruitless, short cycles. Assume that Pi is
such that the unique representative of the class of Pi+1 = Pi ⊕Rψ(Pi) is −Pi+1;
this happens with probability 1/(2n). With probability 1/r the next added point
Rψ(−Pi+1) equals Rψ(Pi) and thus Pi+2 = Pi and the walk will never leave this
cycle. The probability of such cycles is 1/(2rn) and is thereby rather high. See
[WZ98] for a method to detect and deal with such cycles.
We deﬁne the unique representative per class by lexicographically ordering
all x-coordinates of the points in the class and choosing the “smallest” element in
that order. This element has most zeros starting from the most signiﬁcant bit. Of
the two possible y-coordinates chose the one with lexicographically smaller value.
Given that y and y +x are the candidate values and that the number of leading
zeros of x is known already, say i, it is easy to grab the distinguishing bit in the
y-coordinate as the (i+1)-th bit starting from the most signiﬁcant bit. Let Φ(P)
be this unique representative of the class containing P and let (b4,b3,b2,b1,1)
be the ﬁve least signiﬁcant bits of Φ(P). Let j = (b4,b3,b2,b1)2. Then we can
deﬁne the value of ψ(P) to be j ∈ {0,...,15}. The iteration function is then
given by
Pi+1 = f(Pi) = Φ(Pi) ⊕ Rψ(Pi).
To parallelize Pollard rho, we also need to deﬁne distinguished points (or
rather distinguished classes in the present case). For each class, we use the m
most signiﬁcant bits of x(Φ(P)). If these bits are all zero, then we deﬁne this
point (class) to be a distinguished one. With this, we can apply the methods
from Section 3.
4.2 Method 2
A method similar to the second method was described by Gallant, Lambert, and
Vanstone [GLV00]; Harley [Har] uses a similar method in his code to attack the
earlier Certicom challenges.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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This method does not need any precomputed random points Ri on the curve.
Instead, we deﬁne the walk and the iteration function f as
Pi+1 = f(Pi) = Pi ⊕ σj(Pi), (3)
where j is the Hamming weight of the binary representation of x(Pi) in normal
basis representation and σ the Frobenius automorphism. Note that if the com-
putations are not carried out in normal-basis representation it is necessary to
change the representation of x(P) from polynomial basis to normal basis at ev-
ery step. Note that in normal-basis representation the Hamming weight of x(Pi)
is equal to the Hamming weight of x(±σk(Pi)) for all k ∈ {0,...,130}. Note also
that
±σ(Pi+1) = ±σ(Pi) ± σj(σ(P)) = f(±σ(P))
and thus the step function is well deﬁned on the classes.
For parallel Pollard rho, we also need to deﬁne distinguished points (classes).
For example, we can say that a class is a distinguished one if the Hamming
weight of x(P) is less than or equal to w for some ﬁxed value of w. Note that
the value of a determines the parity of the Hamming weight since for all points
Tr(x(P)) = Tr(a). This means that (
 n
w

+
  n
w−2

+    )/2n−1 approximates the
probability of distinguished points as only about 2n−1 diﬀerent values can occur
as x-coordinates.
The proposed version by Gallant, Lambert, and Vanstone [GLV00] does not
use the Hamming weight to deﬁne j. Instead they use a unique representative
per class, e.g. the point with lexicographically smallest x-coordinate, and put
j = hash(x(P)) for hash a hash function from F2n to {0,1,...,n − 1}. Using
the Hamming weight of x(P) instead avoids the computation of the unique
representative at the expense of a somewhat less random walk. There are many
more points with a Hamming weight around n/2 than there are around the
extremal values 0 and n−1. See Section 6.2 for analysis of the loss of randomness.
Harley included an extra tweak to method 2 by using the Hamming weight
for updating the points but restricting the maximal exponent of σ in
Pi+1 = f(Pi) = Pi ⊕ σ
¯ j(Pi), (4)
by taking ¯ j as essentially the remainder of j modulo 7. He observed that for
n = 109 the equality (1 + σ3) = −(1 + σ) holds. He settled for scalars (1 +
σ1),(1 + σ2),(1 + σ4),(1 + σ5),(1 + σ6),(1 + σ7), and (1 + σ8). This limits the
number of times σ has to be applied per step. For sizes larger than 109 somewhat
larger exponents should be used. The walks resulting from this method are even
less resembling random walks but the computation is sped up by requiring fewer
squarings.
5 Cost estimates
In this section we apply Pollard’s rho method to elliptic curves and give rough
cost estimates in terms of ﬁeld operations. The next sections will translate theseEverybody
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estimates to the diﬀerent computation platforms we use in our attack. The ﬁne
tuning for the Certicom challenge ECC2K-130 is given in Section 6. In the fol-
lowing we use I to denote the cost of a ﬁeld inversion, M to denote the cost of
a ﬁeld multiplication, and S to denote the cost of a ﬁeld squaring.
5.1 Point representation and addition
Most high-speed implementations of elliptic-curve cryptography use inversion-
free coordinate systems for the scalar multiplication, i.e. they use a redundant
representation P = (XP : YP : ZP) to denote the aﬃne point (XP/ZP,YP/ZP)
(for ZP  = 0). In Pollard’s rho method it is important that Pi+1 is uniquely
determined by Pi. Thus we cannot use a redundant representation but have to
work with aﬃne points. For ordinary binary curves y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b
addition of P = (xP,yP) and Q = (xQ,yQ) with xP  = xQ is given by
(xR,yR) = (λ2 +λ+a+xP +xQ,λ(xR +xP)+yP +xR), where λ =
yP + yQ
xP + xQ
.
Each addition needs 1I, 2M, and 1S. Note that one of the multiplications could
be combined with the inversion to a division. However, we use a diﬀerent opti-
mization to reduce the expense of the inversion, the by far most expensive ﬁeld
operation.
5.2 Simultaneous inversion
All machines will run multiple instances in parallel. This makes it possible to
reduce the cost of the inversion by computing several inversions simultaneously
using a trick due to Montgomery [Mon87]. Montgomery’s trick is easiest ex-
plained by his approach to simultaneously inverting two elements a and b.
One ﬁrst computes the product c = a   b, then inverts c to d = c−1 and
obtains a−1 = b   d and b−1 = a   d. The total cost is 1I and 3M instead of 2I.
By extending this trick to N inputs one can obtain inverses of N elements at
the cost of 1I and 3(N − 1)M.
If N processes are running in parallel on one machine and the implementation
uses Montgomery’s trick to simultaneously invert all N denominators appearing
in the λ’s above, the cost per addition decreases to (1/N)I, (2+3(N −1)/N)M,
and 1S; for large N this can be approximated by 5M and 1S.
5.3 Inversion
Inversion is by far the most costly of the basic arithmetic operations. Most
implementations use one of two algorithms: the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
(EEA), published in many papers and books [MvOV96], [ACD+06] and Itoh-
Tsujii’s method [IT88] which essentially is using Fermat’s little theorem.
Let F2n be represented in polynomial basis. Each ﬁeld element f can be
regarded as a polynomial over F2 of degree less than n. The EEA ﬁnds elementsThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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u and v such that fu + Fv = 1. Then uf ≡ 1 mod F, degu < n and thus
u represents the multiplicative inverse of f. The classical EEA performs a full
division at each step. In practice for F2n ∼ = F2[X]/F(X), implementers often
choose a version of the EEA that replaces the divisions with division by X (a
right shift of the operand). Although this approach requires more iterations, it
is generally faster in practice. This is the approach most commonly seen when
elements of F2n are represented in polynomial basis but special implementation
strategies such as bit slicing are more suited for Itoh-Tsujii.
Although variants of EEA have been developed for normal basis representa-
tion [Sun06], the most eﬃcient approach is generally based on Itoh-Tsujii. This
algorithm proceeds from the observation that in F2n,f2
n
= f,f2
n−1 = 1, and
therefore f2
n−2 = f−1. Instead of performing divisions as in EEA, this algo-
rithm computes the 2(2n−1 − 1)th power. If f is represented in normal basis,
squarings are simply a left shift of the operand. The exponent is ﬁxed through-
out the computation, so addition chains can be used to minimize the number
of multiplications. For n = 131 a minimum-length addition chain to reach 130
is 1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128,130 and the corresponding addition chain on the expo-
nents is 21−1 = 1,22−1,24−1,28−1,216−1,232−1,264 −1,2128−1,2130 −1.
5.4 Field representation
Typically ﬁelds are represented in a polynomial basis using the isomorphism
F2n ∼ = F2[z]/F(z), where F(z) is an irreducible polynomial of degree n. A basis
is given by {1,z,z2,...,zn−1}. In this representation addition is done component
wise and multiplication is done as polynomial multiplication modulo F. Squaring
is implemented as a special case of multiplication; since all mixed terms disap-
pear in characteristic 2 the cost of a squaring is basically that of the reduction
modulo F. The Certicom challenges (see Section 2) are given in polynomial-basis
representation with F an irreducible trinomial or pentanomial.
An alternative representation of ﬁnite ﬁelds is to use normal bases. A normal
basis is a basis of the form {θ,θ2,θ2
2
,...,θ2
n−1
} for some θ ∈ F2n. Also in
this representation addition is done component wise. Squaring is very easy as it
corresponds to a cyclic shift of the coeﬃcient vector: if c =
Pn
i=0 ciθ2
i
then c2 =
Pn
i=0 ciθ2
i+1
=
Pn
i=0 ci−1θ2
i
, where c−1 = cn. Multiplications are signiﬁcantly
more complicated—to express θ2
i+2
j
in the basis usually a multiplication matrix
is given explicitly. If this matrix has particularly few entries then multiplications
are faster. The minimal number is 2n−1; bases achieving this number are called
optimal normal bases. For n = 131 such a basis exists but for n = 163 it does
not. Alternatives are to use Gauss periods and redundant representations to
represent ﬁeld elements.
Converting from one basis to the other is done with help of a transition
matrix, an n × n matrix over F2.Everybody
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5.5 Cost of one step
In the following sections we will consider implementations on various platforms in
diﬀerent representations—in particular looking at polynomial and normal basis
representations. When using distinguished points within the random walk it is
important that the walk is deﬁned with respect to a ﬁxed ﬁeld representation.
So, if diﬀerent platforms decide to use diﬀerent representations it is important
to change between bases to ﬁnd the next step.
The following sections collect the raw data for the cost of one step, in Sec-
tion 6 we go into details of how the attack against ECC2K-130 is implemented
and give justiﬁcation.
For the Koblitz curves when using method 1, each step takes 1 elliptic curve
addition, (n−1)S (to ﬁnd the lexicographically smallest representative), and 1S
to a variable power of the y-coordinate. In particular if x(P)2
m
gave the unique
representative, one needs to compute y(P)2
m
. Note that the intermediate powers
of y(P) are not needed and special routines can be implemented. We report these
ﬁgures as m-squarings, costing mS. We do not count the costs for updating the
counters ai and bi.
When using method 2 each step takes 1 elliptic curve addition and 2 mS. If
the computations are done in polynomial basis, then also the cost for conversion
to normal basis need to be considered. If Harley’s speedup is used, then the m
in the m-squarings is signiﬁcantly restricted.
6 Fine-tuning of the attack for Certicom ECC2K-130
In this section, we describe the concrete approach we take to attack the DLP on
ECC2K-130 deﬁned in Section 2.
6.1 Choice of step function
Of course we use the Frobenius endomorphism and deﬁne the walk on classes
under Frobenius and negation. Of the two methods described in Section 4 we
prefer the second. Advantages are that it can be applied in polynomial basis
as well as in normal basis, that it automatically avoids short, fruitless cycles
and thus does not require special routines, that there is no need to store pre-
computed points, and that it avoids computing the unique representative in the
step function (computing the Hamming weight is faster than 130S). If the main
computation is done in polynomial-basis representation, a conversion to normal
basis is required.
We analyzed the orders of (1 + σj) modulo the group order for all small
values of j. For j ≥ 3 no small orders appear. To get suﬃcient randomness and
to have an easily computable step function we compute the Hamming weight of
x(P), divide it by 2, reduce the result modulo 8 and add 3. So the updates are
(1 + σj) for j ∈ {3,4,...,10}. For this set we additionally checked that there
does not exist any linear relation with small coeﬃcients between the discreteThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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logarithms of (1 + σj) modulo ℓ. The shortest vector in the lattice spanned by
the logarithms has four-digit coeﬃcients. This means that fruitless collisions are
highly unlikely.
6.2 Heuristic analysis of non-randomness
Consider an adding walk on ℓ group elements that maps P to P + R0 with
probability p0, P + R1 with probability p1, and so on through P + Rr−1 with
probability pr−1, where R0,R1,...,Rr−1 are distinct group elements and p0 +
p1 +     + pr−1 = 1.
If Q is a group element, and P,P ′ are two independent uniform random group
elements, then the probability that P,P ′ both map to Q without having P = P ′
is (1−p2
0−p2
1−   −p2
r−1)/ℓ2. Indeed, if P = Q−Ri and P ′ = Q−Rj, with i  = j,
then P maps to Q with probability pi and P ′ maps to Q with probability pj; there
is chance 1/ℓ2 that P = Q − Ri and P ′ = Q − Rj in the ﬁrst place; overall the
probability is
P
i =j pipj/ℓ2 = (
P
i,j pipj −
P
j p2
j)/ℓ2 = (1 −
P
j p2
j)/ℓ2. Adding
over the ℓ choices of Q one sees that the probability of an immediate collision
from P,P ′ is at least (1 −
P
j p2
j)/ℓ.
In the context of Pollard’s rho algorithm (or its parallelized version), after
a total of T iterations, there are T(T − 1)/2 pairs of iteration outputs. The
inputs are not uniform random group elements, and the pairs are not indepen-
dent, but one might nevertheless guess that the overall success probability is
approximately 1−(1−(1−
P
j p2
j)/ℓ)T(T−1)/2, and that the average number of
iterations before success is approximately
q
πℓ/(2(1 −
P
j p2
j)). This is a special
case of the variance heuristic introduced by Brent and Pollard in [BP81].
For example, if p0 = p1 =     = pr−1 = 1/r, then this heuristic states that ℓ
is eﬀectively divided by 1 − 1/r, increasing the number of iterations by a factor
of 1/
p
1 − 1/r ≈ 1 + 1/(2r), as discussed by Teske [Tes01].
The same heuristic applies to a multiplicative walk that maps P to sjP with
probability pj: the number of iterations is multiplied by 1/
q
1 −
P
j p2
j. In par-
ticular, for the ECC2K-130 challenge, the Hamming weight of x(P) is congruent
to 0,2,4,6,8,10,12,14 modulo 16 with respective probabilities approximately
0.1443,0.1359,0.1212,0.1086,0.1057,0.1141,0.1288,0.1414,
so our walk multiplies the number of iterations by approximately 1.069993. Note
that any walk determined by the Hamming weight will multiply the number of
iterations by at least 1/
q
1 −
P
j
 131
2j
2
/2260 ≈ 1.053211.
6.3 Choice of distinguished points
In total about 260.9 group operations are needed to break the discrete logarithm
problem. If we choose Hamming weight 28 for distinguished points then there
will be an average length of 235.4 steps before hitting a distinguished point,Everybody
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since (
 131
28

+
 131
26

+   )/2130 is approximately 2−35.4, and an expected number
of 225.5 distinguished points. Note that for this curve a = 0 and thus each x-
coordinate has trace 0 and so the Hamming weight is even for any point. If we
instead choose Hamming weight 32 for distinguished points then there will be an
average length of 228.4 steps before hitting a distinguished point and an expected
number of 232.5 distinguished points.
6.4 Implementation details
Most computations will not lead to a collision. Our implementation does not
compute the intermediate scalars ai and bi nor does it store a list of how often
each of the exponents j appeared. Instead the starting point of each walk is
computed deterministically from a salt S. When a distinguished point is found,
the salt together with the distinguished point is reported to the central server.
When distinguished points are noticed, x(P) is given in normal basis rep-
resentation, so it makes sense to keep them in normal basis. To search for col-
lisions it is necessary to have a unique representative per class. We choose the
lexicographically smallest value of x(P),x(P)2,...,x(P)2
130
. In normal basis
representation this is easily done by inspecting all cyclic shifts of x(P). To save
bandwidth a 64-bit hash of this unique representative is reported to the server
along with the original 64-bit seed.
If the server detects a collision on the 64-bit hash, it recovers the two starting
points from the salt values and follows the random walk from the initial points,
this time keeping track of how often each of the powers j appears. Like in the ini-
tial computation the distinguished point is noticed by a small Hamming weight
of the normal basis representation of the x-coordinate. If the x-coordinates co-
incide up to cyclic shifts, i.e. the partial collision gave rise to a complete one,
the unique representative per class is computed. Note that this time also the y-
coordinate needs to be transformed to normal basis to obtain the correct result.
Finally the equivalence of σ and s mod ℓ is used to compute the scalars on
both sides and thereby (eventually) the DLPP(Q).
It is possible for a 64-bit hash collision to occur by accident, rather than from
a distinguished-point collision. We could increase the 64-bit hash to 96 bits or
128 bits to eliminate these accidents. However, a larger hash costs bandwidth and
server storage, and the beneﬁt is small. Even with as many as 232 distinguished
points, accidental 64-bit collisions are unlikely to occur more than a few times,
and disposing of the accidents has negligible cost.
We plan to use several servers storing disjoint lists of distinguished points:
e.g., server i out of 8 receives the distinguished points where the ﬁrst 3 hash bits
are equal to i in binary. This initial routing means that each server then has to
handle only 1/8 of the total volume of distinguished points.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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7 FPGA implementations
The attacks presented in this section are developed for the latest version of CO-
PACOBANA [KPP+06], which is a tightly integrated, reconﬁgurable hardware
cluster.
The 2009 version of COPACOBANA oﬀers 128 Xilinx Spartan-3 XC3S5000-
4FG676 FPGAs, laid out on 16 plug-in modules each hosting 8 chips. Each chip
is conﬁgured with 32 MB of dedicated oﬀ-chip local RAM. Serial data lines
connect the FPGAs as a systolic array on the backplane, passing data packets
from one device to the next in round robin fashion before they ﬁnally reach
their destination. Up to two separate controller units interface the systolic array
(via PCIe) to the mainboard of a low-proﬁle PC that is integrated within the
same case as COPACOBANA. In addition to data routing, the PC can perform
post-processing before it stores or distributes the results to other nodes.
This section presents preliminary results comparing two choices for the un-
derlying ﬁeld arithmetic on COPACOBANA. The ﬁrst approach performs arith-
metic operations on elements represented in polynomial basis, converting to nor-
mal basis as needed, while the second operates directly on elements represented
in normal basis.
7.1 Polynomial basis implementation
The cycle counts and delay are based on the results of implementations on FPGA
(Xilinx XC3S5000-4FG676). For multiplication, digit-serial multiplier is imple-
mented. The choice of digit-size is based on a preliminary exploration of the
trade-oﬀ between speed and area. Here we choose digit-size d = 22 and d = 24
for F2131 and F2163, respectively.
For inversion, we used the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm. Although EEA runs faster
than Itoh-Tsujii, it requires its own data path, adding extra cost in area. Using
Montgomery’s trick for batch inversion lowers the amortized cost to (3−1/N)M+
(1/N)I per inversion. The selection of N = 64 is a trade-oﬀ between performance
and area. One inversion in F2131 takes 212 cycles, and one multiplication takes
8 cycles. Choosing N = 64, each inversion on average takes 28 cycles, and the
whole design takes 8 out of 104 BRAMs on the target FPGA. If we increase N
to 128, the cost of one inversion drops to 26 cycles. However, the whole design
requires 16 BRAMs. Since the current design uses around %11 of the LUTs of
the FPGA, we can put 8∼9 copies of current design onto this FPGA if we do
not use more than %11 BRAMs for each.
Tab. 1 shows the cycle counts of each ﬁeld operation. The cost of memory
access is included.
In order to check the Hamming weight of x-coordinate, we convert the x-
coordinate to normal basis in each iteration. The basis conversion and population-
count operations are performed in parallel and therefore do not add extra delay
to the loop.Everybody
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additions squarings m-squarings multiplications inversions batch-inv. (N = 64)
F2131 2 2 m+1 8 212 28
F2163 2 2 m+1 9 251 31
Table 1. Cycle counts for ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis on XC3S5000-4FG676
The design is synthesized with Xilinx ISE 11.1. On Xilinx XC3S5000-4fg676
FPGA, our current design for F2131 and F2163 can reach a maximum frequency
of 74.6 MHz and 74 MHz, respectively. Table 2 shows the delay of one iteration.
ECC2K-130 ECC2-131 ECC2-163
Method 1 Method 2
1I + 2M + 131S + 1mS 1I + 2M + 1S + 2mS 1I + 2M + 1S 1I + 2M + 1S
Cycles 371 71 38 51
Delay (ns) 4,971 951 509 714
Table 2. Cost of one iteration in polynomial basis on XC3S5000-4FG676
The current design for ECC2K-130 uses 3,656 slices, including 1,468 slices
for multiplier, 75 slices for square, 1,206 slices for base conversion and 117 slices
for Hamming Weight counting. Since a Xilinx XC3S5000 FPGA has 33,280
slices, taking input/output circuits into account, we estimate 9 copies of the
polynomial-basis design can ﬁt in one FPGA. Considering 235 iterations are re-
quired on average to generate one distinguished point, each copy generates 2.6
distinguished points per day. A single chip can then be expected to yield 23.4
distinguished points per day.
The current design for ECC2-131 uses 2,206 slices. Note that circuits to search
for the smallest x(P) is not included. We estimate that 12 copies (limited by
BRAM) can ﬁt in one FPGA.
The current design for ECC2K-163 uses 4,446 slices, including 2,030 slices
for multiplier, 94 slices for square and 1,209 slices for base conversion and 217
slices for Hamming Weight counting. We estimate that 7 copies can ﬁt in one
FPGA.
The current design for ECC2-163 uses 3,242 slices. Note that circuits to
search for the smallest x(P) is not included. We estimate that 9 copies can ﬁt
in one FPGA.
For ECC2-131, it is the number of BRAM that stops us putting more copies
of ECC engine. We believe that the eﬃciency of BRAMs usage can be further
improved, and more copies can be instantiated on one FPGA.
7.2 Normal basis implementation
These estimates are based on an initial implementation of a bit-serial normal-
basis multiplier. At the conclusion of this section, we provide an estimate for theThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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digit-serial version currently under development. The bit-serial design computes
a single bit of the product in each clock cycle. Because of this relatively slow
performance, it consumes very little area. For F2131, the multiplier takes 466
slices of the chip’s available 66,560, or less than 1%, while F2163 requires 679
slices, or around 1%.
additions squarings m-squarings multiplications inversions batch-inversions
F2131 1 1 1 131 1065
F2163 1 1 1 163 1629
Table 3. Cycle counts for ﬁeld operations in normal basis on Xilinx XC3S5000-
5FG1156
An implementation of the full Rho step would instantiate at least one mul-
tiplier expressly for the Itoh-Tsujii inversion routine and process several points
simultaneously to keep the inversion unit busy. Our implementation results take
this approach: each engine consists of one multiplier dedicated to inversion and
eight for ordinary multiplication. The result for F2131 is an area requirement of
1,915 slices while achieving a clock rate of 85.898 MHz.
The inversion unit is the bottleneck at 1,065 cycles required. We can use
Montgomery’s trick to perform many simultaneous inversions. So the design
challenge becomes one of keeping the inversion unit busy, spreading the cost of
the inverter across as many simultaneous Rho steps as possible.
Suppose we process 32 inversions simultaneously using one inversion unit.
This operation introduces 8M cycles of delay. Method 2 requires 1I+2M+1S+
1mS to compute one step of the Rho method. Because squarings are free, we
must compute two additional multiplications per step. On top of this cost are
the 3(N − 1) = 157 multiplications needed for the pre- and post-computation
to obtain individual inverses. Although we might be able to spread a particular
step across several multipliers, we can safely assume that keeping the inversion
unit busy this way requires up to a total of 32 additional multipliers. The chip
has embedded storage for up to 1,664 points, far more than required. With
this approach, these multipliers would be idle roughly ﬁve-eighths of the time;
this estimate is meant to be conservative. At a cost of 466 slices each, we can
expect an engine to consume a total of 14,912 slices. Instantiating all these
multipliers has the advantage that we can complete 32 steps every 1,065 cycles,
or one step every 34 cycles. At 85.898 MHz, that equates to 2,526,411 steps per
second, or 6 distinguished points per day per engine. As a single chip has 66,360
slices available, four of these engines could be instantiated per chip, yielding 24
distinguished points per day per chip. This ﬁgure may underestimate the time
required for overhead like memory access.
Mitigating this eﬀect is the fact that the time-area product can surely be
improved by modifying the multiplier to use a digit-serial approach as described
in [NS06]. This time-area tradeoﬀ processes d bits of the product simultaneouslyEverybody
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at a cost of additional area. We are currently implementing this approach; the
previous work indicates that this approach can improve the time-area product.
As of this writing, normal-basis results for F2163 are still pending.
7.3 Comparison
Both polynomial and normal-basis implementations oﬀer roughly the same per-
formance today. Because the polynomial-basis implementation is in a more ma-
ture state, embodying the entire step of the Rho method, it represents less risk
and uncertainty in terms of use in a practical attack. It achieves this performance
despite the fact that this particular Certicom challenge would appear to be ide-
ally suited to a normal-basis implementation. As a case in point, the polynomial
version must pay the overhead to convert elements back to normal basis at the
end of each step to check if a distinguished point has been reached.
As this paper represents work in progress, the normal-basis ﬁgures in this
section are based on measurements only of the ﬁeld arithmetic time and area.
While the estimates may not fully account for overhead like memory access, they
also do not capture the eﬀect of migrating to a digit-serial multiplier. Because
multiplication cost dominates the cost of inversion – and therefore the cost of a
step of the Rho method, the normal-basis approach may ultimately oﬀer higher
performance because in this particular attack. Performance of the polynomial-
basis version may also improve in unforeseen ways and it would undoubtedly
outperform the normal-basis version in an attack on ECC2-131.
8 Hardware implementations
In this section we present and discuss the results achieved while targeting ASIC
platforms. To obtain the estimates presented in this work, we have used the
UMC L90 CMOS technology, using the Free Standard Cell library from Fara-
day Technology Corporation characterized for HS-RVT (high speed regular Vt)
process option with 8 Metal layers. For synthesis results we have used design
compiler 2008.09 from Synopsys, and for placement and routing we have used
SoC Encounter 7.1-usr3 from Cadence Design Systems.
Both synthesis and post-layout analysis use typical corner values, and rea-
sonable assumptions for constraints. The designs are for performance estimate
and are not reﬁned for actual production (i.e. they do not contain test struc-
tures, a practical I/O subsystem). During synthesis, multiple runs were made
with diﬀerent constraints, and the results with the best area time product have
been selected.
8.1 Polynomial basis implementation
For the polynomial basis, the estimates are based on the work presented by
Meurice de Dormale et al. in [MdDBQ07] and Bulens et al. in [BMdDQ06] where
the authors proposed an implementation based on a pipelined architecture.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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Addition The addition of n-bits will always be equal to 2n-input XOR gates.
No separate synthesis has been made for this circuit. In a practical circuit
the interconnection between the adder the rest of the circuit would have a
signiﬁcant impact upon the delay and the area of the circuit. The delay for
the addition is approximately 75 ps, while the required area is approximately
n 2.5 Gate Equivalents (GEs). No post-layout results are given for this circuit
as a standalone implementation is not representative.
Squaring Squaring is performed with a parallel squarer. This operator is rel-
atively inexpensive thanks to the use of a sparse irreducible polynomial, a
pentanomial, which is hardwired. Each bit of the result is therefore com-
puted using few XOR gates. The detailed results for ASIC implementation
are reported in Table 4, where, due to the small size of this component, no
post-layout analysis is provided.
F2131 F2163
Pre-layout Pre-layout
Delay (ps) ∼ 250 250
Frequency (GHz) ∼ 4.0 4.0
Flip-Flop Number 131 163
Area (mm
2) ∼ 0.003 0.004
GE ∼ 960 1200
Table 4. Results for ASIC implementation of Squarer in polynomial basis
m-Squaring This operation can be implemented using a single squarer that
iteratively computes the m squarings in m clock cycles.
Multiplication In order to perform the modular multiplication, we used a sub-
quadratic Karatsuba parallel multiplier. As for squaring, the modular reduc-
tion step is easily performed with a few XOR gates for each bit of the result.
The modular multiplier has a pipeline depth of 8 clock cycles in both F2131
and F2163 and produces a result at each clock cycle. The detailed results for
the modular multiplication are reported in Table 5
F2131 F2163
Pre-layout Post-layout Pre-layout Post-layout
Delay (ps) ∼ 470 585 500 575
Frequency (GHz) ∼ 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.7
Flip-Flop Number 4608 4608 5768 5768
Area (mm
2) ∼ 0.175 0.185 0.227 0.250
GE ∼ 55000 59000 72500 80000
Table 5. Results for ASIC implementation of Multiplication in polynomial basisEverybody
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Inversion The inversion is based on Fermat’s little theorem with the multipli-
cation chain technique by Itoh and Tsujii. This method is preferred to the
extended Euclidean algorithm according to the comparison of both methods
performed in the work by Bulens et al. [BMdDQ06]. An inversion requires
130 squarings and 8 multiplications in F2131 and 162 squarings and 9 multi-
plications in F2163. The inverter uses the parallel multiplier described above
and a block of several pipelined consecutive squarers. This block allows to
speed up the consecutive squarings required in the inversion using the Itoh-
Tsujii technique. It is done by putting several squarers in a serial way, so
that every bit of the result is now computed with a larger number of XOR
gates, depending on the number of squarings to be performed. Within the
inverter, the block of consecutive squarers actually allows to compute sev-
eral possible numbers of consecutive squarings (the numbers of consecutive
squarings speciﬁed by the technique of Itoh and Tsujii). The inversion is
done by looping over the multiplier and the squarer according to the tech-
nique of Itoh and Tsujii. For this purpose, extra shift registers are required.
The inverter has a pipeline depth of 16 and achieves an inversion with a
mean delay of 10 and 11 clock cycles in F2131 and F2163 respectively.
A lower bound on the area requirement of the inverter can be found by gath-
ering the results for the squarer and the multiplier. This leads to around
60000 GE for F2131 and 81200 for F2163. However, this assumes an itera-
tive use of the squarer. For the parallel pipelined inverter described above,
a better estimate can be obtained by approximating the block of consecu-
tive squarers as a series of single squarers. The number of these consecutive
squarers is given by the maximum number of consecutive squarings in the
technique of Itoh and Tsujii on F2131 and F2163, i.e. 64 in both cases. As a
result, the area cost of the block of consecutive squarers should be around
64000 and 76800 GE for F2131 and F2163 respectively, leading to an area cost
of 123000 GE and 156800 for the full parallel inverter on F2131 and F2163
respectively.
The inverter has a much higher area cost and lower throughput with respect
to the multiplier. From an area-time point of view, it is interesting to com-
bine several inversions using the Montgomery trick instead of replicating
several inverters when trying to increase the throughput of inversions. As
each combined inversion requires 3 multiplications to be performed, it seems
to be always interesting to use the Montgomery trick instead of replicating
several inverters. In practice, the gain of using Montgomery’s trick can be
smaller than expected, as stated in [BMdDQ06]. Simultaneous inversion does
not require a speciﬁc operator as it can be built upon the multiplier and the
inverter.
Conversion A conversion from polynomial to normal basis is required when
using method 2 as described in Section 4.2. The detailed results for this
operation are reported in Table 6.The Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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F2131 F2163
Pre-layout Pre-layout
Delay (ps) ∼ 410 460
Frequency (GHz) ∼ 2.4 2.15
Flip-Flop Number 0 0
Area (mm
2) ∼ 0.044 0.061
GE ∼ 13900 19400
Table 6. Results for ASIC implementation of Polynomial to Normal Basis converter
additions squarings m-squarings multiplications inversions
F2131 1 1 m 1 10
F2163 1 1 m 1 11
Table 7. Cycle counts for ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis on ASIC
8.2 Normal basis implementation
Addition For ASIC, the addition is performed in a way similar to the one of
polynomial bases.
Squaring In normal basis, the squaring is equivalent to a rotation, thus the
impact on the area and delay of this component will be mainly due to the
interconnections.
m-Squaring This operation can be achieved by an iterative use of a single
squarer as for the polynomial basis. However, since a squaring is equivalent
to a rotation, one can anticipate the m rotations and perform this operation
in one clock cycle.
Multiplication The proposed implementation is based on a bit-serial multiplier
which calculates a single bit product every clock cycle. The detailed results
for the modular multiplication are reported in Table 8.
F2131 F2163
Pre-layout Post-layout Pre-layout Post-layout
Delay (ps) ∼ 510 550 485 576
Frequency (GHz) ∼ 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.75
Flip-Flop Number 402 402 661 611
Area (mm
2) ∼ 0.015 0.016 0.025 0.027
GE ∼ 5000 5250 7900 8800
Table 8. Results for ASIC implementation of Field element multiplier in normal basis
Inversion Also in normal bases, the inversion is implemented using Fermat’s
little theorem, thus the considerations of Section 8.1 hold also in this case.
The number of cycle counts for the operations in normal basis on ASIC
are shown in Table 9. The area requirement of the inverter in normal basisEverybody
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should not be signiﬁcantly higher than the cost of the multiplier since the
multiple squarings can be performed with interconnections only. Therefore,
it should be close to the lower bound given by the area cost of the multiplier,
i.e. 5250 GE for F2131.
additions squarings m-squarings multiplications inversions
F2131 1 1 1 131 1178
F2163 1 1 1 163 1629
Table 9. Cycle counts for ﬁeld operations in normal basis on ASIC
8.3 Cost of step on ECC2K-130
A step in the Pollard rho computation on ECC2K-130 consumes 1I+2M+131S+
1mS using method 1. In polynomial basis, this takes 273 cycles on an ASIC while
in normal basis it takes 1572 cycles. Using method 2, a step requires 1I+2M+
1S + 2mS and the additional conversion to normal basis if the computations
are done in polynomial basis. In polynomial basis, the step is performed in 274
cycles on an ASIC while in normal basis it is done in 1443 cycles. A larger cycle
count for the normal basis is due to the iterative approach of the design of the
components in this basis as opposed to the parallel design used for the polynomial
basis. These cycles counts do not consider the use of simultaneous inversion since
the gain of this method should be assessed once the whole processor is assembled,
following [BMdDQ06]. This technique should be employed as much as possible
given the high cost of an inversion. Therefore, the cycle counts are likely to be
signiﬁcantly lower in practice. For instance, combining 10 inversions theoretically
lowers the cycle count for the step in normal basis by about 50%.
Concerning the area, a lower bound can be determined by gathering the
costs of the operators. Note that this bound does not include the cost of storing
elements. In polynomial basis, the lower bound on the area of a processor based
on the components described above is roughly 125000 GE when using method
1 and 140000 GE for method 2. It is mostly the cost of the inverter, as its
multiplier can also be used to perform the two multiplications needed in each
step. In normal basis, the same estimate leads to 6000 GE (mainly the cost of the
multiplier). Based on these estimates, the processor relying on the normal basis
appears to be more eﬃcient from an area-time point of view as it is roughly 6
times slower but 20 times smaller. However, the use of several squarers in parallel
should improve the area-time product of the processor relying on the polynomial
basis.
8.4 Cost of step on ECC2-131
A step in the Pollard rho computation on ECC2-131 consumes 1I + 2M + 1S.
In polynomial basis this takes 13 cycles on ASIC while in normal basis it takesThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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1441 cycles. Again, the iterative approach used in the normal basis causes a
higher cycle count for the normal basis operators. The area costs are on the
same order as on ECC2K-130. Therefore, the processor based on the polynomial
basis appears to be more eﬃcient here since it is 110 faster while being only 20
times larger.
8.5 Cost of step on ECC2-163
A step in the Pollard rho computation on ECC2-163 consumes 1I + 2M + 1S.
In polynomial basis this takes 14 cycles on ASIC while in normal basis it takes
1956 cycles.
The processor based on the polynomial basis has a lower bound on the area
cost around 160000 GE (mainly the cost of the inverter). It is 140 times faster
than the one based on the normal basis. For this reason, it is expected to be
more area-time eﬃcient, as on ECC2-131.
8.6 Detailed cost of the full attack on ECC2K-130
With the cost of individual arithmetic blocks given above, we can now attempt
a ﬁrst order estimation of cost and performance of an ASIC that could be used
for the ECC2K-130 challenge. We will consider using a standard 16mm2 die in
the 90nm CMOS technology using a multi-project wafer (MPW) production in
prototype quantities. The cost of producing and packaging 50-250 of such ASICs
is estimated to be less than 60 000 EUR.
The performance of the subcomponents described in the preceding sections
were all post-layout ﬁgures that include interconnection delays, clock distribution
overhead and all required registers. We estimate that the overall clock rate will
be around 1.5 GHz when all the components are combined into one system. Each
chip would require a PLL for to distribute the internal clock. In this estimation
we will again leave a generous margin in the timing and will assume that the
system clock is 1.25 GHz.
When using the speciﬁc standard cell library the 16mm2, 90nm CMOS die
has a net core area of 12mm2, which could support approximately 3.000.000 gates
with generous overhead for power routing and placement. Reserving 1.000.000
gates for PLL, I/O interface and a shared point inspection unit, we will consider
that only 2.000.000 gates will be available for point calculation units. A single
chip could thus support 400 cores in parallel. Considering that each core requires
1572 clock cycles per iteration (section 7.3), such an ASIC would be able to cal-
culate approximately 320 Miterations/s. The estimation of the complete attack
able to break ECC2K-130 in one year would require approximately 69 000 Mit-
erations/s. Even our overly pessimistic estimation shows that this performance
can be achieved by a modest collection of around 220 dedicated ASICs.Everybody
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9 AMD64 implementations
This section describes our software implementation for general-purpose CPUs
supporting the amd64 (also known as “x86-64”) instruction set. This imple-
mentation is tuned for Intel’s popular Core 2 series of CPUs but also performs
reasonably well on other recent CPUs, such as the AMD Phenom.
9.1 Bitslicing
New speed records for elliptic-curve cryptography on the Core 2 were recently
announced in a Crypto 2009 paper [Ber09a]. The new speed records combine
a fast complete addition law for binary Edwards curves, fast bitsliced multipli-
cation for arithmetic in F2n, and the Core 2’s fast instructions for arithmetic
on 128-bit vectors. Our amd64 implementation combines the bitsliced multipli-
cation techniques from [Ber09a] with several additional techniques for bitsliced
computation. (Binary Edwards curves do not appear to save time in this context;
the implementation uses standard aﬃne coordinates for Weierstrass curves.)
Bitslicing a data structure is a simple matter of transposition. Our imple-
mentation represents 128 elliptic-curve points (x0,y0),(x1,y1),...,(x127,y127),
with xi,yi ∈ F2n, as 2n vectors X0,X1,...,Xn−1,Y0,Y1,...,Yn−1, where the
jth bits of Xi and Yi are the ith bits of xj and yj respectively.
“Logical” vector operations act on bitsliced inputs as 128-way SIMD instruc-
tions. For example, a vector XOR carries out xors in parallel on 128 pairs of
bits. Multiplication in F2n can be decomposed into bit operations, a series of
bit XORs and bit ANDs; one can carry out 128 multiplications on 128 pairs of
bitsliced inputs in parallel by performing the same series of vector XORs and
vector ANDs. XOR and AND are not the only operations available, but other
operations do not seem helpful for multiplication, which takes most of the time
in this implementation.
Similar comments apply to higher-level computations, such as elliptic-curve
arithmetic over F2n. There is an obvious analogy between designing bitsliced
software and designing ASICs, but one should not push the analogy too far:
there are fundamental diﬀerences in gate costs, communication costs, etc.
Many common software-implementation techniques for F2n arithmetic, such
as precomputed multiplication tables, perform quite badly when expressed as
bit operations. However, bitslicing allows free shifts, masks, etc., and fast bit-
sliced algorithms for binary-ﬁeld arithmetic outperform all known non-bitsliced
algorithms.
9.2 Results
Tables 10 and 11 show measurements of the number of cycles per input used for
various computations. These measurements are averages across billions of steps.
Elliptic-curve addition uses 1I + 2M + 1S, and computing the input to the
addition uses 20S. (A non-bitsliced algorithm would use only 13S on average, butThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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addition squaring multiplication inversion normal step
F2131 3.5625 2.6406 85.32 1089.4 103.84 694
F2163 4.0625 2.9141 140.35 1757.18 157.58 1059
Table 10. Cycle counts per input for bitsliced ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis on
a 3000MHz Core 2 Q6850 6fb
addition squaring multiplication inversion normal step
F2131 4.4141 3.8516 101.40 1509.9 59.063 778
F2163 4.9688 4.5859 170.98 2460.9 129.180 1249
Table 11. Cycle counts per input for bitsliced ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis on
a 2200MHz Phenom 9550 100f23
squarings are not the main operation in this implementation.) The implementa-
tion batches 48I into 1I + 141M, and then computes 1I as 8M + 130S (in the
case of ECC2K-130), so on average each inversion costs 3.10417M + 2.70833S.
The total cost of ﬁeld arithmetic in a step is therefore 5.10417M + 23.70833S.
The “step” cycle count shown above includes more than ﬁeld arithmetic:
• About 63% of the time (on a Core 2) is spent on multiplications.
• About 15% of the time is spent on conversion to normal-basis representation.
This computation uses the algorithm described in [Ber09b].
• About 9% of the time is spent on squarings.
• About 7% of the time is spent on additions.
• About 3% of the time is spent on weight calculation. This calculation com-
bines standard full-adder circuits in an obvious way, adding (for example)
15 bits by ﬁrst adding 7 bits, then adding 7 more bits, then adding the two
sums to the remaining bit.
• The remaining 3% of the time is spent on miscellaneous overhead.
The 48 inversions are actually 48 bitsliced inversions of 48   128 ﬁeld elements,
each containing n bits. The implementation handles 48   128 points (x,y) in
parallel. Each x-coordinate (in batches of 128) is converted to normal-basis rep-
resentation, compressed to a Hamming weight, checked for being distinguished,
and then further compressed to three bits that determine the point (x′,y′) that
will be added to (x,y). The implementation computes each x′ by repeated squar-
ing, stores x′ +x along with (x,y), and inverts x′ +x. The total active memory
for all x,y,x′+x,1/(x′+x) is 4 48 128 ﬁeld elements, together occupying 3072n
bytes: i.e., 402432 bytes for n = 131, or 500736 bytes for n = 163. Subsequent
elliptic-curve operations use only a few extra ﬁeld elements.
10 Cell implementations
Jointly developed by Sony, Toshiba and IBM, the Cell Broadband Engine (Cell)
architecture [Hof05] is equipped with one dual-threaded, 64-bit in-order PowerEverybody
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Processing Element (PPE), which can oﬄoad work to the eight Synergistic Pro-
cessing Elements (SPEs) [TCC+05]. Each SPE consists of a Synergistic Pro-
cessing Unit (SPU), 256 kilobytes of private memory called Local Store (LS), a
Memory Flow Controller, and a register ﬁle containing 128 registers of 128 bits
each. The SPUs are the target of our Cell implementation and allow 128-bit wide
single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) operations. The SPUs are asymmetric
processors, having two pipelines (denoted by the odd and the even pipeline)
which are designed to execute two disjoint sets of instructions. Hence, in the
ideal case, two instructions can be dispatched per cycle.
All performance measurements for the Cell stated in this section are obtained
by running on a single SPE on a PlayStation 3 (PS3) video game console on
which the programmer has access to six SPEs.
Like the amd64 architecture, the SPU supports bit-logical operations on 128-
bit registers. Hence, a bitsliced implementation—similar to the one presented
in Section 9—seems to be a good approach. However, for two reasons it is much
harder to achieve good performance with the same techniques on the SPU:
The ﬁrst reason is the restricted local storage size of only 256 KB. As bitsliced
implementations work on 128 inputs in parallel, they need much more memory
for intermediate values than a non-bitsliced implementation. Even if the code and
intermediate results ﬁt into 256 KB, the batch size for Montgomery inversions
has to be smaller yielding a higher number of costly inversions per iteration. The
second reason is that all instructions are executed in order; a fast implementation
requires loop unrolling in several functions increasing the code size and limiting
the available storage for batching even further.
We decided to implement both a bitsliced version and a non-bitsliced version
to compare which approach gives better results for the SPE. Both implementa-
tions required hand-optimizing the code on the assembly level, the main focus
is on the ECC2K-130 challenge.
10.1 Non-bitsliced implementation
We decided to represent 131-bit polynomials using two 128-bit vectors. Let
A,B ∈ F2131 in polynomial basis. In order to use 128-bit look-up tables and
to get 16-bit aligned intermediate results the multiplication is broken into parts
as follows
A = Al + Ah   z128 = e Al + e Ah   z121
B = Bl + Bh   z128 = e Bl + e Bh   z15
C = A   B = e Al   Bl + e Al   Bh   z128 + e Ah   e Bl   z121 + e Ah   e Bh   z136
For the ﬁrst two multiplications a four bit lookup table and for the third and
fourth a two bit lookup table are used. The squaring is implemented by inserting
a 0 bit between consecutive bits of the binary representation. In order to hide
latencies two steps are interleaved aiming at ﬁlling both pipelines in order to
reduce the total number of required cycles. The m-squarings are implemented
using look-up tables for 3 ≤ m ≤ 10 and take for any such value of m a constantThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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number of cycles. The inversion is implemented using a sequence of squarings,
m-squarings and multiplications.
The optimal number of concurrent walks is as large as possible, i.e. such that
the executable and all the required memory ﬁt in the LS. In practice 256 walks
are processed in parallel.
addition squaring m-squaring multiplication inversion normal step
F2131 1 - 2 44 98 161 8000 98 1293
Table 12. Cycle counts per input for non-bitsliced ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis
on one SPE of a 3192 MHz Cell Broadband Engine, rev. 5.1
Cost of step on ECC2K-130 A step in the Pollard rho computation on
ECC2K-130 consumes 1
256I + 5M + 1S + 2mS plus the conversion from poly-
nomial to normal basis when using method 2 as described in Section 4.2. The
required number of cycles for one iteration on the curve ECC2K-130 are stated
in Table 12. Addition is done by two XOR instructions, which go in the even
pipeline, and requires at most two and at least one instruction if interleaved
with two odd instructions. There are 118 miscellaneous cycles which include the
additions, the calculation of the weight, the test if a point is distinguished and
various overhead. The cycle counts stated in Table 12 are obtained by “count-
ing” the required number of cycles of our assembly code with the help of the
SPU timing tool: a static timing analysis tool available for the Cell.
10.2 Bitsliced implementation
The bitsliced implementation is based on the C++-code for the amd64 architec-
ture. In a ﬁrst step we ported the code to C, to reduce the size of the resulting
binary. For the ECC2K-130 we then implemented bitsliced versions of multipli-
cation, reduction, squaring, addition and conditional move (cmov) in assembly
to accelerate the computations.
The maximal batch size that we can use for the ECC2K-130 challenge is 14.
Timings for the implementation are given in Table 13, all timings include costs
for function calls, they ignore costs for reading the input, which is negligible for
long computations until a distinguished point has been found. The measurements
are averages across billions of steps measured at runtime.
As for the amd64 implementation, elliptic-curve addition uses 1I+2M+1S,
and computing the input to the addition uses 20S. The implementation batches
14I into 1I + 39M, and then computes 1I as 8M + 130S so on average each
inversion costs 3.3571M + 9.2857S. The total cost of ﬁeld arithmetic in a step
is therefore 5.3571M + 30.2857S. The “step” cycle count shown above includes
more than ﬁeld arithmetic:Everybody
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addition cmov squaring multiplication inversion normal step
F2131 5.7422 6.3672 4.5625 131.2656 1870.6016 33.0391 1179.5078
Table 13. Cycle counts per input for bitsliced ﬁeld operations in polynomial basis on
one SPE of a 3192 MHz Cell Broadband Engine, rev. 5.1
• About 60% of the time is spent on multiplications.
• About 3% of the time is spent on conversion to normal-basis representation.
• About 12% of the time is spent on squarings.
• About 3% of the time is spent on additions.
• About 3% of the time is spent on conditional moves.
• About 11% of the time is spent on weight calculation.
• The remaining 8% of the time is spent on miscellaneous overhead.
For algorithmic details see also Section 9.
11 Complete implementation of the attack
Eventually all platforms described so far will be used to attack ECC2K-130. As
a proof of concept and as infrastructure for our optimized implementations we
built ref-ntl, a C++ reference implementation of an ECC2K discrete-logarithm
attack using Shoup’s NTL for ﬁeld arithmetic. The implementation has several
components:
• Descriptions of several diﬀerent ECC2K challenges that the user can target.
Similarly to the data in Section 2 each description consists of an irreducible
polynomial F, curve parameters a,b, curve points P,Q in hexadecimal, the
order ℓ of P, the root s of T2 + (−1)aT + 2 modulo ℓ that corresponds to
the Frobenius endomorphism (so that σ(P) = [s]P), a choice of normal-basis
generator, and a choice of weight deﬁning distinguished points.
• A setup program that converts a series of 64-bit seeds t1,t2,... into a series
of curve points A(t1)P ⊕ Q,A(t2)P ⊕ Q,.... The function A uses AES to
expand each seed tj into a bit-string (cj,127,cj,126,...,cj,1,cj,0) of length 128
and then interprets it as a Frobenius expansion to compute starting point
Q ⊕
P127
i=0 cj,iσi(P).
• An iterate program that given an elliptic curve point iterates the step
function until a distinguished point is found and then reports it to a server.
This computation is the real bottleneck in the implementation; the task
of the optimized implementations in Sections 7–10 is to perform the same
computation as quickly as possible on various platforms.
• A short script that normalizes each distinguished point and sorts the nor-
malized distinguished points to ﬁnd collisions.
• A verbose variant of the iterate program that, starting from two colliding
seeds, recomputes the corresponding distinguished points while keeping track
of the iteration steps. This recomputation takes negligible time and removesThe Certicom Challenges ECC2-X
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the need for the optimized implementations to keep track of the iteration
steps.
• Final programs finish and verify that express each of the colliding nor-
malized distinguished points as linear combinations of P and Q and that
print the discrete logarithm of Q base P.
As an end-to-end test of the implementation we solved a randomly generated
challenge over F241, using about one second of computation on one core of a
2.4GHz Core 2 Quad. We checked the result using the Magma computer-algebra
system. We then solved ECC2K-95, as described in Section 1.
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Intel’s New AES and Carry-Less Multiplication
Instructions—Applications and Implications
Shay Gueron
University of Haifa and Intel Corporation, Israel
Intel is adding to its processors 6 new instructions (AESENC, AESENCLAST, AESDEC, AES-
DELAST, AESIMC, AESKEYGENASSIST) that facilitate secure and high performance AES en-
cryption, decryption, and key expansion, and one new instruction (PCLMULQDQ) that performs
carry-less multiplication. PCLMULQDQ can be used in several applications, including elliptic
curve cryptography, CRC, and the Galois Counter Mode (GCM). The talk will provide details on
the instructions, their various usage models, and how they enhance performance and security. In
particular, we will explain why and how parallel modes of operation can gain signiﬁcantly from
the instructions.85 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
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Abstract. This paper applies generalized birthday attacks to the FSB
compression function, and shows how to adapt the attacks so that they
run in far less memory. In particular, this paper presents details of a
parallel implementation attacking FSB48, a scaled-down version of FSB
proposed by the FSB submitters. The implementation runs on a cluster of
8 PCs, each with only 8GB of RAM and 700GB of disk. This situation is
very interesting for estimating the security of systems against distributed
attacks using contributed oﬀ-the-shelf PCs.
Keywords: SHA-3, Birthday, FSB – Wagner, not much Memory
1 Introduction
The hash function FSB [2] uses a compression function based on error-correcting
codes. This paper describes, analyzes, and optimizes a parallelized generalized
birthday attack against the FSB compression function.
This paper focuses on a reduced-size version FSB48 which was suggested as
a training case by the designers of FSB. The attack has not ﬁnished at the time
of writing this document but we give performance ﬁgures for running the code
for this attack. Our results allow us to estimate how expensive a similar attack
would be for full-size FSB.
A straightforward implementation of Wagner’s generalized birthday attack
[12] would need 20 TB of storage. However, we are running the attack on 8
⋆ SHA-2 will soon retire, see [10]
⋆⋆ This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant ITR-
0716498, by the European Commission under Contract ICT-2007-216499 CACE, and
by the European Commission under Contract ICT-2007-216646 ECRYPT II. Perma-
nent ID of this document: ded1984108ff55330edb8631e7bc410c. Date: 2009.09.01.Bernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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nodes of the Coding and Cryptography Computer Cluster (CCCC) at Technische
Universiteit Eindhoven which has a total hard disk space of only 5.5 TB. We
detail how we deal with this restricted background storage, by applying and
generalizing ideas described by Bernstein in [6] and compressing partial results.
We also explain the algorithmic measures we took to make the attack run as
fast as possible, carefully balancing our code to use available RAM, network
throughput, hard disk throughput and computing power.
We are to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst to give a detailed description of
a full implementation of a generalized birthday attack. We plan to put all code
described in this paper into the public domain to maximize reusability of our
results.
Hash-function design. This paper achieves new speed records for generalized
birthday attacks, and in particular for generalized birthday attacks against the
FSB compression function. However, generalized birthday attacks are still much
more expensive than generic attacks against the FSB hash function. “Generic
attacks” are attacks that work against any hash function with the same output
length.
The FSB designers chose the size of the FSB compression function so that
a particular lower bound on the cost of generalized birthday attacks would be
safely above the cost of generic attacks. Our results should not be taken as any
indication of a security problem in FSB; the actual cost of generalized birthday
attacks is very far above the lower bound stated by the FSB designers. It appears
that the FSB compression function was designed too conservatively, with an
unnecessarily large output length.
FSB was one of the 64 hash functions submitted to NIST’s SHA-3 compe-
tition, and one of the 51 hash functions selected for the ﬁrst round. However,
FSB was signiﬁcantly slower than most submissions, and was not one of the 14
hash functions selected for the second round. It would be interesting to explore
smaller and thus faster FSB variants that remain secure against generalized
birthday attacks.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we give a short introduction to
Wagner’s generalized birthday attack and Bernstein’s adaptation of this attack
to storage-restricted environments. Section 3 describes the FSB hash function
to the extent necessary to understand our attack methodology. In Section 4 we
describe our attack strategy which has to match the restricted hard disk space
of our computer cluster. Section 5 details the measures we applied to make
the attack run as eﬃciently as possible dealing with the bottlenecks mentioned
before. We evaluate the overall cost of our attack in Section 6, and give cost
estimates for a similar attack against full-size FSB in Section 7.
Naming conventions. Throughout the paper we will denote list j on level i as
Li,j. For both, levels and lists we start counting at zero.
Logarithms denoted as lg are logarithms to the base 2.
Additions of list elements or constants used in the algorithm are additions
modulo 2.FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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In units such as GB, TB, PB and EB we will always assume base 1024 instead
of 1000. In particular we give 700 GB as the size of a hard disk advertised as
750 GB.
2 Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Attack
The generalized birthday problem, given 2i−1 lists containing B-bit strings, is
to ﬁnd 2i−1 elements—exactly one in each list—whose xor equals 0.
The special case i = 2 is the classic birthday problem: given two lists con-
taining B-bit strings, ﬁnd two elements—exactly one in each list—whose xor
equals 0. In other words, ﬁnd an element of the ﬁrst list that equals an element
of the second list.
This section describes a solution to the generalized birthday problem due to
Wagner [12]. Wagner also considered generalizations to operations other than
xor, and to the case of k lists when k is not a power of 2.
2.1 The tree algorithm
Wagner’s algorithm builds a binary tree as described in this subsection starting
from the input lists L0,0,L0,1,...,L0,2i−1−1 (see Figure 4.1). The speed and
success probability of the algorithm are analyzed under the assumption that
each list contains 2B/i elements chosen uniformly at random.
On level 0 take the ﬁrst two lists L0,0 and L0,1 and compare their list elements
on their least signiﬁcant B/i bits. Given that each list contains about 2B/i
elements we can expect 2B/i pairs of elements which are equal on those least
signiﬁcant B/i bits. We take the xor of both elements on all their B bits and
put the xor into a new list L1,0. Similarly compare the other lists—always two
at a time—and look for elements matching on their least signiﬁcant B/i bits
which are xored and put into new lists. This process of merging yields 2i−2 lists
containing each about 2B/i elements which are zero on their least signiﬁcant B/i
bits. This completes level 0.
On level 1 take the ﬁrst two lists L1,0 and L1,1 which are the results of
merging the lists L0,0 and L0,1 as well as L0,2 and L0,3 from level 0. Compare
the elements of L1,0 and L1,1 on their least signiﬁcant 2B/i bits. As a result of
the xoring in the previous level, the last B/i bits are already known to be 0, so
it suﬃces to compare the next B/i bits. Since each list on level 1 contains about
2B/i elements we again can expect about 2B/i elements matching on B/i bits.
We build the xor of each pair of matching elements and put it into a new list
L2,0. Similarly compare the remaining lists on level 1.
Continue in the same way until level i − 2. On each level j we consider the
elements on their least signiﬁcant (j+1)B/i bits of which jB/i bits are known to
be zero as a result of the previous merge. On level i−2 we get two lists containing
about 2B/i elements. The least signiﬁcant (i−2)B/i bits of each element in both
lists are zero. Comparing the elements of both lists on their 2B/i remaining bits
gives 1 expected match, i.e., one xor equal to zero. Since each element is theBernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
SHARCS '09 Workshop Record 88
xor of elements from the previous steps this ﬁnal xor is the xor of 2i−1 elements
from the original lists and thus a solution to the generalized birthday problem.
2.2 Wagner in memory-restricted environments
A 2007 paper [6] by Bernstein includes two techniques to mount Wagner’s attack
on computers which do not have enough memory to hold all list entries. Various
special cases of the same techniques also appear in a 2005 paper [4] by Augot,
Finiasz, and Sendrier and in a 2009 paper [9] by Minder and Sinclair.
Clamping through precomputation. Suppose that there is space for lists of
size only 2b with b < B/i. Bernstein suggests to generate 2b (B−ib) entries and
only consider those of which the least signiﬁcant B − ib bits are zero.
We generalize this idea as follows: The least signiﬁcant B − ib bits can have
an arbitrary value, this clamping value does not even have to be the same on all
lists as long as the sum of all clamping values is zero. This will be important if
an attack does not produce a collision. We then can simply restart the attack
with diﬀerent clamping values.
Clamping through precomputation may be limited by the maximal number
of entries we can generate per list. Furthermore, halving the available storage
space increases the precomputation time by a factor of 2i.
Note that clamping some bits through precomputation might be a good idea
even if enough memory is available as we can reduce the amount of data in later
steps and thus make those steps more eﬃcient.
After the precomputation step we apply Wagner’s tree algorithm to lists
containing bit strings of length B′ where B′ equals B minus the number of
clamped bits. For performance evaluation we will only consider lists on level 0
after clamping through precomputation and then use B instead of B′ for the
number of bits in these entries.
Repeating the attack. Another way to mount Wagner’s attack in memory-
restricted environments is to carry out the whole computation with smaller lists
leaving some bits at the end “uncontrolled”. We then can deal with the lower
success probability by repeatedly running the attack with diﬀerent clamping
values.
In the context of clamping through precomputation we can simply vary the
clamping values used during precomputation. If for some reason we cannot clamp
any bits through precomputation we can apply the same idea of changing clamp-
ing values in an arbitrary merge step of the tree algorithm. Note that any solution
to the generalized birthday problem can be found by some choice of clamping
values.
Expected number of runs. Wagner’s algorithm, without clamping through
precomputation, produces an expected number of exactly one collision. However
this does not mean that running the algorithm necessarily produces a collision.
In general, the expected number of runs of Wagner’s attack is a function of
the number of remaining bits in the entries of the two input lists of the last
merge step and the number of elements in these lists.FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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Assume that b bits are clamped on each level and that lists have length 2b.
Then the probability to have at least one collision after running the attack once
is
Psuccess = 1 −

2B−(i−2)b − 1
2B−(i−2)b
2
2b
,
and the expected number of runs E(R) is
E(R) =
1
Psuccess
. (2.1)
For larger values of B − ib the expected number of runs is about 2B−ib. We
model the total time for the attack as being linear in the amount of data on level
0, i.e.,
tW ∈ Θ
 
2i−12B−ib2b
. (2.2)
Here 2i−1 is the number of lists, 2B−ib is approximately the number of runs,
and 2b is the number of entries per list. Observe that this formula will usually
underestimate the real time of the attack by assuming that all computations on
subsequent levels are together still linear in the time required for computations
on level 0.
Using Pollard iteration. If because of memory restrictions the number of
uncontrolled bits is high, it may be more eﬃcient to use a variant of Wagner’s
attack that uses Pollard iteration [8, Chapter 3, exercises 6 and 7].
Assume that L0 = L1, L2 = L3, etc., and that combinations x0 + x1 with
x0 = x1 are excluded. The output of the generalized birthday attack will then
be a collision between two distinct elements of L0 + L2 +    .
We can instead start with only 2i−2 lists L0,L2,... and apply the usual Wag-
ner tree algorithm, with a nonzero clamping constant to enforce the condition
that x0  = x1. The number of clamped bits before the last merge step is now
(i−3)b. The last merge step produces 22b possible values, the smallest of which
has an expected number of 2b leading zeros, leaving B − (i − 1)b uncontrolled.
Think of this computation as a function mapping clamping constants to the
ﬁnal B −(i−1)b uncontrolled bits and apply Pollard iteration to ﬁnd a collision
between the output of two such computations; combination then yields a collision
of 2i−1 vectors.
As Pollard iteration has square-root running time, the expected number of
runs for this variant is 2B/2−(i−1)b/2, each taking time 2i−22b (cmp. (2.2)), so
the expected running time is
tPW ∈ Θ

2i−22B/2−(i−1)b/2+b

. (2.3)
The Pollard variant of the attack becomes more eﬃcient than plain Wagner
with repeated runs if B > (i + 2)b.Bernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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3 The FSB Hash Function
In this section we brieﬂy describe the construction of the FSB hash function.
Since we are going to attack the function we omit details which are necessary
for implementing the function but do not inﬂuence the attack. The second part
of this section gives a rough description of how to apply Wagner’s generalized
birthday attack to ﬁnd collisions of the compression function of FSB.
3.1 Details of the FSB hash function
The Fast Syndrome Based hash function (FSB) was introduced by Augot, Fini-
asz and Sendrier in 2003. See [3], [4], and [2]. The security of FSB’s compression
function relies on the diﬃculty of the “Syndrome Decoding Problem” from cod-
ing theory.
The FSB hash function processes a message in three steps: First the message
is converted by a so-called domain extender into suitable inputs for the compres-
sion function which digests the inputs in the second step. In the third and ﬁnal
step the Whirlpool hash function designed by Barreto and Rijmen [5] is applied
to the output of the compression function in order to produce the desired length
of output.
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the security of the compression func-
tion. We do not describe the domain extender, the conversion of the message to
inputs for the compression function, or the last step involving Whirlpool.
The compression function. The main parameters of the compression func-
tion are called n, r and w. We consider n strings of length r which are chosen
uniformly at random and can be written as an r×n binary matrix H. Note that
the matrix H can be seen as the parity check matrix of a binary linear code. The
FSB proposal [2] actually speciﬁes a particular structure of H for eﬃciency; we
do not consider attacks exploiting this structure.
An n-bit string of weight w is called regular if there is exactly a single 1 in
each interval [(i−1) n
w,i n
w −1]1≤i≤w. We will refer to such an interval as a block.
The input to the compression function is a regular n-bit string of weight w.
The compression function works as follows. The matrix H is split into w
blocks of n/w columns. Each non-zero entry of the input bit string indicates
exactly one column in each block. The output of the compression function is an
r-bit string which is produced by computing the xor of all the w columns of the
matrix H indicated by the input string.
Preimages and collisions. A preimage of an output of length r of one round
of the compression function is a regular n-bit string of weight w. A collision
occurs if there are 2w columns of H —exactly two in each block—which add
up to zero.
Finding preimages or collisions means solving two problems coming from
coding theory: ﬁnding a preimage means solving the Regular Syndrome Decod-
ing problem and ﬁnding collisions means solving the so-called 2-regular Null-
Syndrome Decoding problem. Both problems were deﬁned and proven to be
NP-complete in [4].FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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Parameters. We follow the notation in [2] and write FSBlength for the version
of FSB which produces a hash value of length length. Note that the output of
the compression function has r bits where r is considerably larger than length.
NIST demands hash lengths of 160, 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits, respectively.
Therefore the SHA-3 proposal contains ﬁve versions of FSB: FSB160, FSB224,
FSB256, FSB384, and FSB512. We list the parameters for those versions in Ta-
ble 7.1.
The proposal also contains FSB48, which is a reduced-size version of FSB
and the main attack target in this paper. The binary matrix H for FSB48 has
dimension 192×3 217; i.e., r equals 192 and n is 3 217. In each round a message
chunk is converted into a regular 3   217-bit string of Hamming weight w = 24.
The matrix H contains 24 blocks of length 214. Each 1 in the regular bit string
indicates exactly one column in a block of the matrix H. The output of the
compression function is the xor of those 24 columns.
3.2 Attacking the compression function of FSB48
Coron and Joux pointed out in [7] that Wagner’s generalized birthday attack
can be used to ﬁnd preimages and collisions in the compression function of FSB.
The following paragraphs present a slightly streamlined version of the attack of
[7] in the case of FSB48.
Determining the number of lists for a Wagner attack on FSB48. A
collision for FSB48 is given by 48 columns of the matrix H which add up to
zero; the collision has exactly two columns per block. Each block contains 214
columns and each column is a 192-bit string.
We choose 16 lists to solve this particular 48-sum problem. Each list entry
will be the xor of three columns coming from one and a half blocks. This ensures
that we do not have any overlaps, i.e., more than two columns coming from
one matrix block in the end. We assume that taking sums of the columns of H
does not bias the distribution of 192-bit strings. Applying Wagner’s attack in a
straightforward way means that we need to have at least 2⌈192/5⌉ entries per list.
By clamping away 39 bits in each step we expect to get at least one collision
after one run of the tree algorithm.
Building lists. We build 16 lists containing 192-bit strings each being the xor
of three distinct columns of the matrix H. We select each triple of three columns
from one and a half blocks of H in the following way:
List L0,0 contains the sums of columns i0, j0, k0, where columns i0 and j0
come from the ﬁrst block of 214 columns, and column k0 is picked from the
following block with the restriction that it is taken from the ﬁrst half of it. Since
we cannot have overlapping elements we get about 227 sums of columns i0 and
j0 coming from the ﬁrst block. These two columns are then added to all possible
columns k0 coming from the ﬁrst 213 elements of the second block of the matrix
H. In total we get about 240 elements for L0,0.
We note that by splitting every second block in half we neglect several solu-
tions of the 48-xor problem. For example, a solution involving two columns fromBernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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the ﬁrst half of the second block cannot be found by this algorithm. We justify
our choice by noting that fewer lists would nevertheless require more storage and
a longer precomputation phase to build the lists.
The second list L0,1 contains sums of columns i1, j1, k1, where column i1 is
picked from the second half of the second block of H and j1 and k1 come from
the third block of 214 columns. This again yields about 240 elements.
Similarly, we construct the lists L0,2, L0,3,..., L0,15.
For each list we generate more than twice the amount needed for a straight-
forward attack as explained above. In order to reduce the amount of data for
the following steps we note that about 240/4 elements are likely to be zero on
their least signiﬁcant two bits. Clamping those two bits away should thus yield
a list of 238 bit strings. Note that since we know the least signiﬁcant two bits
of the list elements we can ignore them and regard the list elements as 190-bit
strings. Now we expect that a straightforward application of Wagner’s attack to
16 lists with about 2190/5 elements yields a collision after completing the tree
algorithm.
Note on complexity in the FSB proposal. The SHA-3 proposal estimates
the complexity of Wagner’s attack as described above as 2r/ir where 2i−1 is the
number of lists used in the algorithm. This does not take memory into account,
and in general is an underestimate of the work required by Wagner’s algorithm;
i.e., attacks of this type against FSB are more diﬃcult than claimed by the FSB
designers.
Note on information-set decoding. The FSB designers say in [2] that Wag-
ner’s attack is the fastest known attack for ﬁnding preimages, and for ﬁnding
collisions for small FSB parameters, but that another attack—information-set
decoding—is better than Wagner’s attack for ﬁnding collisions for large FSB
parameters.
In general, information-set decoding can be used to ﬁnd an n-bit string of
weight 48 indicating 48 columns of H which add up to zero. Information-set
decoding will not take into account that we look for a regular n-bit string.
The only known way to obtain a regular n-bit string is running the algorithm
repeatedly until the output happens to be regular. Thus, the running times given
in [2] provide certainly lower bounds for information-set decoding, but in practice
they are not likely to hold.
4 Attack Strategy
In this section we will discuss the necessary measures we took to mount the
attack on our cluster. We will start with an evaluation of available and required
storage.
4.1 How large is a list entry?
The number of bytes required to store one list entry depends on how we represent
the entry. We considered four diﬀerent ways of representing an entry:FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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Value-only representation. The obvious way of representing a list entry is as
a 192-bit string, the xor of columns of the matrix. Bits we already know to be
zero of course do not have to be stored, so on each level of the tree the number
of bits per entry decreases by the number of bits clamped on the previous level.
Ultimately we are not interested in the value of the entry—we know already
that in a successful attack it will be all-zero at the end—but in the column
positions in the matrix that lead to this all-zero value. However, we will show
in Section 4.3 that computations only involving the value can be useful if the
attack has to be run multiple times due to storage restrictions.
Value-and-positions representation. If enough storage is available we can
store positions in the matrix alongside the value. Observe that unlike storage re-
quirements for values the number of bytes for positions increases with increasing
levels, and becomes dominant for higher levels.
Compressed positions. Instead of storing full positions we can save storage
by only storing, e.g., positions modulo 256. After the attack has successfully
ﬁnished the full position information can be computed by checking which of the
possible positions lead to the appropriate intermediate results on each level.
Dynamic recomputation. If we keep full positions we do not have to store the
value at all. Every time we need the value (or parts of it) it can be dynamically
recomputed from the positions. In each level the size of a single entry doubles
(because the number of positions doubles), the expected number of entries per
list remains the same but the number of lists halves, so the total amount of data
is the same on each level when using dynamic recomputation. As discussed in
Section 3 we have 240 possibilities to choose columns to produce entries of a list,
so we can encode the positions on level 0 in 40 bits (5 bytes).
Observe that we can switch between representations during computation if
at some level another representation becomes more eﬃcient: We can switch be-
tween value-and-position representation to compressed-positions representation
and back. We can switch from one of the above to compressed positions and we
can switch from any other representation to value-only representation.
4.2 What list size can we handle?
To estimate the storage requirements it is convenient to consider dynamic re-
computation (storing positions only) because in this case the amount of required
storage is constant over all levels and this representation has the smallest mem-
ory consumption on level 0.
As described in Section 3.2 we can start with 16 lists of size 238, each con-
taining bit strings of length r′ = 190. However, storing 16 lists with 238 entries,
each entry encoded in 5 bytes requires 20 TB of storage space.
The computer cluster used for the attack consists of 8 nodes with a storage
space of 700 GB each. Hence, we have to adapt our attack to cope with total
storage limited to 5.5 TB.Bernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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On the ﬁrst level we have 16 lists and as we need at least 5 bytes per list
entry we can handle at most 5.5   240/24/5 = 1.1 × 236 entries per list. Some of
the disk space is used for operating system and so a straight-forward implemen-
tation would use lists of size 236. First computing one half tree and switching
to compressed-positions representation on level 2 would still not allow us to use
lists of size 237.
We can generate at most 240 entries per list so following [6] we could clamp
4 bits during list generation, giving us 236 values for each of the 16 lists. These
values have a length of 188 bits represented through 5 bytes holding the positions
from the matrix. Clamping 36 bits in each of the 3 steps leaves two lists of length
236 with 80 non-zero bits. According to (2.1) we thus expect to run the attack
256.5 times until we ﬁnd a collision.
The only way of increasing the list size to 237 and thus reduce the number
of runs is to use value-only representation on higher levels.
4.3 The strategy
The main idea of our attack strategy is to distinguish between the task of ﬁnding
clamping constants that yield a ﬁnal collision and the task of actually computing
the collision.
Finding appropriate clamping constants. This task does not require storing
the positions, since we only need to know whether we ﬁnd a collision with a
particular set of clamping constants; we do not need to know which matrix
positions give this collision.
Whenever storing the value needs less space we can thus compress entries by
switching representation from positions to values. As a side eﬀect this speeds up
the computations because less data has to be loaded and stored.
Starting from lists L0,0,...,L0,7, each containing 237 entries we ﬁrst compute
list L3,0 (see Figure 4.1) on 8 nodes. This list has entries with 78 remaining bits
each. As we will describe in Section 5, these entries are presorted on hard disk
according to 9 bits that do not have to be stored. Another 3 bits are determined
by the node holding the data (see also Section 5) so only 66 bits or 9 bytes of
each entry have to be stored, yielding a total storage requirement of 1152 GB
versus 5120 GB necessary for storing entries in positions-only representation.
We then continue with the computation of list L2,2, which has entries of 115
remaining bits. Again 9 of these bits do not have to be stored due to presorting,
3 are determined by the node, so only 103 bits or 13 bytes have to be stored,
yielding a storage requirement of 1664 GB instead of 2560 GB for uncompressed
entries.
After these lists have been stored persistently on disk, we proceed with the
computation of list L2,3, then L3,1 and ﬁnally check whether L4,0 contains at
least one element. These computations require another 2560 GB.
Therefore total amount of storage sums up to 1152 GB + 1664 GB + 2560 GB
= 5376 GB; obviously all data ﬁts onto the hard disk of the 8 nodes.FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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If a computation with given clamping constants is not successful, we change
clamping constants only for the computation of L2,3. The lists L3,0 and L2,2 do
not have to be computed again. All combinations of clamping values for lists
L0,12 to L0,15 summing up to 0 are allowed. Therefore there is a large amount
of valid clamp bit combinations.
With 37 bits clamped on every level and 3 clamped through precomputation
we are left with 4 uncontrolled bits and therefore, according to (2.1), expect 16.5
runs of this algorithm.
Computing the matrix positions of the collision. In case of success we
know which clamping constants we can use and we know which value in the lists
L3,0 and L3,1 yields a ﬁnal collision. Now we can recompute lists L3,0 and L3,1
without compression to obtain the positions. For this task we decided to store
only positions and use dynamic recomputation. On level 0 and level 1 this is
the most space-eﬃcient approach and we do not expect a signiﬁcant speedup
from switching to compressed-positions representation on higher levels. In total
one half-tree computation requires 5120 GB of storage, hence, they have to be
performed one after the other on 8 nodes.
The (re-)computation of lists L3,0 and L3,2 is an additional time overhead
over doing all computation on list positions in the ﬁrst place. However, this cost
is incurred only once, and is amply compensated for by the reduced data volume
in previous steps. See Section 5.2.
5 Implementing the Attack
The computation platform for this particular implementation of Wagner’s gen-
eralized birthday attack on FSB is an eight-node cluster of conventional desktop
PCs. Each node has an Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600 CPU with a clock rate of
2.40 GHz and direct fully cached access to 8 GB of RAM. About 700 GB mass
storage are provided by a Western Digital SATA hard disk with 20 GB reserved
for system and user data. The nodes are connected via switched Gigabit Ethernet
using Marvell PCI-E adapter cards.
We chose MPI as communication model for the implementation. This choice
has several virtues:
– MPI provides an easy interface to start the application on all nodes and to
initialize the communication paths.
– MPI oﬀers synchronous message-based communication primitives.
– MPI is a broadly accepted standard for HPC applications and is provided
on a multitude of diﬀerent platforms.
We decided to use MPICH2 [1] which is an implementation of the MPI 2.0
standard from the University of Chicago. MPICH2 provides an Ethernet-based
back end for the communication with remote nodes and a fast shared-memory-
based back end for local data exchange.
We implemented two micro-benchmarks to measure hard disk and network
throughput. The results of these benchmarks are shown in Figure 5.1. NoteBernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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Fig.5.1. Micro-benchmarks measuring hard disk and network throughput.
that we measure hard disk throughput directly on the device, circumventing
the ﬁlesystem, to reach peak performance of the hard disk. We measured both
sequential and randomized access to the disk.
The rest of this section explains how we parallelized and streamlined Wag-
ner’s attack to make the best of the available hardware.
5.1 Parallelization
Most of the time in the attack is spent on determining the right clamping con-
stants. As described in Section 4 this involves computations of several partial
trees, e.g., the computation of L3,0 from lists L0,0,...,L0,7 (half tree) or the
computation of L2,2 from lists L0,8,...,L0,11 (quarter tree). Other computa-
tions do not start with lists of level 0, the computation of list L3,1 for example
is computed from the (previously computed and stored) lists L2,2 and L2,3.
Lists of level 0 are generated with the current clamping constants. On every
level, each list is sorted and afterwards merged with its neighboring list giving
the entries for the next level. The sorting and merging is repeated until the ﬁnal
list of the partial tree is computed.
Distributing data over nodes. This algorithm is parallelized by distributing
fractions of lists over the nodes in a way that each node can perform sort and
merge locally on two lists. On each level of the computation, each node contains
fractions of two lists. The lists on level j are split between n nodes according to
lg(n) bits of each value. For example when computing the left half-tree, on level
0, node 0 contains all entries of lists 0 and 1 ending with a zero bit (in the bitsBernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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not controlled by initial clamping), and node 1 contains all entries of lists 0 and
1 ending with a one bit.
Therefore, from the view of one node, on each level the fractions of both lists
are loaded from hard disk, the entries are sorted and the two lists are merged.
The newly generated list is split into its fractions and these fractions are sent
over the network to their associated nodes. There the data is received and stored
onto the hard disk. The continuous dataﬂow of this implementation is depicted
in Figure 5.2.
Presorting into parts. To be able to perform the sort in memory, incoming
data is presorted into one of 512 parts according to the 9 least signiﬁcant bits
of the current sort range. This leads to an expected part size for uncompressed
entries of 640 MB (0.625 GB) which can be loaded into main memory at once to
be sorted further. The beneﬁt of presorting the entries before storing them is:
1. We can sort a whole fraction, that exceeds the size of the memory, by sorting
its presorted parts independently.
2. Two adjacent parts of the two lists on one node (with the same presort-bits)
can be merged directly after they are sorted.
3. We can save 9 bits when compressing entries to value-only representation.
Merge. The merge is implemented straightforwardly. If blocks of entries in both
lists share the same value then all possible combinations are generated: speciﬁ-
cally, if a b-bit string appears in the compared positions in c1 entries in the ﬁrst
list and c2 entries in the second list then all c1c2 xors appear in the output list.
5.2 Eﬃcient implementation
Cluster computation imposes three main bottlenecks:
– the computational power and memory latency of the CPUs for computation-
intensive applications
– limitations of network throughput and latency for communication-intensive
applications
– hard disk throughput and latency for data-intensive applications
Wagner’s algorithm imposes hard load on all of these components: a large
amount of data needs to be sorted, merged and distributed over the nodes occu-
pying as much storage as possible. Therefore, demand for optimization is primar-
ily determined by the slowest component in terms of data throughput; latency
generally can be hidden by pipelining and data prefetch.
Finding bottlenecks. Our benchmarks show that, for suﬃciently large packets,
the performance of the system is mainly bottlenecked by hard disk throughput
(cmp. Figure 5.1). Since the throughput of MPI over Gigabit Ethernet is higher
than the hard disk throughput for packet sizes larger than 216 bytes and sinceFSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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the same amount of data has to be sent that needs to be stored, no performance
penalty is expected by the network for this size of packets.
Therefore, our ﬁrst implementation goal was to design an interface to the
hard disk that permits maximum hard disk throughput. The second goal was to
optimize the implementation of sort and merge algorithms up to a level where
the hard disks are kept busy at peak throughput.
Persistent data storage. Since we do not need any caching-, journaling- or
even ﬁling-capabilities of conventional ﬁlesystems, we implemented a throughput-
optimized ﬁlesystem, which we call AleSystem. It provides fast and direct access
to the hard disk and stores data in portions of Ales. Each cluster node has one
large unformatted data partition sda1, which is directly opened by the AleSys-
tem using native Linux ﬁle I/O. Caching is deactivated by using the open ﬂag
O DIRECT: after data has been written, it is not read for a long time and does
not beneﬁt from caching. All administrative information is persistently stored
as a ﬁle in the native Linux ﬁlesystem an mapped into the virtual address space
of the process. On sequential access, the throughput of the AleSystem reaches
about 90 MB/s which is roughly the maximum that the hard disk permits.
Tasks and Threads. Since our cluster nodes are driven by quad-core CPUs, the
speed of the computation is primarily based on multi-threaded parallelization.
On the one side, the receive-/presort-/store, on the other side, the load-/sort-
/merge-/send-tasks are pipelined. At the current state of the implementation, we
have several threads for sending/receiving data and for running the AleSystem.
The core of the implementation is given by ﬁve threads which process the main
computation. There are two threads which have the task to presort incoming
data (one thread for each list). Furthermore, sorting is parallelized with two
threads (one thread for each list) and for the merge task we have one more
thread.
Memory layout. Given this task distribution, the size of necessary buﬀers can
be deﬁned. The micro-benchmarks show that bigger buﬀers generally lead to
higher throughput. However, the sum of all buﬀer sizes is limited by the size of
the available RAM. For the list parts we need 6 buﬀers, each 640MB, adding up
to 3.75 GB. We need two times 2×8 network buﬀers for double-buﬀered send
and receive, which results in 32 network buﬀers. To presort the entries double-
buﬀered into 512 parts of two lists, we need 2048 ales. The size of network packets
must be 2x   5,x ≥ 3 bytes because uncompressed entries of the highest level
occupy 40 bytes. The size of an ale additionally must be a multiple of 512 bytes
due to hardware requirements for DMA access. This gives a size of 2y   5,y ≥ 9
bytes for each ale. Therefore, we chose a size of 220   5 bytes = 5 MB for the
network packets summing up to 160 MB and a size of 218   5 bytes = 1.25 MB
for the ales giving a memory demand of 2.5 GB. Over all, our implementation
requires about 6.5 GB of RAM leaving enough space for the operating system
and additional data as stack and the administrative data for the AleSystem.
Eﬃciency and further optimizations. Using our rough splitting of tasks
to threads, we reach an average CPU usage of about 60% up to 80% peak.FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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At the current optimization state, our average hard disk throughput is about
40 MB/s. The hard disk micro-benchmark (see Figure 5.1) shows, that an average
throughput between 45 MB/s and 50 MB/s should be feasible for packet sizes
of 1.25 MB. Since sorting is the most complex task, we will further parallelize
sorting to be able to use 100% of the CPU if the hard disk permits higher data
transfer. We expect that further parallelization of the sort task will increase CPU
data throughput on sort up to about 50 MB/s. That should suﬃce for maximum
hard disk throughput.
6 Results
The attack is currently running on 8 nodes of the Coding and Cryptography
Computer Cluster (CCCC). This section gives timing results of the diﬀerent
steps of the computation and estimates the total time of the attack based on the
expected number of runs as given in (2.1).
6.1 Running time
Step one. As described before the ﬁrst major step is to compute a set of clamp-
ing values which leads to a collision. In this ﬁrst step entries are stored by
positions on level 0 and 1 and from level 2 on list entries consist of values.
Computation of list L3,0 takes about 32h and list L2,2 about 14h, summing
up to 46h. These computations need to be done only once.
The time needed to compute list L2,3 is about the same as for L2,2 (14h), list
L3,1 takes about 4h and checking for a collision in lists L3,0 and L3,1 on level 4
about another 3.5h, summing up to about 21.5h. Those steps need to be done
on average 16.5 times and and we thus expect them to take about 355h.
Step two. Finally, when we ﬁnd a collision and compute the correct clamping
values, we will recompute the collision with uncompressed lists to ﬁnd the right
columns leading to this collision. Computing lists L3,0 and L3,1 uncompressed
(by storing positions) takes at most 33h each, summing up to 66h.
Overall, ﬁnding a collision for the FSB48 compression function using our
algorithm and cluster takes on average 467h or about 19.5 days.
6.2 Time-storage tradeoﬀs
As described in Section 4, the main restriction on the attack strategy was the
total amount of background storage.
If we had 10496 GB of storage at hand we could handle lists of size 238,
again using the compression techniques described in Section 4. As described in
Section 4 this would give us exactly one expected collision in the last merge
step and thus reduce the number of required runs to ﬁnd the right clamping
constants from 16.5 to 1.58. With a total storage of 20 TB we could run aBernstein, Lange, Niederhagen, Peters, Schwabe
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straightforward Wagner attack without compression which would eliminate the
need to recompute two half trees at the end.
Increasing the size of the background storage even further would eventually
allow to store list entry values alongside the positions and thus eliminate the
need for dynamic recomputation. However, the performance of the attack is
bottlenecked by hard disk throughput rather than CPU time so we don’t expect
any improvement through this measure.
On clusters with even less background storage the computation time will
(asymptotically) increase by a factor of 16 with each halving of the storage size.
For example a cluster with 2688 GB of storage can only handle lists of size 236.
The attack would then require 256.5 computations to ﬁnd appropriate clamping
constants.
Of course the time required for one half-tree computation depends on the
amount of data. As long as the performance is bottlenecked mainly by hard disk
(or network) throughput the running time is linearly dependent on the amount
of data, i.e. a Wagner computation involving 2 half-tree computations with lists
of size 238 is about 4.5 times as fast as a Wagner computation involving 18
half-tree computations with lists of size 237.
7 Scalability Analysis
The attack described in this paper including the variants discussed in Section 6
are much more expensive in terms of time and especially memory than a brute-
force attack against the 48-bit hash function FSB48.
This section gives estimates of the power of Wagner’s attack against the
larger versions of FSB, demonstrating that the FSB design overestimated the
power of the attack. Table 7.1 gives the parameters of all FSB hash functions.
A straightforward Wagner attack against FSB160 uses 16 lists of size 2127
containing elements with 632 bits. The entries of these lists are generated as
xors of 10 columns from 5 blocks, yielding 2135 possibilities to generate the
entries. Precomputation includes clamping of 8 bits. Each entry then requires
135 bits of storage so each list occupies more than 2131 bytes. For comparison,
the largest currently available storage systems oﬀer a few petabytes (250 bytes)
of storage.
To limit the amount of memory we can instead generate, e.g., 32 lists of size
260, where each list entry is the xor of 5 columns from 2.5 blocks, with 7 bits
clamped during precomputation. Each list entry then requires 67 bits of storage.
Clamping 60 bits in each step leaves 273 bits uncontrolled so the Pollard
variant of Wagner’s algorithm (see Section 2.2) becomes more eﬃcient than the
plain attack. This attack generates 16 lists of size 260, containing entries which
are the xor of 5 columns from 5 distinct blocks each. This gives us the possibility
to clamp 10 bits through precomputation, leaving B = 630 bits for each entry
on level 0.
The time required by this attack is approximately 2224 (see (2.3)). This is
substantially faster than a brute-force collision attack on the compression func-FSBday: Implementing Wagner's Generalized Birthday Attack against the SHA-3 round-1 candidate FSB
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n w r Number of lists Size of lists Bits per entry Total storage Time
FSB48 3 × 2
17 24 192 16 2
38 190 5 · 2
42 5 · 2
42
FSB160 7 × 2
18 112 896 16 2
127 632 17 · 2
131 17 · 2
131
16 (Pollard) 2
60 630 9 · 2
64 9 · 2
224
FSB224 2
21 128 1024 16 2
177 884 24 · 2
181 24 · 2
181
16 (Pollard) 2
60 858 13 · 2
64 13 · 2
343
FSB256 23 × 2
16 184 1472 16 2
202 1010 27 · 2
206 27 · 2
206
16 (Pollard) 2
60 972 14 · 2
64 14 · 2
386
32 (Pollard) 2
56 1024 18 · 2
60 18 · 2
405
FSB384 23 × 2
16 184 1472 16 2
291 1453 39 · 2
295 39 · 2
295
32 (Pollard) 2
60 1467 9 · 2
65 18 · 2
618.5
FSB512 31 × 2
16 248 1987 16 2
393 1962 53 · 2
397 53 · 2
397
32 (Pollard) 2
60 1956 12 · 2
65 24 · 2
863
Table 7.1. Parameters of the FSB variants and estimates for the cost of generalized
birthday attacks against the compression function. Storage is measured in bytes.
tion, but is clearly much slower than a brute-force collision attack on the hash
function, and even slower than a brute-force preimage attack on the hash func-
tion.
Similar statements hold for the other full-size versions of FSB. Table 7.1
gives rough estimates for the time complexity of Wagner’s attack without storage
restriction and with storage restricted to a few hundred exabytes (260 entries per
list). These estimates only consider the number and size of lists being a power
of 2 and the number of bits clamped in each level being the same. The estimates
ignore the time complexity of precomputation. Time is computed according to
(2.2) and (2.3) with the size of level-0 entries (in bytes) as a constant factor.
Although ﬁne-tuning the attacks might give small speedups compared to the
estimates, it is clear that the compression function of FSB is oversized, assuming
that Wagner’s algorithm in a somewhat memory-restricted environment is the
most eﬃcient attack strategy.
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Abstract. Current proposals for special-purpose factorization hardware
will become obsolete if large quantum computers are built: the number-
ﬁeld sieve scales much more poorly than Shor’s quantum algorithm for
factorization. Will all special-purpose cryptanalytic hardware become
obsolete in a post-quantum world?
A quantum algorithm by Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp has frequently been
claimed to reduce the cost of b-bit hash collisions from 2
b/2 to 2
b/3.
This paper analyzes the Brassard–Høyer–Tapp algorithm and shows that
it has fundamentally worse price-performance ratio than the classical
van Oorschot–Wiener hash-collision circuits, even under optimistic as-
sumptions regarding the speed of quantum computers.
Keywords. hash functions, collision-search algorithms, table lookups,
parallelization, rho, post-quantum cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
The SHARCS (Special-Purpose Hardware for Attacking Cryptographic
Systems) workshops have showcased a wide variety of hardware designs
for factorization, brute-force search, and hash collisions. These hardware
designs often achieve surprisingly good price-performance ratios and are
among the top threats against currently deployed cryptosystems, such as
RSA-1024.
Would any of this work be useful for a post-quantum attacker—an
attacker equipped with a large quantum computer? The power of today’s
cryptanalytic hardware is of tremendous current interest, but will the
? Permanent ID of this document: 971550562a76ba87a7b2da14f71ca923. Date of this
document: 2009.08.23. This work was supported by the National Science Foundation
under grant ITR–0716498.Bernstein
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same hardware designs remain competitive in a world full of quantum
computers, assuming that those computers are in fact built?
One might guess that the answer to both of these questions is no:
that large quantum computers will become the tool of choice for all large
cryptanalytic tasks. Should SHARCS prepare for a transition to a post-
quantum SHARCS?
Case study: Factorization. Today’s public eﬀorts to build factoriza-
tion hardware are focused on the number-ﬁeld sieve. The number-ﬁeld
sieve is conjectured to factor b-bit RSA moduli in time 2b1/3+o(1)
; older
algorithms take time 2b1/2+o(1)
and do not appear to be competitive with
the number-ﬁeld sieve once b is suﬃciently large. Detailed analyses show
that “suﬃciently large” includes a wide range of b’s of real-world crypto-
graphic interest, notably b = 1024.
The standard advertising for quantum computers is that they can
factor much more eﬃciently than the number-ﬁeld sieve. Speciﬁcally, Shor
in [15] and [16] introduced an algorithm to factor a b-bit integer in bΘ(1)
operations on a quantum computer having bΘ(1) qubits. For a detailed
analysis of the number of qubit operations inherent in Shor’s algorithm
see, e.g., [19].
Simulating this quantum computer on traditional hardware would
make it exponentially slower. The goal of quantum-computer engineer-
ing is to directly build qubits as physical devices that can eﬃciently and
reliably carry out quantum operations. Note that, thanks to “quantum
error correction,” perfect reliability is not required; for example, [4, Sec-
tion 5.3.3.3] shows that an essentially perfect qubit can be simulated by
an essentially constant number of 99.99%-reliable qubits.
Assume that this goal is achieved, and that a quantum computer
can be built for bΘ(1) Euros to factor a b-bit integer in bΘ(1) seconds.
This quantum computer will be much more scalable than number-ﬁeld-
sieve hardware, and therefore much more cost-eﬀective than number-ﬁeld-
sieve hardware for large b—including b’s of cryptographic interest if the
exponents Θ(1) are reasonably small.
Case study: Preimage search. Similar comments apply to hardware
for brute-force search, i.e., hardware to compute preimages.
Consider a function H that can be computed by a straight-line se-
quence of h bit operations. Assume for simplicity that there is a unique
b-bit string x satisfying H(x) = 0. Grover in [8] and [9] presented a
quantum algorithm to ﬁnd this x with high probability in approximately
2b/2h operations on Θ(h) qubits. A real-world quantum computer withCost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?
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similar performance would scale much more eﬀectively than traditional
hardware using 2bh operations, and would therefore be much more cost-
eﬀective than traditional hardware for large b—again possibly including
b’s of cryptographic interest. Grover’s speedup from 2bh to 2b/2h is not as
dramatic as Shor’s speedup from 2b1/3+o(1)
to bΘ(1), but it is still a clear
speedup when b is large.
More generally, assume that there are exactly p preimages of 0 under
H. Traditional hardware ﬁnds a preimage with high probability using ap-
proximately (2b/p)h operations. Boyer, Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp in [5]
presented a minor extension of Grover’s algorithm to ﬁnd a preimage with
high probability using approximately (2b/2/p1/2)h quantum operations on
Θ(h) qubits. It is not necessary for p to be known in advance.
If quantum search is run for only (2b/2/p1/2)h operations then it has
approximately an 2 chance of success.
Case study: Collision search. The point of this paper is that all known
quantum algorithms to ﬁnd collisions in hash functions are less cost-
eﬀective than traditional cryptanalytic hardware, even under optimistic
assumptions regarding the speed of quantum computers. Quantum com-
puters win for suﬃciently large factorizations, and for suﬃciently large
preimage searches, but they do not win for collision searches.
This conclusion does not depend on the engineering diﬃculty of build-
ing quantum computers; it will remain true even in a world full of quan-
tum computers. This conclusion also does not depend on real-world limits
on interesting input sizes. Within the space of known quantum collision
algorithms, the most cost-eﬀective algorithms are tantamount to non-
quantum algorithms, and it is clear that non-quantum algorithms should
be implemented with standard bits rather than with qubits.
In particular, this paper shows that the quantum collision method
introduced in [6] by Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp is fundamentally less
cost-eﬀective than the collision-search circuits that had been introduced
years earlier by van Oorschot and Wiener in [17]. There is a popular myth
that the Brassard–Høyer–Tapp algorithm reduces the cost of b-bit hash
collisions from 2b/2 to 2b/3; this myth rests on a nonsensical notion of cost
and is debunked in this paper.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 summarize the asymptotic speeds of the attack
machines considered in this paper. The horizontal axis is machine size,
from 20 to 2b/2. The vertical axis is (typical) time to ﬁnd a collision, from
20 to 2b. Figure 1.1 assumes a realistic two-dimensional communication
mesh; Figure 1.2 makes the naive assumption that communication is free.Bernstein
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parallel rho (§5)
Fig.1.1. Asymptotic collision-search time assuming realistic communication costs.
Parallel rho is 1994 van Oorschot–Wiener [17]. Parallel quantum guessing is 2003
Grover–Rudolph [10].
2 Guessing a collision
A collision in a function H is, by deﬁnition, a pair (x,y) such that x 6= y
and H(x) = H(y). The simplest way to ﬁnd a collision is to simply guess
a pair (x,y) in the domain of H and see whether it is a collision.
Assume, for concreteness, that H maps (b + c)-bit strings to b-bit
strings, where c ≥ 1. Assume that x and y are uniform random (b+c)-bit
strings. What is the chance that (x,y) is a collision in H? The answer
depends on the distribution of output values of H but is guaranteed to
be at least 1/2b − 1/2b+c. The proof is a standard calculation: say the 2b
output values of H have p0,p1,...,p2b−1 preimages respectively, where
p0 + p1 + ··· + p2b−1 = 2b+c; then the number of collisions (x,y) is
p0(p0 − 1) + p1(p1 − 1) + ··· + p2b−1(p2b−1 − 1)
= p2
0 + p2
1 + ··· + p2
2b−1 − (p0 + p1 + ··· + p2b−1)
≥
(p0 + p1 + ··· + p2b−1)2
2b − (p0 + p1 + ··· + p2b−1)
= 2b+2c − 2b+c
by Cauchy’s inequality.
A sequence of N independent guesses succeeds with probability at
least 1 − (1 − (1/2b − 1/2b+c))N and involves at worst 2N computationsCost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?
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Fig.1.2. Asymptotic collision-search time assuming free communication. Parallel rho
is 1994 van Oorschot–Wiener [17]. “BHT claim” is 1998 Brassard–Høyer–Tapp [6].
Parallel quantum guessing is 2003 Grover–Rudolph [10].
of H. In particular, a sequence of

1/(1/2b − 1/2b+c)

≈ 2b independent
guesses succeeds with probability more than 1 − exp(−1) ≈ 0.63 and
involves (at worst) ≈ 2b+1 computations of H. This attack can be im-
plemented on a very small circuit, typically dominated by the size of a
circuit to compute H.
The impact of quantum computers. A collision in H is exactly a
preimage of 0 under the (2b+2c)-bit-to-1-bit function F deﬁned as follows:
F(x,y) = 0 if H(x) = H(y) and x 6= y; F(x,y) = 1 if H(x) 6= H(y) or
x = y. One can ﬁnd a preimage by quantum search instead of by guessing.
Quantum search uses approximately 2b/2h quantum operations on Θ(h)
qubits, where h is the cost of evaluating the function. (To understand
the appearance of 2b/2 here, recall that quantum search ﬁnds one out of p
b-bit preimages in time approximately 2b/2/p1/2; now replace b by 2b+2c,
and replace p by 2b+2c − 2b+c.)
One could summarize this change by claiming that quantum comput-
ers reduce collision-search time from 2b to 2b/2, saving a factor of 2b/2.
There are two reasons that the actual speedup factor is much smaller.
The ﬁrst reason is that, even in the most optimistic visions of quantum
computing, qubits will be larger and slower than bits. The second rea-
son is that there are many other ways to reduce the time far below 2b,
and in fact far below 2b/2, without quantum computing. There are alsoBernstein
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faster quantum collision-search algorithms, but—as shown in subsequent
sections of this paper—the non-quantum algorithms are the most cost-
eﬀective algorithms known.
3 Table lookups
There is a classic way to use large tables to reduce the number of H
evaluations:
• Generate many inputs x1,x2,...,xM.
• Compute H(x1),H(x2),...,H(xM), and lexicographically sort the M
pairs (H(x1),x1),(H(x2),x2),...,(H(xM),xM).
• Generate many more inputs y1,y2,...,yN. After generating yj, com-
pute H(yj) and look it up in the sorted list, hoping to ﬁnd a collision.
This attack has the same eﬀect as searching all MN pairs (xi,yj) for
collisions H(xi) = H(yj). In particular, the attack has a high probability
of success if M ≈ N ≈ 2b/2. What makes the attack interesting is that it
is faster than considering each pair (xi,yj) separately—although it also
requires a large attack machine with M(2b + c) bits of memory.
In a naive model of communication, random access to a huge array
takes constant time; looking up H(yi) in the sorted list takes approx-
imately lgM memory accesses; and sorting in the ﬁrst place takes ap-
proximately M lgM memory accesses. The table-lookup attack thus takes
M+N evaluations of H and additional time approximately (M+N)lgM
for memory access. For example, if M ≈ N ≈ 2b/2, then the attack takes
2b/2+1 evaluations of H and additional time approximately 2b/2b for mem-
ory access.
In a realistic two-dimensional model of communication, random access
to an M-element array takes time M1/2. The table-lookup attack thus
takes M + N evaluations of H and additional time approximately (M +
N)M1/2 lgM for memory access. For example, if M ≈ N ≈ 2b/2, then the
attack takes 2b/2+1 evaluations of H and additional time approximately
23b/4b for memory access. Memory access is the dominant cost here for
typical choices of H.
To summarize, a size-M machine ﬁnds collisions in time roughly 2b/M
in a naive model of communication, or time roughly 2b/M1/2 in a realistic
model of communication. If this machine is run for only  times as long
then it has approximately an  chance of success.
The impact of quantum computers. Fix x1,x2,...,xM. Consider the
b-bit-to-1-bit function F deﬁned as follows: F(y) = 0 if there is a collisionCost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?
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among (x1,y),(x2,y),...,(xM,y); otherwise F(y) = 1. The above attack
guesses a preimage of 0 under F.
Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp in [6] propose instead ﬁnding a preimage
of F by quantum search. They claim in [6, Section 3] that this quantum
attack takes “expected time O((k +
p
N/rk)(T + logk))” where “N”
is the number of hash-function inputs (i.e., 2b+c), “N/r” is the number
of hash-function outputs (i.e., 2b), “k” is the table size (i.e., M), and
“T” is the cost of evaluating the hash function (i.e., h). In other words,
they state that quantum search ﬁnds a preimage of F in expected time
O((M + 2b/2/M1/2)(h + logM)).
There are several reasons to question the Brassard–Høyer–Tapp claim.
Quantum search uses 2b/2/M1/2 evaluations of F, not merely 2b/2/M1/2
evaluations of H. Computing F(y) requires not only computing H(y)
but also comparing H(y) to H(x1),H(x2),...,H(xM). There are two
obstacles to performing these comparisons eﬃciently when M is large:
• Realistic two-dimensional models of quantum computation, just like
realistic models of non-quantum computation, need time M1/2 for
random access to a table of size M. This M1/2 loss is as large as the
M1/2 speedup claimed by Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp.
• A straight-line circuit to compare H(y) to H(x1),H(x2),...,H(xM)
uses Θ(Mb) bit operations, so a quantum circuit has to use Θ(Mb)
qubit operations. Sorting the table H(x1),H(x2),...,H(xM) does not
reduce the size of a straight-line comparison circuit, so it does not
reduce the number of quantum operations. The underlying problem
is that, inside the quantum search, the input to the comparison is a
quantum superposition of b-bit strings, so the output depends on all
Mb bits in the precomputed table.
There are much simpler quantum collision-search algorithms that reach
the speed that Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp claim for their algorithm; see
the next section of this paper. Unfortunately, as discussed later, this speed
is still not competitive with non-quantum collision hardware.
4 Parallelization
There is a much simpler way to build a machine of size M that ﬁnds
collisions in time 2b/M. The machine consists of M small independent
collision-guessing units (each unit being one of the circuits described in
Section 2), all running in parallel. This machine does as much work in
time T as a single collision-guessing machine would do in time MT. InBernstein
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particular, it has high probability of ﬁnding a collision in time 2b/M—
not just in a naive model of communication, but in a realistic model of
communication. This machine, unlike the table-lookup machine described
in the previous section, does not have trouble with communication as M
grows.
A more sophisticated size-M machine sorts H(x1),H(x2),...,H(xM)
and H(y1),H(y2),...,H(yM) in time Θ(bM1/2) using a two-dimensional
mesh-sorting algorithm; see, e.g., [14] and [13]. Computing the H val-
ues takes time Θ(h); the sorting dominates if M is large. This machine
has probability approximately M2/2b of ﬁnding a collision, assuming
M ≤ 2b/2. Repeating the same procedure 2b/M2 times takes time only
Θ(2bb/M3/2) and has high probability of ﬁnding a collision.
To summarize, this size-M machine ﬁnds collisions in time roughly
2b/M3/2 in a realistic model of communication. For example, a machine
of size 2b/3 ﬁnds collisions in time roughly 2b/2. If this machine is run for
 times as long then it has approximately an  chance of success.
The impact of quantum computers. Consider a size-M quantum
computer that consists of M small independent collision-searching units,
all running in parallel. After approximately 2b/2h quantum operations,
each collision-searching unit has approximately an 2 chance of success, so
the entire machine has approximately an M2 chance of success. In par-
ticular, the machine has a high probability of success after approximately
2b/2h/M1/2 quantum operations.
For example, a quantum computer of size 2b/3 can ﬁnd collisions in
time approximately 2b/3, as claimed in [6]. The fact that mindless par-
allelism would achieve the same performance as [6] was pointed out by
Grover and Rudolph in [10].
One can also try to build the quantum analogue of the more so-
phisticated size-M machine discussed above. Consider the function F
that, given 2Mb bits (x1,x2,...,xM,y1,y2,...,yM), outputs 0 if and
only if some (xi,yj) is a collision in H. Quantum search ﬁnds a preim-
age of F using approximately 2b/2/M quantum evaluations of F, saving
a factor of M1/2 compared to the previous algorithm. A standard two-
dimensional mesh-sorting algorithm to compute F can be converted into a
two-dimensional mesh-sorting quantum algorithm taking time Θ(bM1/2)
on a machine of size M.
This more sophisticated machine might be slightly better than the
mindlessly parallel quantum machine if H is expensive, but its overall
time is still on the scale of 2b/2/M1/2. The beneﬁt of considering M inputs
together is that M operations produce M2 collision opportunities, a factorCost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?
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M better than mindless parallelism—but this speeds up quantum search
by only M1/2, while communication costs also grow by a factor M1/2.
The same idea would be an improvement over [6] and [10] in a three-
dimensional model of parallel quantum computation, or in a naive parallel
model without communication delays. The function F can be evaluated
by a straight-line sequence of essentially bM bit operations (by standard
sorting algorithms), and if communication were free then a machine of
size M could carry out all of those bit operations in essentially constant
time. For example, a quantum computer of size 2b/3 would be able to ﬁnd
collisions in time approximately 2b/6 in a naive model.
5 The rho method
Let me review. The best size-M non-quantum machine described so far
takes time roughly 2b/M3/2 to ﬁnd a collision: for example, 27b/10 if M =
2b/5. Quantum search reduces 2b/M3/2 to 2b/2/M1/2: for example, 24b/10 if
M = 2b/5. All of these results are for a realistic model of communication;
a naive model would save a factor of M1/2.
“But what about the rho method?” the cryptographers are screaming.
“What kind of idiot would build a machine of size 2b/5 to ﬁnd collisions
in time 24b/10, when everybody knows how to build a machine of size only
2b/10 to ﬁnd collisions just as quickly?”
Recall that the rho method iterates the function H. Choose a (b+c)-
bit string x0, compute the b-bit string H(x0), apply an injective padding
function π to produce a (b+c)-bit string x1 = π(H(x0)), compute H(x1),
compute x2 = π(H(x1)), etc. After approximately 2b/2 steps one can
reasonably expect to ﬁnd a “distinguished point”: a string xi whose ﬁrst
b/2 bits are all 0. (In practice very simple functions π such as “append
c zero bits” seem to work for every function H of cryptographic interest,
although theorems obviously require more randomness in π.)
Now consider another such sequence y0,y1,..., again iterated until
a distinguished point. There are approximately 2b pairs (xi,yj) before
those distinguished points, so one can reasonably expect that those pairs
include a collision. Furthermore, if those pairs do include a collision, then
the distinguished points will be identical; the sequence lengths will then
reveal the diﬀerence i − j, and an easy recomputation of the sequences
will ﬁnd the collision.
More generally, consider a machine with M parallel iterating units,
and redeﬁne a “distinguished point” as a string xi whose ﬁrst b/2−dlgMe
bits are all 0. In time approximately 2b/2/M this machine will have consid-Bernstein
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ered Θ(2b/2) inputs to H and will have found Θ(M) distinguished points.
The inputs have a good chance of including a collision, and that collision
is easily found from a match in the distinguished points. Sorting the dis-
tinguished points takes time only Θ(M1/2); this is not a bottleneck for
M ≤ 2b/3.
To summarize, this size-M machine ﬁnds collisions in time roughly
2b/2/M. For example, a machine of size 1 ﬁnds collisions in time roughly
2b/2; a machine of size 2b/6 ﬁnds collisions in time roughly 2b/3; and a
machine of size 2b/3 ﬁnds collisions in time roughly 2b/6. All of these
results hold in a realistic model of communication.
The special case M = 1 was introduced by Pollard in [12] in 1975.
The general case, ﬁnding collisions in time 2b/2/M, was introduced by
van Oorschot and Wiener in [17] in 1994.
The impact of quantum computers. All of the quantum-collision
algorithms in the literature are steps backwards from the non-quantum
algorithm of [17].
The best time claimed—by Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp in [6], and by
Grover and Rudolph in [10]—is 2b/2/M1/2 on a size-M quantum com-
puter. This is no better than running M parallel copies of Pollard’s 1975
method, and is much worse than the van Oorschot–Wiener method.
The previous section of this paper explains how to achieve time 2b/2/M
on a size-M quantum computer, but only in a naive model allowing free
communication. The design has to evaluate H as many times as the van
Oorschot–Wiener method, and has to evaluate it on qubits rather than
on bits. The lack of iteration in this design might be pleasing for purists
who insist on proofs of performance, but this feature is of no practical
interest.
Of course, one can also achieve quantum time 2b/2/M by viewing
the van Oorschot–Wiener algorithm as a quantum algorithm. However,
replacing bits with qubits certainly does not save time! There are several
obvious ways to combine quantum search with the rho method, but I
have not found any such combinations that improve performance, and I
conjecture that—in a suitable generic model—no such improvements are
possible. Quantum search allows N operations to search N2 possibilities,
but the rho method already has the same eﬃciency.
Many authors have claimed that quantum computers will have an
impact on the complexity of hash collisions, reducing time 2b/2 to time
2b/3. In fact, time 2b/3 had already been achieved by non-quantum ma-
chines of size just 2b/6, and smaller time 2b/4 had already been achieved
by non-quantum machines of size 2b/4. Anyone afraid of quantum hash-Cost analysis of hash collisions: will quantum computers make SHARCS obsolete?
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collision algorithms already has much more to fear from non-quantum
hash-collision algorithms.
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Abstract. In this paper we make a ﬁrst feasibility analysis for imple-
menting lattice reduction algorithms on GPU using CUDA, a program-
ming framework for NVIDIA graphics cards. The enumeration phase of
the BKZ lattice reduction algorithm is chosen as a good candidate for
massive parallelization on GPU. Given the nature of the problem we gain
large speedups compared to previous CPU implementations. Our imple-
mentation saves more than 50% of the time in high lattice dimensions.
Among other impacts, this result inﬂuences the security of lattice based
cryptosystems.
Keywords: Lattice reduction, ENUM, parallelization, graphics cards,
CUDA
1 Introduction
Lattice-based cryptosystems are considered to be secure against quantum com-
puter attacks. Therefore those systems are promising alternatives to factoring
or discrete logarithm based systems. For those systems already exist quantum
computer algorithms that solve the problems eﬃciently. This will turn out as a
problem as soon as large scale quantum computers will be built.
The security of lattice-based schemes is based on the hardness of special
lattice problems. Lattice basis reduction helps to determine the actual hardness
of those problems in practice. During the last ten years there have been no
notable improvements to practical lattice reduction. So people start thinking
about using special hardware to speed up the existing algorithms.
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In 2008, Bernstein et al. use parallelization techniques on graphic cards to
solve integer factorization using elliptic curves [BCC+09]. Using NVidia’s CUDA
parallelization framework, they gained a speed-up of up to 6 compared to com-
putation on a four core CPU. Former applications of GPU parallelization in
cryptography were mainly to secret key cryptography, see [CIKL05] for exam-
ple.
Our Contribution. In this paper we present a parallel version of the enumera-
tion algorithm that searches short vectors in a lattice. We are using the CUDA
framework of NVIDIA for implementing an algorithm on graphics cards. Firstly
we explain the ideas of how to parallelize enumeration on GPU. Secondly we
present some ﬁrst experimental results. Using the GPU, we reduce the time re-
quired for enumeration of a lattice in dimensions bigger than 50 to less than
50%. This result inﬂuences the security of lattice based cryptosystems, that is
mostly based on the hardness of ﬁnding short vectors in a lattice.
The original algorithm for exhaustive search in lattices was presented by
Fincke and Pohst [FP83] and Kannan [Kan83]. The algorithm used in practice
today is the variant of Schnorr and Euchner [SE91]. In [PS08] Pujol and Stehl´ e
analyze the stability of the enumeration when using ﬂoating point arithmetic. A
parallel version of the enumeration is not known to date.
2 Preliminaries
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rd. It can be represented by a basis matrix
B = {b1,...,bn}. We call L(B) = {
Pn
i=1 xibi,xi ∈ Z} the lattice spanned by
the basis vectors bi ∈ Rd. The dimension n of a lattice is the number of linear
independent vectors in the lattice, i.e. the number of basis vectors. When n = d
the lattice is called full dimensional.
The basis of a lattice is not unique. Every unimodular transformation M,
i.e. transformation with detM = ±1, turns a basis matrix B into a second basis
MB of the same lattice.
The determinant of a lattice is deﬁned as det(L(B)) =
p
det(BTB). For
full dimensional lattices we have det(L(B)) = |det(B)|. The determinant of a
lattice is invariant of the choice of the lattice basis, which follows from the mul-
tiplicative property of the determinant and the fact that basis transformations
have determinant 1.
The length of the shortest vector of a lattice L(B) is denoted λ1(L(B)) or in
short λ1 if the lattice is uniquely determined.
The Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization computes an orthogonal projection of
a basis. It is an eﬃcient algorithm that outputs B∗ = [b∗
1,...,b∗
n] and µi,j such
that B = B∗ · [µi,j], where [µi,j] is an upper triangular matrix consisting of the
Gram-Schmidt coeﬃcients µi,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n. The orthogonalized matrix B∗
is not necessarily a basis of the lattice.Shortest Lattice Vector Enumeration on Graphics Cards
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2.1 Lattice Basis Reduction
Problems. Some lattice bases are more useful than others. The goal of lattice
basis reduction (or in short lattice reduction) is to ﬁnd a basis consisting of short
and almost orthogonal lattice vectors. More exactly, we can deﬁne some (hard)
problems on lattices. The most important one is the shortest vector problem
(SVP), which is looking for a vector v ∈ L \ {0} with kvk = λ1(L(B)). In most
cases, the Euclidean norm k·k2 is considered. As the SVP is NP-hard (at least
under randomized reductions) people consider the approximate version γ-SVP,
that is looking for a vector v ∈ L \ {0} with kvk ≤ γ · λ1(L(B)).
Other important problems like the closest vector problem (CVP) that searches
for a nearest lattice vector to a given point in space, its approximation variant
γ-CVP, or the shortest basis problem (SBP) are listed and described in detail in
[ECR].
Algorithms. One of the main contributions to lattice reduction was the work of
Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lov´ asz in 1982 [LLL82], where they introduced the LLL
algorithm, which was the ﬁrst polynomial time algorithm to solve the approxi-
mate shortest vector problem in higher dimensions. Another famous contribution
is the BKZ block algorithm of Schnorr and Euchner [SE91]. In practice, this is
the algorithm that gives the best solution to lattice reduction so far. Their paper
[SE91] also introduces the enumeration algorithm (ENUM), which practically is
the fastest algorithm to solve the exact shortest vector problem using complete
enumeration of all lattice vectors. It is used as a black box in the BKZ algorithm.
The enumeration algorithm organizes linear combinations of the basis vectors in
a search tree and performs a depth ﬁrst search above the tree. In the same pa-
per, Schnorr and Euchner explain the idea of deep inserting vectors into a basis
during LLL reduction. This approach results in shorter vectors at the expense
of the algorithms runtime.
Other promising algorithm variants were presented by Schnorr [Sch03], Nguyen
and Stehl´ e [NS05], and Gama and Nguyen [GN08a]. The variant of [NS05] is
implemented in the fpLLL library of [Ste], which is the fastest public implemen-
tation of ENUM algorithms. In [GN08b] Gama and Nguyen compare the NTL
implementation [Sho] of ﬂoating point LLL, the deep insertion variant of LLL
and the BKZ algorithm. It is the ﬁrst comprehensive comparison of lattice basis
reduction algorithms and helps understanding their practical behavior. Koy in-
troduced the notion of a primal-dual reduction in [Koy04]. Schnorr [Sch03] and
Ludwig [BL06] deal with random sampling reduction. Both are a bit diﬀerent
concepts of lattice reduction, where primal-dual reduction uses the dual of a
lattice for reducing and random sampling combines LLL-like algorithms with an
exhaustive point search in a set of lattice vectors that is likely to contain short
vectors.
The parallelization of lattice reduction was considered in [Vil92,HT93,RV92].
These papers present parallel versions for n and n2 processors, where n is the
lattice dimension. In [Jou93] the parallel LLL of Villard [Vil92] is combined with
the ﬂoating point ideas of [SE91]. In [Wet98] the authors present a blockwiseHermans, Schneider, Buchmann, Vercauteren, Preneel
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generalization of Villards algorithm. Backes and Wetzel worked out a parallel
variant of the LLL algorithm for multi-core CPU architectures [BW09]. All pre-
vious parallel algorithms handle the LLL algorithm, but to our knowledge there
exists no parallel version of the enumeration algorithm. Furthermore, for GPU
parallelization there is no work done.
Applications. Lattice reduction has applications in cryptography as well as in
cryptanalysis. The foundation of some promising cryptographic primitives is
based on the hardness of lattice problems. Lattice reduction helps determining
the practical hardness of those problems and is a basis for real world applica-
tion of those hash functions, signatures, and encryption schemes. Well known
examples are the SWIFFT hash functions of Lyubashevsky et al. [LMPR08],
the signature scheme of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08], or the
encryption schemes of [AD97,Pei09,SSTX09]. The NTRU [HPS98,otCC09] and
GGH [GGH97] schemes do not provide a security proof, but the most promising
attacks are also lattice based ones.
In cryptanalysis, there are further applications of lattice basis reduction.
Not only lattice-based systems can be broken using this technique. There are
attacks on RSA and similar systems, using lattice reduction to ﬁnd roots of
certain polynomials [CNS99,DN00]. Low density knapsack cryptosystems where
successfully attacked with lattice reduction [LO85]. Other applications of lattice
basis reduction are factoring numbers and computing discrete logarithms using
diophantine approximations [Sch91]. In Operations Research, or generally speak-
ing, discrete optimization, lattice reduction can be used to solve linear integer
programs [Len83].
2.2 Programming Graphics Cards
Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) is hardware that is speciﬁcally designed to
perform a massive number of speciﬁc graphical operations in parallel. The intro-
duction of platforms like CUDA by NVidia [Nvi07a] or CTM by ATI [AMD06],
that make it easier to run custom programs instead of limited graphical oper-
ations on a GPU, has been the major breakthrough for the GPU as a general
computing platform. The introduction of integer and bit arithmetic also broad-
ened the scope to cryptographic applications.
Applications. Many general mathematical packages are available for GPU, like
the BLAS library [NVI07b] that supports basic linear algebra operations.
An obvious application in the area of cryptography is brute force searching
using multiple parallel threads on the GPU. There are also implementations
of AES [CIKL05] [Man07] [HW07] and RSA [MPS07] [SG08], [Fle07] available.
These implementations can also be used (partially) in cryptanalysis. Integer
factorization on elliptic curves has been implemented in [BCC+09]. However, to
date, no applications based on lattices are available for GPU.Shortest Lattice Vector Enumeration on Graphics Cards
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Programming Model. For the work in this paper the CUDA platform will be
used. The GPUs from the Tesla range, which support CUDA, are composed
of several multiprocessors, each containing a small number of scalar processors.
For the programmer this underlying hardware model is hidden by the concept of
SIMT-programming: Single Instruction, Multiple Thread. The basic idea is that
the code for a single thread is written, which is then uploaded to the device and
executed in parallel by multiple threads.
The threads are organized in multidimensional arrays, called blocks. All
blocks are again put in a multidimensional array, called the grid. When exe-
cuting a program (a grid), threads are scheduled in groups of 32 threads, called
warps. Within a warp threads should not diverge, as otherwise the execution of
the warp is serialized.
Memory Model. The Tesla GPUs provide multiple levels of memory: registers,
shared memory, global memory, texture and constant memory. Registers and
shared memory are on chip and close to the multiprocessor and can be accessed
with low latency. The number of registers and shared memory is limited, since
the number available for one multiprocessor must be shared among all threads
in a single block.
Global memory is oﬀ-chip and is not cached. As such, access to global mem-
ory can slow down the computations drastically, so several strategies for speeding
up memory access should be considered (besides the general strategy of avoid-
ing global memory access). By coalescing memory access, e.g. loading the same
memory address or a consecutive block of memory from multiple threads, the
delay is reduced, since a coalesced memory access has the same cost as a sin-
gle random memory access. By launching a large number of blocks the latency
introduced by memory loading can also be hidden, since other blocks can be
scheduled in the meantime.
The constant and texture memory are cached and can be used for speciﬁc
types of data or special access patterns.
Instruction Set. Modern GPUs provide the full range of (32 and) 64 bit ﬂoating
point, integer and bit operations. Addition and multiplication are fast, other
operations can, depending on the type, be much slower. There is no point in
using other than 32 or 64 bit numbers, since smaller types are always cast to
larger types. Most GPUs have a specialized FMAD instruction, which performs
a ﬂoating point multiplication followed by an addition at the cost of only a single
operation. This instruction can be used during the BKZ enumeration.
One problem that occurs on GPU’s is the fact that today GPU’s are not
able to deal with higher precision than 64 bit ﬂoating point numbers. For lattice
reduction, sometimes higher bit sizes are required to guarantee the correct ter-
mination of the algorithms. For an n-dimensional lattice, using the ﬂoating point
LLL algorithm of [LLL82], one requires a precision of O(nlogB) bits, where B
is an upper bound for the d-dimensional vectors [NS05]. For the L2 algorithm
of [NS05], the required bit size is O(nlog2 3), which is independent of the entry
size. For more details on the ﬂoating point LLL analysis see [NS05] and [NS06].Hermans, Schneider, Buchmann, Vercauteren, Preneel
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In [PS08] the authors state that for enumeration algorithms double preci-
sion is suitable up to dimension 90, which is beyond the dimensions that are
practical today. Therefore enumeration should be possible on actual graphics
cards, whereas LLL-like algorithms will gain some problems and require some
multi-precision framework.
3 Parallel Enumeration on GPU
In this section we present our algorithm for shortest vector enumeration in lat-
tices. Firstly we brieﬂy explain the ENUM algorithm of Schnorr and Euchner
[SE91]. Secondly we explain the ideas of GPU parallelization of the algorithm
before presenting our new algorithm.
The enumeration algorithms used are variants of those in [Kan83] and [FP83].
Schnorr and Euchner [SE91] improve the enumeration technique. Their algo-
rithm is the fastest one today and also the one used in the NTL [Sho] and fpLLL
[Ste] library. Therefore we have chosen this algorithm as basis for our parallel
algorithm.
The ENUM algorithm enumerates over all linear combinations [x1,...,xn]
∈ Zn which generate a vector v =
Pn
i=1 xibi. Those linear combinations are
organized in a tree structure. Leafs of the tree contain full linear combinations,
whereas inner nodes contain partly ﬁlled vectors. The search for the tree leaf
that determines the shortest lattice vector is performed in a depth ﬁrst search
order. The most important part of the enumeration is cutting oﬀ parts of the
tree, i.e. the strategy which subtrees are explored and which ones cannot lead to
a shorter vector. Usually, as initial bound for the length of the shortest vector,
one uses the norm of the ﬁrst basis vector. For a more detailed description we
refer to [PS08].
3.1 Multi-Thread Enumeration
Roughly speaking, the parallel enumeration works as follows. The search tree of
combinations that is explored in the enumeration algorithm can be split at a
high level, distributing subtrees among several threads. Each thread then runs
an enumeration algorithm, keeping the ﬁrst coeﬃcients ﬁxed. These threads can
run independently of the others, which limits communication needed between
threads. The top level enumeration is performed on CPU and outputs start
vectors for the single GPU threads.
When the number of postponed subtrees is higher than the number of threads
that we can start in parallel, then we copy the start vectors to the GPU and
let it enumerate the subtrees. After all threads have ﬁnished enumerating their
subtrees we proceed in the same manner: caching start vectors on CPU and start
enumeration on GPU. Figure 1 illustrates this approach. The variable α deﬁnes
the region where the initial enumeration is performed. The subtrees where GPU
threads work are also depicted in Figure 1.Shortest Lattice Vector Enumeration on Graphics Cards
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Fig.1. Illustration of the algorithm ﬂow. The top part is enumerated on CPU, the
lower subtrees are explored in parallel on GPU.
If a GPU subtree enumeration ﬁnds a new optimal vector, it writes back
the coordinates and norm of this vector to the main memory. The other GPU
threads will directly receive the new norm, which will allow them to cut away
more parts of the subtree.
Early Termination. The computation power of the GPU is used best when as
many threads as possible are working at the same time. Therefore the number of
enumeration steps that can be performed on GPU is bounded by a value S (for
each subtree). When S is exceeded by one of the GPU subtree enumerations,
this subtree enumeration stops computing and writes back it current state to
the main memory. This state can be used later on, to restart the enumeration at
exactly the same position it stopped. The early termination after S enumeration
steps is needed because the subtree enumerations have diﬀerent lengths. The
early termination ensures that the GPU is always running a high number of
enumerations in parallel and isn’t stalled by a small number of long-running
enumerations. This small number long-running threads are the cause of thread
divergence, which causes performance degradation.
Because of early termination some of the subtree enumerations are not ﬁn-
ished after a single launch of the GPU enumeration. This is the main reason
why the entire algorithm is iterated several times. At each iteration the GPU
launches a mix of enumerations: new subtrees from the top enumeration and
subtrees that were not ﬁnished in one of the previous GPU launches (because S
was exceeded).
3.2 The Iterated Parallel ENUM Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows the high-level layout of the GPU enumeration algorithm.
Details concerning the updating of the bound A, as well as the write-back of
newly discovered optimal vectors have been omitted. The actual enumeration is
also not shown: it is part of several subroutines which are called from the main
algorithm.Hermans, Schneider, Buchmann, Vercauteren, Preneel
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Algorithm 1: High-level GPU ENUM Algorithm
Input: bi, A, α, n
Compute the Gram-Schmidt decomposition of bi 1
while true do 2
S = {(xi,∆xi,∆
2xi,li = α,si = 0)}i ← Top enum: generate at most 3
numstartpoints − #T vectors
R = {(¯ xi,∆xi,∆
2xi,li,si)}i ← GPU enumeration, starting from S ∪ T 4
T ← {Ri : si ≥ S} 5
if #T < cputhreshold then 6
Enumerate the starting points in T on the CPU. 7
Stop 8
end 9
end 10
Output: (x1,...,xn) with
‚
‚Pn
i=1 xibi
‚
‚ = λ1(L)
The whole process of launching a grid of GPU threads is iterated several
times (line 2), until the whole search tree has been enumerated either on GPU
or CPU.
In line 3, the top of the search tree is enumerated, to generate a set S of
starting vectors xi for which enumeration should be started at level α. More
detailed, the top enumeration in the region between α and n outputs distinct
vectors
xi = [0,...,0,xα,...,xn] for i = 1...numstartpoints − #T .
The top enumeration will stop automatically if a suﬃcient amount of vectors
from the top of the tree have been enumerated. The rest of the top of the tree
is enumerated in the following iterations of the algorithm.
Line 4 performs the actual GPU enumeration. In each iteration, a set of start-
ing vectors and starting levels {xi,li} is uploaded to the GPU. These starting
vectors can be either vectors generated by the top enumeration in the region
between α and n (in which case li = α) or the vectors (and levels) written back
by the GPU when exceeding S, so that the enumeration will continue. In total
numstartpoints vectors (a mix of new and old vectors) are uploaded at each
iteration. For each starting vector xi (with associated starting level li) the GPU
outputs a vector
¯ xi = [¯ x1,..., ¯ xα−1,xα,...,xn] for i = 1...numstartpoints,
(which describes the current position in the search tree), the current level li, the
number of enumeration steps si performed and also part of the internal state
of the enumeration. This state {¯ xi,∆xi,∆2xi,li} can be used to continue the
enumeration later on. The vectors ∆xi and ∆2xi are used in the enumeration to
generate the zig-zag pattern and are part of the internal state of the enumeration
[SE91]. This state is added to the output to be able to eﬃciently restart the
enumeration at the point it was terminated.Shortest Lattice Vector Enumeration on Graphics Cards
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Line 5 will select the resulting vectors from the GPU enumeration that were
terminated because of reaching the bound S. These will be added to the set T of
leftover vectors, which will be relaunched in the next iteration of the algorithm.
If the set of leftover vectors is too small to get an eﬃcient GPU enumeration,
the CPU takes over and ﬁnishes of the last part of the enumeration. This ﬁnal
part only takes limited time.
GPU Threads. The number of starting points numstartpoints is higher than
the number of threads (numthreads) that are launched on the GPU. Each
thread will pick a new starting vector from the stack, after it ﬁnished enumerat-
ing his starting point. This is done until all numstartpoints starting vectors
are enumerated or stopped after reaching S enum steps. The reason for this is
closely connected to the early termination feature discussed before. Since the
subtree enumerations have diﬀerent lengths, a thread should be able to con-
tinue working even if the subtree enumeration was small. In our experiments,
numstartpoints was around 20-30 times higher than numthreads, which
means that on average every GPU thread enumerated 20-30 subtrees in each
iteration.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present some preliminary results of our CUDA implementation
of our algorithm. For comparison we used the highly optimized ENUM algorithm
of the fpLLL library in version 3.0.11 of Stehl´ e and Pujol from [Ste]3. The CUDA
program was compiled using nvcc, for the CPU programs we used g++ with
compiler ﬂag -O2. The tests were run on a Intel Core2 Extreme CPU X9650
(using one single core) running at 3 GHz, and a NVIDIA GTX 280 graphics
card. We run up to 100000 threads in parallel on the GPU.
Our input lattices are LLL reduced with δ = 0.99. We chose random lattices
following the construction principle of [GM03] with bit size of the entries of 10·n.
Both algorithms output the same coeﬃcient vectors and therefore a lattice vector
with shortest possible length. Table 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the experimental
n 45 48 50 52 54
fpLLL 18.3s 139s 277s 2483s 6960s
CUDA 20.2s 92s 133s 959s 2599s
110% 66% 48% 39% 37%
Table 1. Average time needed for enumeration of lattices in each dimension n.
results. They compare our CUDA implementation with the ENUM of fpLLL (run
fpLLL with parameter -a svp). The ﬁgure shows the runtimes of both algorithms
when applied to ﬁve diﬀerent lattices of each dimension. One can notice that in
3 Timings of the NTL version of ENUM can be found in [GN08b].Hermans, Schneider, Buchmann, Vercauteren, Preneel
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Fig.2. Timings for enumeration. The graph shows the time needed for enumerating
ﬁve diﬀerent random lattices in each dimension n.
dimension above 48, our CUDA implementation always outperforms the fpLLL
implementation. In lower dimensions, the initialization of the GPU requires more
time than the enumeration itself, therefore the complete algorithm lasts longer
than on CPU. Table 1 shows the average value over all ﬁve lattices in each
dimension. Again one notices that in dimension 45, the GPU algorithm is a bit
slower. It demonstrates its strength in dimensions above 48, where the time goes
down to 48% in dimension 50 and down to 37% in dimension 54. Therefore we
can state that the GPU algorithm gains big speedups in dimensions bigger than
50, which are the interesting ones in practice.
On the GPU a throughput up to 100 million enumeration steps per second
is achieved, while similar experiments on CPU only yielded 25 million steps per
second.
Further Work. Further improvements are possible using multiple CPU cores.
Our implementation only uses one CPU core for the top enumeration, whereas
additional cores are kept aside for the computations. When GPU starts enumer-
ation it would be possible to start threads on diﬀerent CPU cores as well. We
expect a speedup of two compared to our actual implementation using this idea.
A second opportunity for further speedups is the tweaking of the several
parameters (like S, α, numthreads, numstartpoints). Exhaustive testing will
improve the sets of parameters for GPU enumeration for each lattice dimension.Shortest Lattice Vector Enumeration on Graphics Cards
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It is possible to start enumeration using a shorter starting value than the
ﬁrst basis vectors norm. The Gaussian heuristic can be used to predict the norm
of the shortest basis vector λ1. This can lead to enormous speed ups in the
algorithm. We did not include this improvement into our algorithm so far to get
comparable results to fpLLL.
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Abstract. This paper sets new speed records for ECM, the elliptic-curve method of factoriza-
tion, on several diﬀerent hardware platforms: GPUs (speciﬁcally the NVIDIA GTX), x86 CPUs
with SSE2 (speciﬁcally the Intel Core 2 and the AMD Phenom), and the Cell (speciﬁcally the
PlayStation 3 and the PowerXCell 8i). In particular, this paper explains how to carry out more
than one billion 192-bit modular multiplications per second on a
$2000 personal computer.
1 Introduction
The paper “ECM on Graphics Cards” at Eurocrypt 2009 [6] reported a new implementation
of ECM performing 41.88 million 280-bit mulmods per second on an NVIDIA GTX 295
GPU. Here “mulmods” are modular multiplications, and ECM is the elliptic-curve method
of factorization, a critical subroutine inside NFS, the number-ﬁeld sieve. See [6, Section 1]
for discussion of the cryptanalytic importance of ECM and NFS.
For comparison, the standard GMP-ECM software package, running simultaneously on
all four cores of an Intel Core 2 Quad Q9550 CPU, performs only 14.85 million mulmods
per second with the same 280-bit modulus length. The same paper recommended building
a
$2226 computer with two GTX 295 GPUs and a Core 2 Quad Q6600 CPU, performing in
total an astonishing 96.79 million 280-bit mulmods per second.
In this paper we show that GPUs are capable of much higher performance. For example,
with 210-bit moduli, the same GTX 295 can carry out 481 million mulmods per second.
This example uses a somewhat smaller modulus size than [6], but this change explains only
a small part of the tenfold increase in speed.
This paper also sets new ECM speed records on several diﬀerent CPUs: for example, with
192-bit moduli, a Cell-based IBM BladeCenter QS22 can carry out 334 million mulmods per
second; an AMD Phenom II 940 can carry out 202 million mulmods per second (20% more
on the same CPU than the ECM software being used in the ongoing RSA-768 factorization
project); an Intel Core 2 Quad Q9550 can carry out 114 million mulmods per second; and
a low-cost PlayStation 3 can carry out 102 million mulmods per second with slightly larger,
195-bit moduli. Our software is tuned in many platform-speciﬁc ways but in every case
beneﬁts from systematically exploiting the available parallelism.
We ﬁnd that GPUs are faster than CPUs, but that the best price-performance ratio is
achieved by computers that run CPUs and GPUs simultaneously, as in [6]. Speciﬁcally, a
computer with one Phenom II 940 CPU and two GTX 295 GPUs costs only about
$2000
and handles 1.1 billion 192-bit mulmods per second with our ECM software, several times
faster than the best result of [6].Bernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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Our GPU software goes beyond the software of [6] not only in speed but also in generality:
most importantly, within the range of modulus sizes that are of interest inside NFS-over-
ECM, we handle several diﬀerent sizes, while [6] handled only 280 bits. We expect the
same techniques to be useful for other computations bottlenecked by modular multiplication.
The traditional example (typically with 1024-bit moduli, larger than in this paper) is RSA,
while a much more modern example (typically with similar modulus sizes to this paper) is
evaluation of pairings to verify short signatures. Note that for eﬃciency one must feed many
simultaneous computations to the hardware; this is not possible for a laptop carrying out
an occasional cryptographic computation, but it is feasible for a busy server bottlenecked
by cryptography, and it is very easily achieved inside cryptanalytic computations such as
NFS-over-ECM.
Readers not familiar with ECM can ﬁnd all relevant background in [32], [7], and [6].
2 Today’s Computing Hardwares
2.1 X86 and Streaming SIMD Extensions
The 64-bit x86 instruction set (x86-64) is supported by all AMD CPUs since the K8 (Opteron
and Athlon 64), some versions of the Intel Pentium 4, and all Intel Core 2 and i7 CPUs.
In x86-64 there are sixteen 64-bit general-purpose integer registers (GPRs). Modern x86-
64 processors decode the variable-length CISC instructions into RISC-like micro-operations
for possibly out-of-order dispatching in 3 uniﬁed pipelines (Intel Core) or 3 integer plus 3
ﬂoating-point pipelines (AMD).
The GNU Multi-Precision (GMP) library uses the biggest multiplication available, the
MUL instruction (unsigned 64×64 = 128-bit) to compute multi-precision integers in a straight-
forward manner, using 64-bit limbs with native ADC (add-with-carry) instructions.
AMD K8 and K10 CPUs sport an impressive integer multiplier that can in theory dispatch
a 64×64 = 128-bit MUL once every two cycles with a latency of 4–5 cycles. In practice other
bottlenecks — principally the forced use of registers (RDX,RAX) for the product and RAX for
the multiplicand — makes it challenging to average one 64×64 = 128-bit MUL every 3 cycles.
Intel CPUs can only dispatch one 64 × 64 = 128-bit MUL every 4 cycles, with a latency
of 7 cycles. Furthermore, MUL uses resources (32-bit multipliers) that conﬂict with other
instructions. Therefore it becomes imperative to consider other approaches to big integer
arithmetic than the 64-bit MUL instructions, such as the x86 vector instructions below.
SSE2 Instructions All Intel CPUs since the Pentium 4 and all AMD CPUs since the
K8 supports the SSE2 (Streaming SIMD Extensions 2) instruction set, where SIMD in turn
stands for Single Instruction Multiple Data (performing the same action on many operands).
SSE2 instruction set operates on 16 architectural 128-bit registers, called xmm [0–15], as
packed 8-, 16-, 32- or 64-bit ints. The instructions are arcane and highly non-orthogonal:
Load/Store: Between xmm and memory or lowest xmm unit zero-extended and GPR.
Reorganize Data: Multi-way 16- and 32-bit move called Shuﬄes (8-bit available in SSSE3
only), and Packing, Unpacking, or Conversion on vector data of diﬀerent densities.
Logical: AND, OR, NOT, XOR; Shift (packed 16-, 32- or 64-bits) Left, Right Logical and
Right Arithmetic; Shift entire xmm register right/left byte-wise only.The Billion-Mulmod-Per-Second PC
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Arithmetic: Add/subtract on 8-, 16-, 32- and 64-bit integers (including “saturating” ver-
sions); multiply of 16-bits (high and low word returns, signed and unsigned, and fused
multiply-multiply-adds) and 32-bits unsigned; max/min (signed 16-bit, unsigned 8-bit);
unsigned averages (8-/16-bit); sum-of-diﬀerences for 8-bits. A regular set of arithmetic
instructions are available on IEEE-754 single and double ﬂoats.
Experiments demonstrate that, on AMD CPUs, integer multiplication uses separate com-
putational resources from the vector instructions. On Intel CPUs the resources conﬂict.
Both Intel Core and AMD K10 architectures can pipeline most vector instructions with
a theoretical throughput of one instruction per cycle. One attractive possibility is vectorized
ﬂoating-point arithmetic, speciﬁcally the MULPD (multiply 2 packed doubles — 53 bits of
mantissa) instruction, with a radix of 224. Another attractive possibility is vectorized integer
arithmetic, speciﬁcally the PMULUDQ (packed multiply unsigned doubleword to quadword)
instruction, which can do two 32 × 32 = 64-bit products every cycle. Of course without
intrinsic carry ﬂags for SSE additions, for big integer arithmetic we still need to hand-carry
unsigned limbs. Still, we are able to go as high as radix 230, which usually saves a limb, and
carrying integral limbs uses shifts and bitmasks, which is no worse than the add-subtract in
ﬂoat limbs.
For completeness, we tested and optimized single-thread assembly code using MUL, PMULUDQ,
and MULPD as the principal way to multiply for every x86-64 CPU we have. A simple model
predicts, and experiments conﬁrm, that PMULUDQ is fastest for Intel and using the 64-bit MUL
is best for AMD.
Other vector instruction sets on x86 (SSE3, SSSE3, and SSE4) have no further instruc-
tions that help big integer arithmetic throughput. Note that the signed 32×32 = 64 multiply
(PMULDQ) in SSSE3 cannot be used due to the lack of an arithmetic 64-bit right shift. We
expect this to change only when AMD’s SSE5 (with fused multiply-adds) come to market.
2.2 Graphics Cards from NVIDIA and CUDA
Today’s graphics cards contain powerful graphics processing units (GPUs) to handle the
increasing complexity and screen resolution in video games. GPUs have now developed into
a powerful, highly parallel computing platform that ﬁnds more and more interest outside
graphics-processing applications. In cryptography, there have been many attempts of ex-
ploiting the computational power of GPUs [10,11,26,31]. In particular, Bernstein et al. have
explored the possibility of using graphics cards to speed up ECM computation [6]. The inter-
ested reader is referred to their paper for a more detailed description of the GPU computing
platform and various NVIDIA graphics cards; here we only provide a brief summary of GPU
programming. More importantly, we will compare our results with theirs in Section 4. Some
of the information here is repeated from [6] to keep this paper self-contained.
Like Bernstein et al., we use NVIDIA’s GPUs because they provide a programmer-
friendly parallel programming environment called CUDA. A GPU program (*.cu) is written
in CUDA and compiled into intermediate virtual machine code (*.ptx). The NVIDIA driver
then converts that into real machine code (*.cubin) and loads it to run with appropriate
data.
A typical NVIDIA GPU contains several to several tens of streaming multiprocessors
(MPs), as depicted in Figure 1. Each MP contains a scheduling and dispatching unit thatBernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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Fig.1. NVIDIA’s GPU Block Diagram
can handle many lightweight threads. The actual computation is done by eight streaming
processors (SPs) and two super function units (SFUs) on each MP, and a GPU typically
contains tens to hundreds of these SPs, which NVIDIA advertises as “cores.”
Like in any other architecture with a memory hierarchy, the closer any memory is to
the processor core, the faster it will be. So there are, as shown in Figure 1, a big register
ﬁle, fast on-die shared memory, fast local read-only caches to device memory on the card,
and uncached thread-local and global memories. Note that the NVIDIA platform only pro-
vides read-only caching. Programmers are on their own to manage the caching of read-write
memories.
Uncached memories have relatively low throughput and long latency. For example, a
GeForce 8800 GTX has 128 SPs running at 1.35 GHz; its controllers have a total throughput
of only 86.4 GB/s to device memory. This translates to one 32-bit ﬂoating-point number per
cycle per MP, not to mention the latency of 400–600 cycles.
These characteristics mean that GPU programming generally involves controlling a large
number of threads. The beneﬁts of using many threads are twofold. First, we will be able to
exploit thread-level parallelism in the application via mapping these threads to the hundreds
of SPs in GPU and having them run in parallel. Secondly, having multiple threads time-share
a physical SP enables latency hiding, a well-known strategy in the computer architecture
community. Only with enough threads can we eliminate wasted clock cycles (caused by
dependent pipeline stalls) and fully utilize all computational units available on GPU. In
particular, NVIDIA reports the theoretical maximal GFLOPS of their GPUs as if the user
can always run enough threads ﬁlling up the 20+-stage pipelines of all SPs.
In the CUDA programming model, the threads of an application are organized in a two-
tier hierarchy. At top level they form a thread grid, which just means that they run one
single program called the kernel. A grid of threads are divided into thread blocks. Threads inThe Billion-Mulmod-Per-Second PC
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the same block can cooperate, while diﬀerent blocks of threads run independently. A block
of threads must be executed by one single MP, which makes intra-block cooperation such
as thread synchronization much easier. Thread blocks also make scaling easier: GPUs with
more MPs can process more blocks in parallel without changing the program or the kernel
conﬁguration.
Even though the CUDA programming model is about the concept of threads, it is essential
for the programmer to understand that the minimal scheduling entity is actually a warp.
In CUDA, the number of threads in a warp depends on microarchitecture implementation;
for all current GPUs it is 32. Each instruction is in fact decoded only once a warp. Hence,
each thread in a warp must run the same program (SPMD or same program multiple data),
controlled by built-in variables (e.g., ThreadID). Thus we need at least 8×24/32 = 6 warps
per MP since a ﬂoat instruction has a latency of 20–24 cycles.
The GPU threads are lightweight hardware threads, which incur very fast context switches
with little overhead. To support this, the physical registers are divided among all active
threads. For example, on 8800 GTX there are 8192 registers per MP. If we were to use 256
threads, then each thread could use 32 registers—very few for complicated algorithms. The
register pressure can be even greater, as sometimes the conversion of the virtual machine code
leaves something to be desired. GPUs from the GT2xx family have twice as many registers,
making things much easier.
To summarize, the massive parallelism in NVIDIA’s GPU architecture makes GPU pro-
gramming very diﬀerent from sequential programming on traditional CPUs. In general, GPUs
are most suitable for executing the data-parallel part of an algorithm. To get the most out of
the theoretical arithmetic throughput, one must maximize the ratio of arithmetic operations
to memory accesses.
2.3 Cell Processor
The Cell processor was jointly developed by Sony, Toshiba, and IBM in 2005. A Cell processor
is constructed from one Power Processing Element (PPE) and eight Synergistic Processor
Elements (SPEs) with a high-bandwidth Element Interconnection Bus (EIB), as shown in
Figure 2. The processor cores work at clock rates up to 4 GHz, while the EIB works at half of
Fig.2. The Cell Processor Block DiagramBernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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the system clock rate. EIB does not only connects PPE and SPE but also memory and I/O
controllers. EIB is composed of four rings, each oﬀering a bandwidth of 16 bytes per cycle,
and supports multiple simultaneous transfers per ring. The peak bandwidth of the entire EIB
is 96 bytes per cycle. The PPE is more of a conventional PowerPC processor, which supports
two-level on-chip caches with multi-threading capability and vector multimedia extensions.
The PPE’s main task is usually to run the operating system.
Each SPE is composed of a synergistic processor unit (SPU) and a memory ﬂow controller
(MFC). The SPU, acting like a RISC processor, is used mainly for computation. Each SPU
has a SIMD unit that is capable of vector processing of integer and ﬂoating-point numbers
of various lengths. The SIMD unit is an important feature for high-performance computing
and will be described in more detail later in this section.
The SPU contains a 256-kilobyte local store for instructions and data needed for executing
a program on it. Instructions and data must be explicitly moved to the local store by sending
direct memory access (DMA) commands to the MFC. The MFC acts like a DMA engine and
handles communication between the local SPE core and other cores, main memory, and the
I/O controller. The use of DMA allows for eﬃcient use of memory bandwidth and enables
overlapping of computation and communication.
Figure 3 shows the block diagram of an SPE. Each SPU has a large 128-entry, 128-bit-
Fig.3. SPE Block Diagram
wide register ﬁle. The ﬂat architecture (all operand types stored in a single register ﬁle)
of the register ﬁle allows for instruction latency hiding without speculation [1]. The SPUThe Billion-Mulmod-Per-Second PC
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has two in-order issued pipelines, called the even and odd pipelines, which can issue and
complete up to two instructions per cycle. The two pipelines handle diﬀerent instruction
types, as shown in Figure 3. Roughly, value computation will use the even pipeline while
access to local store (including address calculation) will use the odd pipeline. The arithmetic
logical units (ALUs) in the SPU are also designed to support 128-bit-wide SIMD operations,
which can process up to eight short integer operations, four single-precision ﬂoating-point
operations, or two double-precision ﬂoating-point operations concurrently every cycle.
In 2008, IBM introduced a new variant of the Cell processors, called the PowerXCell 8i.
Compared with the previous Cell processors, PowerXCell 8i supports fully-pipelined double-
precision ﬂoating-point operations. The double-precision peak throughput of a PowerXCell
8i processor is 102 GFLOPS using 8 SPEs, as opposed to 14 GFLOPS with the previous
Cell processor. The Roadrunner, currently #1 on the list of Top 500 supercomputers [2],
consists of 12960 PowerXCell 8i processors and oﬀers a peak performance of more than
1700000 GFLOPS.
There has been a small amount of previous work in optimizing cryptographic algorithms
on the Cell processor. Costigan and Scott published their experience porting SSL to the
Cell processor [12]. They use multi-precision math library provided by IBM Cell’s SDK on
the SPE to implement the kernel operations in SSL, whereas we implement our own multi-
precision arithmetic without using IBM’s library. Recently, Costigan and Schwabe reported
a fast implementation of elliptic curve cryptography based on Curve25519 for the Cell [13].
This curve is deﬁned modulo 2255 −19 to allow extremely fast reduction. We handle general
moduli as required for ECM.
3 Implementation
3.1 Elliptic-curve Arithmetic
We use the windowed double-and-add algorithm to compute the scalar multiples of a point on
elliptic curves [6,7], in which a scalar multiplication is transformed into a sequence of point
doublings and additions. To avoid the expensive division operations, we use the projective
coordinates to represent the point Q = (X : Y : Z), whereas the starting point P is stored in
its aﬃne coordinates (x,y). We choose the standard Edwards coordinates and use the mixed
addition law on Edwards curves [21]. The addition law is given by
X3 = Z1(X1Y2 − Y1X2)(X1Y1 + Z2
1X2Y2)
Y3 = Z1(X1X2 + Y1Y2)(X1Y1 − Z2
1X2Y2)
Z3 = Z2
1(X1X2 + Y1Y2)(X1Y2 − Y1X2),
whereas the doubling law is given by
X3 = ((X1 + Y1)2 − (X2
1 + Y 2
1 ))((X2
1 + Y 2
1 ) − 2Z2
1)
Y3 = (X2
1 + Y 2
1 )(X2
1 − Y 2
1 )
Z3 = (X2
1 + Y 2
1 )((X2
1 + Y 2
1 ) − 2Z2
1).Bernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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Note that the extended Edwards coordinates presented by Hisil et al. [20] save 1 multiplica-
tion per addition but require extra storage and scheduling. On several platforms storage is
a concern so we did not apply those formulas.
In the windowed double-and-add algorithm, the number of doublings will be equal to the
number of bits in the scalar k, while the number of additions will depend on the window
size. With a larger window size, a smaller number of additions will be executed during the
computation of the scalar multiplication. However, this speed-up comes at a price of extra
storage space, i.e., the pre-computed points need to be stored in memory. On modern x86
CPUs, this is not a problem since the on-die caches are usually large enough to hold many
pre-computed points. On the Cell processor and GPU, the on-die fast memories are more
limited, and we need to store the pre-computed points in oﬀ-chip device memories, accessing
which involves a high latency. The Cell processor has an architectural design that helps
relieve this problem. Namely, with the help of MFC, we are able to store pre-computed
points in oﬀ-chip main memory rather than in on-die local store. Since the computation
time of a point doubling on an elliptic curve is much longer than the transmission time for
fetching the next pre-computed point to be used in the subsequent addition (if any), we can
overlap computation and communication via the well-known double-buﬀer mechanism. As
a result, our ECM implementation is able to support virtually an arbitrarily large window
size. A similar latency-hiding strategy also works on NVIDIA GPU, except that we need to
explicitly move the data, as opposed to the use of a DMA memory controller.
3.2 Modular Arithmetic
The kernel operation of ECM is multi-precision integer modular arithmetic, in which an
integer is represented using L limbs in radix 2r with each limb ranging from −2r−1 to 2r−1
and stored in a single-precision variable. The single-precision arithmetic can be carried out by
either ﬁxed-point or ﬂoating-point arithmetic, depending on which arithmetic delivers higher
throughput on the chosen hardware platform. Such a representation allows us to represent
any integer between −R/2 and R/2, where R = 2Lr.
On the x86 CPU, we take advantage of the wide arithmetic pipelines and use 64-bit integer
arithmetic aided by XMM arithmetic. On NVIDIA GPU, we use 24-bit integer arithmetic,
which in a single cycle can produce the lower 32 bits of the product of two 24-bit integers.
We also use full 32-bit addition and subtraction, whose throughput is one every cycle. On
the Cell processor, we use 16-bit integer arithmetic, which in a single cycle can produce a
32-bit product. The PowerXCell 8i processor has a better, fully-pipelined double-precision
ﬂoating-point arithmetic implementation, which we take advantage of and implement the
modular arithmetic with.
Stage-1 ECM requires additions, subtractions, and multiplications modulo N, where
N is the number to be factored. We use Montgomery’s method to avoid trial divisions in
computing modular operations [25]. In this method, addition and subtraction modulo N are
straightforward, as we can simply add and subtract, respectively, the two operands limb by
limb, followed by a carry reduction to bring each limb to its normal range of −2r−1 to 2r−1.
We note that it is fairly safe to skip a small number of carry reduction steps after an addition
or a subtraction because we have some headroom in the storage of the limbs if we do not
need to multiply the result immediately.The Billion-Mulmod-Per-Second PC
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The modular multiplication is more complicated, as it involves a multiplication step
followed by a reduction step. Textbook description says that there are more advanced al-
gorithms, e.g., the Karatsuba multiplication, that would outperform the plain schoolbook
multiplication when the number of limbs is in the range that we are interested in. However,
as the latter makes better use of the native fused multiply-and-add (MADD) instruction on
the Cell processor and GPU, it turns out to be faster in this context and hence becomes the
choice of multiplication method in our implementation. On the x86 CPU, since the number
of limbs is small, we go to schoolbook directly.
The following step is the modular reduction. Suppose that the two original operands have
L limbs with radix 2r in multiplication step. Multiplication produces a partial product C
with 2L limbs such that C =
P2L−1
i=0 ci2ri. In the multi-precision case of Montgomery multi-
plication, we will eliminate the lower half of C by adding a speciﬁc multiple of the modulus N
sequentially, i.e., making c′
0 = 0, c′
1 = 0,...,c′
L−1 = 0 so that after this elimination step, the
upper half c′
2L−12r(L−1)+c′
2L−22r(L−2)+...+c′
L will be the result of modular multiplication.
As we have mentioned in Section 3.1, some of the operands of the modular arithmetic
operations are stored in oﬀ-chip device memories on the Cell processor and GPU. To load
these operands incurs a long latency, which we hide via the well-known double-buﬀer strategy.
To support this strategy, each modular arithmetic operation is further broken down into
three sub-operations: load, execute, and store. This is similar to the design philosophy of
the Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC), in which memory latency is exposed to
the compiler designers and assembly-language programmers so that they can schedule the
instructions properly to hide memory latency via instruction-level parallelism.
One reason why we are able to achieve such a tremendous speed-up over previous results
is that we have a diﬀerent thread organization. Recall that in [6], one modular multiplication
is carried out by a group of 28 threads. This same amount of work can be done by fewer
threads; in fact, there is a natural way to divide the work equally to be done by k threads as
long as k divides the number of limbs n. It is easy to verify that in such a work decomposition,
the total number of registers required for a ﬁxed amount of computation roughly remains
constant. If one uses less threads to compute a single multiplication, then each thread will
use more resources, putting more pressure on, e.g., the fast on-die shared memory. The
other hand, each thread will do more work, and hence we will have a higher compute-to-
memory-access ratio. In [6], the authors used a design that is on one extreme of the spectrum,
namely, n threads to compute an n-limb multiplication. In this paper, we try the other end,
namely, one single thread to compute one n-limb multiplication. We are able to achieve a
much improved compute-to-memory-access ratio, as well as eliminate ineﬃciencies due to
synchronization overhead and such, resulting in a much improved performance.
3.3 Software Pipelining, Loop Unrolling, and Hyperthreading
ECM is embarrassingly parallelizable and can exploit SIMD by running many curves in
parallel. This is always achievable in practice, since trying ECM on a single curve with
a large parameter B1 is not as eﬀective as using the same amount of time to try many
curves with a smaller B1. This is also necessary for GPUs, since fewer threads would not run
faster—we would see almost the same speed with many pipeline stalls. The reason of course
is that compared to modern processors, the SPs in GPUs do very high latency operations.
However, this phenomenon is not limited to GPUs.Bernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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We know that modern CPUs often have out-of-order execution and their dispatchers look
very hard for ILP (instruction-level parallelism). But sometimes there is just not enough ILP,
and all the pipelines would be mostly full of bubbles. In our preliminary implementations we
observe some of these situations, especially in the reduction step of Montgomery modular
multiplication. For example, on an SPU of the PowerXCell 8i processor, it takes about 900
cycles to complete two Montgomery multiplications simultaneously, using two-way SIMD on
double-precision ﬂoats, of which 500 are actually wasted due to data-dependent stalls.
An analogous situation happened with an extreme case among modern CPUs, namely
the Pentium 4, which has ALU running at a clock twice as fast as the rest of the chip,
but with pipelines with 30+ stages. Even with out-of-order execution, it is extraordinarily
diﬃcult to ﬁll a pipeline that is even deeper than the GPUs today. The diﬃculty to locate
and use ILP is compounded because there are only six general-purpose registers.
Part of Intel’s solution is to make the CPU run two hardware threads. The two threads
each have their own set of architectural registers, switching whenever there is a stall. Intel
calls this form of symmetric multithreading hyperthreading. While it of course can never
get close to the 2× speedup from having another core, hyperthreading can achieve fairly
impressive gains for certain classes of code.
If there are enough spare registers, both architectural and actual, then we can apply
the following strategy to utilize these unused resources as well as the computational power
wasted by the pipeline stalls. We can run more “threads” of computation simultaneously
by interleaving instructions from several ﬂows of independent computations into one single
physical thread of instructions. By measuring the percentage of time spent in useful compu-
tation, we conclude that such a strategy of combining software pipelining and loop unrolling
(SPLU) does work well on Cells.
On x86-64 CPUs, SPLU cannot work as above since they have too few GPRs architec-
turally. However, a diﬀerent kind of SPLU is possible in the following sense: Modern x86-64
CPUs have multiple independent pipelines that execute multiple instructions in parallel.
Their combined throughput is additive if there is no contention to shared resources such as
arithmetic circuitry or external memory. When mixed properly, a sequence of instructions
containing a stream of 64-bit integer multiplications (using MUL and GPRs) and another
stream of 32-bit SIMD integer multiplications (using PMULUDQ and XMM registers) can theo-
retically achieve a throughput close to those combined from two threads executed separately
on the latest AMD Phenom IIs. This we call heterogenous software multi-threading.
In practice, we are able to speed up our AMD code by 20%+. This agrees with conven-
tional wisdom that the two types of multiplications share no circuitry on an AMD CPU.
Unfortunately this is not the case with Intel CPUs, and the throughput of the combined
instruction stream is much lower than the sum of the throughputs had we executed two
individual streams. However, our heterogeneous software hyperthreaded ECM code used for
the C2+ still gained more than native hyperthreading when we ran it on the Ci7.
4 Experimental Results
We measure the performance of our implementations of stage-1 ECM for B1 = 8192 on
various hardware platforms and present the experimental results in this section. We have
three diﬀerent families of hardware platforms: GPU, x86 CPU, and Cell. For GPU, weThe Billion-Mulmod-Per-Second PC
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perform our experiments on NVIDIA GTX 295. For x86 CPU, we have AMD Phenom II
940 at 3 GHz (K10+) and Intel Core 2 Quad Q9550 at 2.83 GHz (C2+). For Cell, we
have Sony PlayStation 3 (PS3) and IBM BladeCenter QS22, and only the latter supports
high-throughput double-precision ﬂoating-point arithmetic.
The performance of our latest implementations of stage-1 ECM for these hardware plat-
forms is summarized in Figure 4 and Table 1. We note that in Table 1, since diﬀerent
Eurocrypt 2009
QS22
PS3
C2+
K10+
GTX 295
Number of bits in the modulus
E
C
M
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
p
u
t
(
c
u
r
v
e
s
/
s
e
c
o
n
d
)
100 400 300 200 100
10000
1000
100
Fig.4. Performance comparison of stage-1 ECM on various hardware platforms
implementations may use diﬀerent bit lengths, we scale the results to 192 bits in order to
compare their performance. As a rule of thumb, since the bottleneck of the computation is
the (schoolbook) multi-precision integer multiplication, whose complexity grows quadrati-
cally as the number of bits in the multiplicand, we use the square of the length of the moduli
in bits to scale the results. For example, the result of a 280-bit ECM would be scaled by
2802/1922, or roughly a factor of two. Such a scaling ignores factors such as pressure on
on-die memories, which can be signiﬁcant for GPU implementations. As we can see from
Figure 4, there are two dips on the GPU curve when we go above 210 bits and 299 bits.
These are precisely when we have to reduce the number of thread blocks because we do not
have enough fast memories to support as many thread blocks. As a result, the exponent
of the linear regression line for GPU result on logarithmic scale is −2.46, showing that the
performance actually drops faster than quadratically as we increase the number of bits in
the modulus.
It is clear that from Figure 4, the GPUs have the best performance across all modulus
lengths. The runner-up is AMD’s K10+, whose price-performance ratio is also very compet-Bernstein, Chen, Chen, Cheng, Hsiao, Lange, Lin, Yang
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Table 1. Performance results of stage-1 ECM on selected hardware platforms.
GTX 295 K10+ C2+ QS22 PS3 GTX 295 [6]
#cores 480 4 4 16 6 480
clock (MHz) 1242 3000 2830 3200 3200 1242
price (USD) 500 190 270
$
$
$ 413 500
TDP (watts) 295 125 95 200 <100 295
GFLOPS 1192 6+24 3+23 204 154 1192
#threads 46080 48+16 48+16 160 6
#bits in moduli 210 192 192 192 195 280
#limbs 15 3+7 3+7 8 15 28
window size (bits) u6 u6 u6 s5 s5 s4
mulmods (10
6/sec) 481 202 114 334 102 42
curves (1/sec) 4928 1881 1110 3120 1010 401
curves (1/sec, scaled) 5895 1881 1110 3120 1042 853
itive. Since the CPU results are obtained via SPLU, we list two numbers for GFLOPS and
#threads, one for 64-bit integer (left) and the other for SIMD units (right). We note that
such GFLOPS rating can be misleading since diﬀerent platforms have diﬀerent arithmetic
pipeline widths, and the wider the pipeline is, the more useful a “FLOP” is, which is evident
from the numbers of GPU vs. CPU as well as QS22 vs. PS3.
It is important to note that this gain in computational power does not come at a price
of power consumption. The billion-mulmod PC that we recommend can be run on a 850W
power supply, whereas we measured from the outlet a K10+ (Phenom II 940) running our
code and got 170W. Since our box is more than ﬁve times as fast as the K10+, the billion-
mulmod-per-second PC is more eﬃcient per watt.
We show the eﬀect of heterogeneous software hyperthreading on x86 CPUs in Figure 5,
using 192-bit mulmods on AMD K10+ as an example. In Figure 5, each point represents a
way to mix the XMM and integer instructions. We see that some ways of mixing actually
result in worse performance than time sharing between XMM and integer units, although
most combinations yield some improvements.
The Cell processor is also quite competitive in terms of price-performance ratio, as its
price in Table 1 is that of a whole machine, unlike the other platforms for which only the
component prices are listed. This is largely due to the fact that Sony is currently subsidizing
its PS3 sales, making PS3 an attractive platform for ECM.
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Virtex-6 and Spartan-6, plus a Look into the Future
Peter Alfke
Xilinx, USA
Recently, Xilinx introduced two new FPGA families, Virtex-6 and Spartan-6, closely related in
architecture, but each optimized for diﬀerent markets and applications: Virtex-6 for high perfor-
mance, features and capacity; Spartan-6 for low cost and low power consumption. Both families
take advantage of 40/45 nm technology, and both are derived from the successful Virtex-5 archi-
tecture. I will give an overview of the salient features and capabilities of both families. Then I
will give a peek into the future, explaining the impact of rapidly rising development costs for all
future technology nodes. That limits ASICs and ASSPs to serve only high-volume opportunities,
but oﬀers unique advantages for FPGAs. But we need to overcome certain technical obstacles and
streamline the user’s design process.147 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
Eﬃcient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube
Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128
Jean-Philippe Aumasson1,∗, Itai Dinur2, Luca Henzen3, Willi Meier1,†, and Adi Shamir2
1 FHNW, Windisch, Switzerland
2 Weizmann Institute, Rehovot, Israel
3 ETH Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract. Cube testers are a generic class of methods for building distinguishers, based on cube attacks
and on algebraic property-testers. In this paper, we report on an eﬃcient FPGA implementation of
cube testers on the stream cipher Grain-128. Our best result (a distinguisher on Grain-128 reduced to
237 rounds, out of 256) was achieved after a computation involving 2
54 clockings of Grain-128, with a
256×32 parallelization. An extrapolation of our results with standard methods suggests the possibility
of a distinguishing attack on the full Grain-128 in time 2
83, which is well below the 2
128 complexity
of exhaustive search. We also describe the method used for ﬁnding good cubes (a simple evolutionary
algorithm), and report preliminary results on Grain-v1 obtained with a bitsliced C implementation.
For instance, running a 30-dimensional cube tester on Grain-128 takes 10 seconds with our FPGA
machine, against about 45 minutes with our bitsliced C implementation, and more than a day with a
straightforward C implementation.
1 Introduction
The stream cipher Grain-128 was proposed by Hell, Johansson, Maximov, and Meier [16] as a variant of
Grain-v1 [17,18], to accept keys of up to 128 bits, instead of up to 80 bits. Grain-v1 has been selected in the
eSTREAM portfolio4 of promising stream ciphers for hardware, and Grain-128 was expected to retain the
merits of Grain-v1.
Grain-128 takes as input a 128-bit key and a 96-bit IV, and it produces a keystream after 256 rounds
of initialization. Each round corresponds to clocking two feedback registers (a linear one, and a nonlinear
one). Several attacks on Grain-128 were reported: [22] claims to detect nonrandomness on up to 313 rounds,
but these results were not documented, and not conﬁrmed by [9], which used similar methods to ﬁnd a
distinguisher on 192 rounds. Shortcut key-recovery attacks on 180 rounds were presented in [10], while [5]
exploited a sliding property to speed up exhaustive search by a factor two. More recently, [21] presented
related-key attacks on the full Grain-128. However, the relevance of related-key attacks is disputed, and no
attack signiﬁcantly faster than bruteforce is known for Grain-128 in the standard attack model.
The generic class of methods known as cube testers [1], based on cube attacks [8] and on algebraic property-
testers, aims to detect non-randomness in cryptographic algorithms, via multiple queries with chosen values
for the IV bits (more generally, referred to as public variables). Both cube attacks and cube testers sum
the output of a cryptographic function over a subset of its inputs. Over GF(2), this summation can be
viewed as high-order diﬀerentiation with respect to the summed variables. This property was used in [20] to
suggest a general measurement for the strength of cryptographic functions of low algebraic degree. Similar
summation methods, along with more concrete cryptanalytic ideas, were later used to attack several stream
ciphers. For example, Englund, Johansson, and Turan [9] presented a framework to detect non-randomness
in stream ciphers, and in [23] Vielhaber developed a key-recovery attack (called AIDA) on reduced versions
of Trivium [6]—another cipher in the eSTREAM portfolio. More recently, generalizations of these attacks
were proposed: Cube attacks generalize AIDA as a key-recovery attack on a large variety of cryptographic
∗Supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project no. 113329.
†Supported by GEBERT R¨ UF STIFTUNG, project no. GRS-069/07.
4See http://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream.Aumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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schemes. Cube testers use similar techniques to those used in [9], but are more general. Cube testers were
previously applied to Trivium [1], and seem relevant to attack Grain-128, since it also builds on low-degree
and sparse algebraic equations.
This paper presents an FPGA implementation of cube testers on Grain-128. We ran 256 instances of
Grain-128 in parallel, each instance being itself parallelized by a factor 32. Our heaviest experiment involved
the computation of 254 clockings of the Grain-128 mechanism, and detected nonrandomness on up to 237
rounds (out of 256). As an aside, we describe some of the other tools we used: a bitsliced C implementation
of cube testers on Grain-128, and a simple evolutionary algorithm for searching “good cubes”.
Compared to previous works, our attacks are more robust and general. For example, [5] exploits a sliding
property that can easily be avoided, as [5, §3.4] explains: “to eliminate the self-similarity of the initialization
constant. If the last 16 bits of the LFSR would for example have been initialized with (0,...,0.1), then this
would already have signiﬁcantly reduced the probability of the sliding property.”
2 Brief Description of Grain-128
The mechanism of Grain-128 consists of a 128-bit LFSR, a 128-bit NFSR (both over GF(2)), and a Boolean
function h. The feedback polynomial of the NFSR has algebraic degree two, and h has degree three (see
Fig. 1).
Given a 128-bit key and a 96-bit IV, one initializes Grain-128 by ﬁlling the NFSR with the key, and the
LFSR with the IV padded with 1 bits. The mechanism is then clocked 256 times without producing output,
and feeding the output of h back into both registers. Details can be found in [16].
NFSR LFSR
h
g f
i
?
? - 
- 
- -
? i   
7 2 7 1
19 1 6 1
Fig.1. Schematic view of Grain-128’s keystream generation mechanism (numbers designate arities). During initial-
ization, the output bit is fed back into both registers, i.e., added to the output of f and g.
3 Cube Testers
In this section, we brieﬂy explain the principles behind cube testers, and describe the type of cube testers
used for attacking Grain-128. More details can be found in [1], and in the article introducing (key-recovery)
cube attacks [8].
An important observation regarding cube testers is that for any function f : {0,1}n  → {0,1}, the sum
(XOR) of all entries in the truth table X
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)Ecient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128
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equals the coeﬃcient of the highest degree monomial x1    xn in the algebraic normal form (ANF) of f. This
observation has been used by Englund, Johansson, and Turan [9] for building distinguishers.
For a stream cipher, one may consider as f the function mapping the key and the IV bits to the ﬁrst
bit of keystream. Obviously, evaluating f for each possible key/IV and xoring the values obtained yields the
coeﬃcient of the highest degree monomial in the implicit algebraic description of the cipher.
Instead, cube attacks work by summing f(x) over a subset of its inputs. For example, if n = 4 and
f(x) = f(x1,x2,x3,x4) = x1 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x3 ,
then summing over the four possible values of (x1,x2) yields
X
(x1,x2)∈{0,1}2
f(x1,x2,x3,x4) = 4x1 + 4x3 + (x3 + x4) ≡ x3 + x4 ,
where (x3 + x4) is the factor of x1x2 in f:
f(x1,x2,x3,x4) = x1 + x1x2(x3 + x4) + x3 .
Indeed, when x3 and x4 are ﬁxed, then the maximum degree monomial becomes x1x2 and its coeﬃcient equals
the value (x3 + x4). In the terminology of cube attacks, the polynomial (x3 + x4) is called the superpoly of
the cube x1x2. Cube attacks work by detecting linear superpolys, and then explicitly reconstructing them
via probabilistic linearity tests [3].
Now, assume that we have a function f(k0,...,k127,v0,...,v95) that, given a key k and an IV v, returns
the ﬁrst keystream bit produced by Grain-128. For a ﬁxed key k0,...,k127, the sum
X
(v0,...,v95)∈{0,1}96
f(k0,...,k127,v0,v95)
gives the evaluation of the superpoly of the cube v0v1    v95. More generally, one can ﬁx some IV bits, and
evaluate the superpoly of the cube formed by the other IV bits (then called the cube variables, or CV).
Ideally, for a random key, this superpoly should be a uniformly distributed random polynomial. However,
when the cipher is constructed with components of low degree, and sparse algebraically, this polynomial is
likely to have some property which is eﬃciently detectable. More details about cube attacks and cube testers
can be found in [1,8].
In our tests below, we measure the balance of the superpoly, over 64 instances with distinct random keys.
4 Software Implementation
Since we need to run many independent instances of Grain-128 that operate on bits (rather than bytes or
words), a bitsliced implementation in software is a natural choice. This technique was originally presented
by Biham [2], and can speed up the preprocessing phase of cube attacks (and cube testers) as suggested by
Crowley in [7].
To test small cubes, and to perform the search described in §6, we used a bitsliced implementation of
Grain-128 that runs 64 instances of Grain-128 in parallel, each with (potentially) diﬀerent keys and diﬀerent
IV’s. We stored the internal states of the 64 instances in two arrays of 128 words of 64 bits, where each bit
slice corresponds to an instance of Grain-128, and the i-th word of each array contains the i-th bit in the
LFSR (or NFSR) of each instance.
Our bitsliced implementation provides a considerable speedup, compared to the reference implementation
of Grain-128. For example, on a PC with an Intel Core 2 Duo processor, evaluating the superpoly of a cube
of dimension 30 for 64 distinct instances of Grain-128 with a bitsliced implementation takes approximately
45 minutes, against more than a day with the designers’ C implementation. Appendix A gives our C code.Aumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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5 Hardware Implementation
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA’s) are reconﬁgurable hardware devices widely used in the implemen-
tation of cryptographic systems for high-speed or area-constrained applications. The possibility to reprogram
the designed core makes FPGA’s an attractive evaluation platform to test the hardware performances of
selected algorithms. During the eSTREAM competition, many of the candidate stream ciphers were imple-
mented and evaluated, on various FPGA’s [4,11,13]. Especially for Proﬁle1 (HW), the FPGA performance
in terms of speed, area, and ﬂexibility was a crucial criterion to identify the most eﬃcient candidates.
To attack Grain-128, we used a Xilinx Virtex-5 LX330 FPGA to run the ﬁrst reported implementation
of cube testers in hardware. This FPGA oﬀers a large number of embedded programmable logic blocks,
memories and clock managers, and is an excellent platform for large scale parallel computations.
Note that FPGA’s have already been used for cryptanalytic purposes, most remarkably with COPA-
COBANA [15,19], a machine with 120 FPGA’s that can be programmed for exhaustive search of small keys,
or for parallel computation of discrete logarithms.
5.1 Implementation of Grain-128
The Grain ciphers (Grain-128 and Grain-v1) are particularly suitable for resource-limited hardware envi-
ronments. Low-area implementations of Grain-v1 are indeed able to ﬁll just a few slices in various types of
FPGA’s [14]. Using only shift registers combined with XOR and AND gates, the simplicity of the Grain’s
construction could also be easily translated into high-speed architectures. Throughput and circuit’s eﬃciency
(area/speed ratio) are indeed the two main characteristics that have been used as guidelines to design our
Grain-128 module for the Virtex-5 chip. The relatively small degree of optimization for Grain allows the
choice of diﬀerent datapath widths, resulting in the possibility of a speedup by a factor 32 (see [16]).
We selected a 32-bit datapath to get the fastest and most eﬃcient design in terms of area and speed.
Fig. 2 depicts our module, where both sides of the diagram contain four 32-bit register blocks. During the
setup cycle, the key and the IV are stored inside these memory blocks. In normal functioning, they behave
like shift register units, i.e., at each clock cycle the 32-bit vectors stored in the lower blocks are sent to the
upper blocks. For the two lowest register blocks (indices between 96 and 127), the input vectors are generated
by speciﬁc functions, according to the algorithm deﬁnition. The g′ module executes the same computations
of the function g plus the addition of the smallest index coming from the LFSR, while the output bits
are entirely computed inside the h′ module. Table 1 summarizes the overall structure of our 32×Grain-128
architecture.
Table 1. Performance results of our Grain-128 implementation.
Frequency Throughput Size Available area
[MHz] [Mbps] [Slices] [Slices]
Grain-128 module 200 6,400 180 51,840
5.2 Implementation of Cube Testers
Besides the intrinsic speed improvement from software to hardware implementations of Grain-128, the main
beneﬁt resides in the possibility to parallelize the computations of the IV queries necessary for the cube
tester. With 2m instances of Grain-128 in parallel, running a cube tester with a (n + m)-dimensional cube
will be as fast as with an n-dimensional cube on a single instance.
In addition to the array of Grain-128 modules, we designed three other components: the ﬁrst provides the
pseudorandom key and the 2n IV’s for each instance, the second collects and sums the outputs, and the last
component is a controller unit. Fig. 3 illustrates the architecture of our cube tester implementation ﬁtted inEcient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128
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1,1,...,1
Fig.2. Overview of our Grain-128 architecture. At the beginning of the simulation, the key and the IV are directly
stored in the NFSR and LFSR register blocks. All connections are 32-bit wide.
a Virtex-5 chip. No special macro blocks has been used, we just tried to exploit all the available space to ﬁt
the largest Grain-128 array. Below we describe the mode of operation of each component:
• Simulation controller: This unit manages the IO interface to control the cube tester core. Through
the signal s inst, a new instance is started. After the complete evaluation of the cube over the Grain-
128 array, the u inst signal is asserted and later a new instantiation with a diﬀerent key is started.
This operation mode works diﬀerently from the software implementation, where the 256 instances
run in parallel.
• Input generator: After each run of the cipher array, the (n-m)-bit partial IV is incremented by
one. This vector is then combined with diﬀerent m-bit oﬀset vectors to generate the 2m IVs. The
key distribution is also managed here. A single key is given to the parallel Grain-128 modules and is
updated only when the partial IV is equal to zero.
• Output collector: The outcoming 32-bit vectors from the parallel Grain-128 modules are xored, and
the result is xored again with the intermediate results of the previous runs. The updated intermediate
results are then stored until the u inst signal is asserted. This causes a reset of the 32-bit intermediate
vector and an update of an internal counter.
The m-bit binary representations of the numbers in 0,...,2m − 1 are stored in oﬀset vectors. These
vectors are given to the Grain-128 modules as the last cube bits inside the IV. The correct allocation of the
CV bits inside the IV is performed by the CV routers. These blocks take the partial IV and the oﬀset vectors
to form a 96-bit IV, where the remaining bits are set to zero. When the cube is updated, the oﬀset bits are
reallocated, varying the composition of the IV’s.
In the input generator, the key is also provided by a LSFR with (primitive) feedback polynomial x128 +
x29 + x27 + x2 + 1. This guarantees a period of 2128 − 1, thus ensuring that no key is repeated.
The evaluation of the superpoly for all 256 instances with diﬀerent pseudorandom keys is performed inside
the output collection module. After the 2n−m queries, the intermediate vector contains the ﬁnal evaluation
of the superpoly for a single instance. The implementation of a modiﬁed Grain-128 architecture with ×32
speedup allows us to evaluate the same cube for 32 subsequent rounds. That is, after the exhaustive simulation
of all possible values of the superpoly, we get the results for the same simulation done with an increasingAumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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Fig.3. Architecture of the FPGA cube module. The width of all signals is written out, except for the control signals
in grey.
number of initialization rounds r, 32i ≤ r < 32(i + 1) and i ∈ [1,7]. This is particularly useful to test the
maximal number of rounds attackable with a speciﬁc cube (we don’t have to run the same initialization
rounds 32 times to test 32 distinct round numbers).
Finally, 32 dedicated counters are incremented if the values of the according bit inside the intermediate
result vector is zero or one, respectively. At the end of the repetitions, the counters indicate the proportion
between zeros and ones for 32 diﬀerent values of increasing rounds. This proportion vector can be constantly
monitored using an IO logic analyzer.
Since the required size of a single Grain-128 core is 180slices, up to 256 parallel ciphers can be implemented
inside a Virtex-5 LX330 chip (cf. Table 1). This gives m = 8, hence decreasing the number of queries to
2n−8. Table 2 presents the evaluation time for cubes up to dimension 50. The critical path has been kept
inside the Grain-128 modules, so the working frequency of the cube machine is 200MHz.
Estimate for an ASIC Implementation The utilization of an application-speciﬁc integrated circuit
(ASIC) is a further solution to enhance the performances of cube testers on Grain-128. Like in the FPGA,
several parallel cipher modules should run at the same time, decreasing the evaluation period of a cube. Using
the ASIC results presented in [11,14], we could estimate a speed increase up to 400MHz for a 90nm CMOS
technology. Evaluating a related area cost of about 10kGE for a single Grain-128 module (broad estimate),
we could take into account a single chip design of 4mm×4mm size, hosting the same number of Grain-128
elements of 256. This leads to a similar ASIC cube tester implementation, which is able to compute a cubeEcient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128
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Table 2. FPGA evaluation time for cubes of diﬀerent dimension with 2
m = 2
8 parallel Grain-128 modules. Note
that detecting nonrandomness requires the calculation of statistics on several trials, e.g., our experiments involved
64 trials with a 40-bit cube.
Cube dimension 30 35 37 40 44 46 50
Nb. of queries 2
22 2
27 2
29 2
32 2
36 2
38 2
42
Time 0.17sec 5.4sec 21sec 3min 45min 3h 2days
in half the time of the FPGA. However, in this rough estimate we omitted several problematics related to
ASIC design, like the expensive fabrication costs or the development of an interface to communicate the
cube indices inside the chip.
6 Search for Good Cubes
To search for cubes that maximize the number of rounds after which the superpoly is still not balanced,
we programmed a simple evolutionary algorithm (EA). Metaheuristic optimization methods like EA’s seem
relevant for searching good cubes, since they are generic, highly parametrizable, and are often the best choice
when the topology of the search space is unknown. In short, EA’s aim to maximize a ﬁtness function, by
updating a set of points in the search space according to some evolutionary operators, the goal being to
converge towards a (local) optimum in the search space.
We implemented in C a simple EA that adapts the evolutionary notions of selection, reproduction, and
mutation to cubes, which are then seen as individuals of a population. Our EA returns a set of cubes, and
is parametrized by
• σ, the cube dimension, in bits.
• µ, the maximal number of mutations.
• π, the (constant) population size.
• χ, the number of individuals in the oﬀspring.
• γ, the number of generations.
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudocode of our EA, where lines 3 to 5 correspond to the reproduction, lines 6 and 7
correspond to the mutation, while lines 8 and 9 correspond to the selection.
Algorithm 1 uses as ﬁtness function a procedure that returns the highest number of rounds for which
it yields a constant superpoly. We chose to evaluate the constantness rather than the balance because it
reduces the number of parameters, thus simplifying the conﬁguration of the search.
Algorithm 1 Evolutionary algorithm for searching good cubes.
1. initialize a population of π random σ-bit cubes
2. repeat γ times
3. repeat χ times
4. pick two random cubes 1 and 2 in the population of π cubes
5. create a new cube with each index chosen randomly from 1 or 2
6. choose a random number i in {1,...,µ}
7. choose i random indices in the new cube, replace them by random indices
8. evaluate the ﬁtness of the population and of the oﬀspring
9. replace population by the π best-ranking individuals
10. return the π cubes in the population
In practice, we optimized Algorithm 1 with ad hoc tweaks, like initializing cubes with particular “weak”
indices, e.g., 33, 66, and 68; we indeed observed that these indices appeared frequently in the cubes found byAumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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a vanilla version of our EA, which suggests that the distribution of monomials containing the corresponding
bits tends to be lesser than that of random monomials. We later initialized the population by forcing the use
of alleged weak indices in certain individuals, and experimental results did not contradict our conjecture.
Note that EA’s can be signiﬁcantly more complex, notably by using more complicated selection and
mutation rules (see [12] for an overview of the topic).
The choice of parameters depends on the cube dimension considered. In our algorithm, the quality of the
ﬁnal result is determined by the population size, the oﬀspring size, the number of generations, and the type
of mutation. In particular, increasing the number of mutations favors the exploration of the search space,
but too much mutation slows down the convergence to a local optimum. The population size, oﬀspring size,
and number of generations are always better when higher, but too large values make the search too slow.
For example, we could ﬁnd our best 6-dimensional cubes (σ = 6) by setting µ = 3, π = 40, χ = 80, and
γ = 100. The search then takes a few minutes. Slower searches did not give signiﬁcantly better results.
7 Experimental Results
Table 3 summarizes the maximum number of initialization rounds after which we could detect imbalance
in the superpoly corresponding to the ﬁrst keystream bit. It follows that one can mount a distinguisher for
195-round Grain-128 in time 210, and for 237-round Grain-128 in time 240. The cubes used are given in
Appendix B.
Table 3. Best results for various cube dimensions on Grain-128.
Cube dimension 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 37 40
Rounds 180 195 203 208 215 222 227 233 237
8 Discussion
8.1 Extrapolation
We used standard methods to extrapolate our results, using the generalized linear model ﬁtting of the
Matlab tool. We selected the Poisson regression in the ”log” value, i.e. logarithm as canonical function and
the Poisson distribution, since the achieved results suggested a logarithmic behavior between cube size and
number of round. The obtained extrapolation, depicted on Fig. 4, suggests that cubes of dimension 77 may
be suﬃcient to construct successful cube testers on the full Grain-128, i.e., with 256 initialization rounds.
If this extrapolation is correct, then a cube tester making 64×277 = 283 chosen-IV queries can distinguish
the full Grain-128 from an ideal stream cipher, against 2128 ideally. We add the factor 64 because our
extrapolation is done with respect to results obtained with statistic over 64 random keys. That complexity
excludes the precomputation required for ﬁnding a good cube; based on our experiments with 40-dimensional
cubes, less than 25 trials would be suﬃcient to ﬁnd a good cube (based on the ﬁnding of good small cubes,
e.g., using our evolutionary algorithm). That is, precomputation would be less than 288 initializations of
Grain-128.
8.2 The Possibility of Key-Recovery Attacks
To apply key-recovery cube attacks on Grain-128, one must ﬁnd IV terms with a linear superpoly in the
key bits (or maxterms). In general, it is more diﬃcult to ﬁnd maxterms than terms with a biased superpoly,
since one searches for a very speciﬁc structure in the superpoly. Moreover, the internal structure of Grain-128
seems to make the search for maxterms particularly diﬃcult for reduced variants of the cipher: Initially, theEcient FPGA Implementations of High-Dimensional Cube Testers on the Stream Cipher Grain-128
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Fig.4. Extrapolation of our cube testers on Grain-128, obtained by general linear regression using the Matlab
software, in the “poisson-log” model. The required dimension for the full Grain-128 version is 77 (see zoom on the
right).
key and IV are placed in diﬀerent registers, and the key bits mix together extensively and non-linearly before
mixing with the IV bits. Thus, the output bit polynomials of Grain-128 in the key and IV variables contain
very few IV terms whose superpoly is linear in the key bits. A natural way to deal with these polynomials
is to apply linearization by replacing non-linear products of key bits with new variables. The linearization
techniques are more complicated than the basic cube attack techniques and thus we leave key-recovery
attacks on Grain-128 as future work.
8.3 Observations on Grain-v1
Grain-v1 is the predecessor of Grain-128. Its structure is similar to that of Grain-128, but the registers are
80-bit instead of 128-bit, the keys are 80-bit, the IV’s are 64-bit, and the initialization clocks the mechanism
160 times (see Appendix C).
The feedback polynomial of Grain-v1’s NFSR has degree six, instead of two for Grain-128, and is also less
sparse. The ﬁlter function h has degree three for both versions of Grain, but that of Grain-v1 is denser than
that of Grain-128. These observations suggest that Grain-v1 may have a better resistance than Grain-128 to
cube testers, because its algebraic degree and density are likely to converge much faster towards ideal ones.
To support the above hypothesis, we used a bitsliced implementation of Grain-v1 to search for good
cubes with the EA presented in §6, and we ran cube testers (still in software) similar to those on Grain-128.
Table 4 summarizes our results, showing that one can mount a distinguisher on Grain-v1 with 81 rounds
of initialization in 224. However, even an optimistic (for the attacker) extrapolation of these observations
suggests that the full version of Grain-v1 resists cube testers, and the basic cube attack techniques.
Table 4. Best results for various cube dimensions on Grain-v1.
Cube dimension 6 10 14 20 24
Rounds 64 70 73 79 81Aumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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9 Conclusion
We developed and implemented a hardware cryptanalytical device for attacking the stream cipher Grain-128
with cube testers (which give distinguishers rather than key recovery). We were able to run our tests on
256 instances of Grain-128 in parallel, each instance being itself parallelized by a factor 32. The heaviest
experiment run involved about 254 clockings of the Grain-128 mechanism.
To ﬁnd good parameters for our experiments in hardware, we ﬁrst ran light experiments in software with
a dedicated bitsliced implementation of Grain-128, using a simple evolutionary algorithm. We were then able
to attack reduced versions of Grain with up to 237 rounds. An extrapolation of our results suggests that the
full Grain-128 can be attacked in time 283 instead of 2128 ideally. Therefore, Grain-128 may not provide full
protection when 128-bit security is required.
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A Bitsliced Implementation of Grain-128
We present the C code of a function that, given 64 keys and 64 IV’s (already bitsliced), returns the ﬁrst
keystream bit produced by Grain-128 with rounds initialization rounds.
typedef unsigned long long u64;
u64 grain128 bitsliced64( u64 * key, u64 * iv, int rounds ) {
u64 l[128+rounds], n[128+rounds], z=0;
int i,j;
for(i=0; i<96; i++){
n[i]= key[i];
l[i]= iv[i];
}
for(i=96; i<128; i++){
n[i]= key[i];
l[i]= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL;
}
for(i=0; i<rounds; i++){
l[i+128] = l[i] ˆ l[i+7] ˆ l[i+38] ˆ l[i+70] ˆ l[i+81] ˆ l[i+96];
n[i+128] = l[i] ˆ n[i] ˆ n[i+26] ˆ n[i+56] ˆ n[i+91] ˆ n[i+96] ˆ
(n[i+ 3] & n[i+67]) ˆ (n[i+11] & n[i+13]) ˆ (n[i+17] & n[i+18]) ˆ
(n[i+27] & n[i+59]) ˆ (n[i+40] & n[i+48]) ˆ (n[i+61] & n[i+65]) ˆ
(n[i+68] & n[i+84]);
z = (n[i+12] & l[i+8]) ˆ (l[i+13] & l[i+20]) ˆ
(n[i+95] & l[i+42]) ˆ (l[i+60] & l[i+79]) ˆ
(n[i+12] & n[i+95] & l[i+95]);
z = n[i + 2] ˆ n[i + 15] ˆ n[i + 36] ˆ n[i + 45] ˆ n[i + 64] ˆ
n[i + 73] ˆ n[i + 89] ˆ z ˆ l[i + 93];
l[i+128] ˆ = z;
n[i+128] ˆ = z;
}
z = (n[i+12] & l[i+8]) ˆ (l[i+13] & l[i+20]) ˆ
(n[i+95] & l[i+42]) ˆ (l[i+60] & l[i+79]) ˆ
(n[i+12] & n[i+95] & l[i+95]);
z = n[i + 2] ˆ n[i + 15] ˆ n[i + 36] ˆ n[i + 45] ˆ n[i + 64] ˆ
n[i + 73] ˆ n[i + 89] ˆ z ˆ l[i + 93];
return z;
}Aumasson, Dinur, Henzen, Meier, Shamir
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B Cubes for Grain-128
Table 5 gives the indices of the cubes used for ﬁnding the results in Table 3.
Table 5. Cubes used for Grain-128.
Cube dimension Indices
6 33, 36, 61, 64, 67, 69
10 5, 28, 34, 36, 37, 66, 68, 71, 74, 79
14 5, 28, 34, 36, 37, 51, 53, 54, 56, 63, 66, 68, 71, 74
18 5, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71,
73, 74
22 4, 5, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 51, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68,
69, 71, 73, 74, 79, 89
26 4, 7, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 51, 53, 54,
56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
30 4, 7, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 51, 53, 54,
56, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 79, 80, 83, 86
37 4, 7, 12, 14, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 51,
53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 75, 76, 77,
78, 79, 89, 90, 91
40 4, 7, 12, 14, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, 41, 51,
53, 54, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 75, 76, 77,
78, 79, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91
C Grain-v1
Fig. 5 presents the structure of Grain-v1.
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Fig.5. Schematic view of Grain-v1’s keystream generation mechanism (numbers designate arities). During initializa-
tion, the output bit is fed back into both registers, i.e., added to the output of f and g.159 SHARCS '09 Workshop Record
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Abstract. Many real-world car door systems and garage openers are
based on the KeeLoq cipher. Recently, the block cipher has been exten-
sively studied. Several attacks have been published, including a complete
break of a KeeLoq access control system. It is possible to instantly over-
ride the security of all KeeLoq code-hopping schemes in which the secret
key of a remote-control is derived from its serial number. The latter can
be intercepted from the communication between a receiver and a trans-
mitter. In contrast, if a random SEED is used for the key derivation, the
cryptanalysis demands for higher computation power and may become
infeasible with a standard PC.
In this paper we develop a hardware architecture for the cryptanalysis of
KeeLoq. Our brute-force attack, implemented on the Cost-Optimized
Parallel Code-Breaker COPACOBANA, is able to reveal the secret key of
a remote control in less than 0.5 seconds if a 32-bit seed is used and in less
than 6 hours in case of a 48-bit seed. To obtain reasonable cryptographic
strength against this type of attack, a 60-bit seed has to be used, for
which COPACOBANA needs in the worst case about 1011 days for the
key recovery. However, the attack is arbitrarily parallelizable and could
thus be run on multiple COPACOBANAs to decrease the attack time.
Keywords: KeeLoq, COPACOBANA, cryptanalysis
1 Introduction
Electronic car or garage opening systems consist of remote controls,
which replace traditional keys, and receivers which control the door.Novotn y, Kasper
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Fig.1: KeeLoq encryption.
On having its button pressed a remote sends a hopping code to the
receiver to open or close the door. A hopping code is generated by
a KeeLoq encryption incorporating a 16-bit counter value, a 12-bit
discrimination value and a 4-bit function value, as shown in Figure 1.
While the counter is incremented in the remote each time a hopping
code is generated, the discrimination and function values remain
constant.
To obtain the device key on the side of the receiver, the serial
number of the remote is either decrypted with a manufacturer key or
xored with the manufacturer key, as shown in Figure 2 and in Fig-
ure 3a. Alternatively, a randomly generated seed value may by com-
bined with the serial number for the key derivation. For the latter,
Microchip proposes three scenarios: a) 28 bits of the serial number
(N) are combined with 32 bits of the random seed (S) according to
the pattern 0x0NNNNNNNSSSSSSSS (Scenario 2 in Figure 3b), b)
12 bits of the serial number are combined with 48 bits of the seed in
the pattern 0x0NNNSSSSSSSSSSSS (Scenario 3 in Figure 3c), c) 60
bits of the seed in the pattern 0x0SSSSSSSSSSSSSSS (Scenario 4 in
Figure 3d).
Since the KeeLoq cipher has been extensively studied [1], [2],
[3], several diﬀerent types of attack have been proposed. The attack
described in [3] reveals the manufacturer key by means of power
analysis. As the manufacturer key is shared by all devices of the same
producer and since many commercial products derive the device keys
from their serial numbers only (without using a seed), breaking theCryptanalysis of KeeLoq with COPACOBANA
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Fig.2: Device key generation.
system is straightforward — the serial number is intercepted from
the communication between the remote and the receiver, and the
secret key of the remote is derived (Scenario 1 in Figure 3a).
The goal of this work is ﬁnding the correct Device Key when
random seed is used for device key generation (Scenarios 2 through
4 in Figure 3). As illustrated in Figure 2, the 32 most signiﬁcant
bits (MSB) of the device key are derived from the higher 32 bits of
the input value, while the lower 32 bits are generated from the lower
32 bits of the input. If a random seed is used, lower 32 bits of the
device key are always random, while upper 32 bits may have either
a ﬁxed value (Scenario 2), or one of 216 potential values (Scenario
3), or one of 228 potential values (Scenario 4). Consequently, when
implementing a brute-force attack, each combination of 32 MSBs of
the device key may be precomputed in software and then combined
with all 232 combinations of 32 LSBs (generated in hardware by a
counter), until the correct value of the device key is found.
2 KeeLoq Breaker
To break the cipher we need to intercept two hopping codes of the
same device, generated from the same device key. Such hopping codes
are generated from identical discrimination and function values, but
from diﬀerent counter values (see Figure 1). However, the diﬀerenceNovotn y, Kasper
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Fig.3: Scenarios for device key generation.
between the counter values will be small, if the two consecutive (or
almost consecutive) hopping codes are intercepted.
We implemented a brute-force attack on KeeLoq on the parallel
computation cluster COPACOBANA [4]. This cluster has been de-
signed to support cryptanalytical calculations. The cluster is equipped
with 120 low-cost Xilinx Spartan3-1000 FPGAs, which communicate
with the host computer via the controller board. Note, that it is pos-
sible to employ several COPACOBANAs in order to further increase
the performance.
The diagram of the circuit implemented in each FPGA is shown
in Figure 4. A candidate for the device key is found by means ofCryptanalysis of KeeLoq with COPACOBANA
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Fig.4: KeeLoq breaker.
exhaustive key-search, if the decryptions of two intercepted hop-
ping codes reveal identical discrimination values and moderately in-
creased counter values.
The core of the implementation is a Device Key Generator con-
sisting of a 32-bit register and a 32-bit counter. The register holds 32
MSBs of the device key (being precomputed in software and assigned
by the host computer), while the counter is repeatedly increased to
generate all possible values for the lower 32 bits of the device key.
If all counter-values have been generated, and no key candidate has
been found, the FPGA is assigned with the new value of upper 32
bits of the key.
A KeeLoq decryption is executed in 132 rounds. In our op-
timized implementation we unrolled both decryption units into a
pipeline structure. Each path of the pipeline consists of 176 stages,
i.e., each stage contains 4 rounds of the cipher (the number of stages
was limited by available resources). The KeeLoq breaker occupies
6423 out of 7680 slices (83%) of the Xilinx Spartan 3-1000 FPGA.
The maximum achievable clock frequency for the COPACOBANA
was 110 MHz, i.e., each FPGA can test up to 110 million keys per
second.Novotn y, Kasper
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SEED length 1 FPGA 1 COPACOBANA 100 COPACOBANAs
(bits) (< 80 $) (< 10000 $) (< 1000000 $)
32 39 secs 0.33 secs 3.3 msecs
48 29.6 days 5.9 hours 213 secs
60 332 years 1011 days 10.1 days
Table 1: Worst case times for the brute force attack on KeeLoq
3 Results and Conclusions
When a 32-bit seed is used, up to 232 potential values of the de-
vice key need to be tested, in order to ﬁnd the correct one. This
takes 232
120×110·106 ≈ 0.33 seconds on one COPACOBANA in the worst
case. Finding the correct device key in case of a 48-bit seed takes
up to 248
120×110·106 seconds ≈ 5.9 hours on one COPACOBANA. For
the 60-bit seed we need up to 260
120×110·106 seconds ≈ 1011 days on one
COPACOBANA. The attack is arbitrarily parallelizable and could
thus be run on multiple COPACOBANAs to decrease the attack
time. Worst case times for all possible seed lengths, and 1 FPGA, 1
COPACOBANA and 100 COPACOBANAs, respectively, are sum-
marized in Table 1.
We conclude that using a 32-bit seed provides no security, since
a key can be found in real-time. While a seed with 48 bits can be
broken in less than 6 hours by one COPACOBANA, employing a
60-bit seed can provide reasonable security.
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